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Abstract 
This dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and 
physics.  I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical 
models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’.  Part I addresses the 
object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, 
encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new 
classifications.  In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass 
via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the 
distinction is more trouble than it is worth. 
Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and 
promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism.  I 
examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues 
more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ 
and ‘space material’.  I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation 
relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms.  I conclude 
that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and 
should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies.   
Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it.  I explore issues 
of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an 
extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion 
physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories.  I also 
explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches 
toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area.  I conclude with 
ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for 
future methodological partnerships. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and 
physics.  I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical 
models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’.  In this, I principally 
argue that  
1) there are far fewer intrinsic properties than classically conceived and the traditional 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is more trouble than it is worth, and should be jettisoned,  
2) current substantivalism should be put aside to develop more comprehensive 
monistic ontologies, and  
3) the formal study of ‘dimensions’ should be a key metaphysical topic.   
In this, I take science, and physics in particular, as giving our best account of the world and 
as offering models that can be valuably analysed on their own terms, with certain cautions; as 
we are now well aware, there are lots of models that make sense of the data and no way to 
wholly remove ourselves from the data recovery process.  These are insightful, and 
seemingly intractable, concerns, which will nonetheless be largely put aside here in an effort 
to let criticisms of particular hypotheses get off the ground.  With that understanding in place, 
I will help myself to many of the more perplexing physical phenomena in an effort to 
reconfigure classical models for a better understanding of this universe. 
 There is a classical and (generally) pre-theoretical way of looking at the world that 
understands it at a human scale; there are objects, like chairs and rabbits and boats, that move 
or are moved about.  We, as special observers as well as objects, create special relations 
between some of those objects—grouping them together where we find similar qualities or 
quantities (e.g. ‘plums’, ‘my possessions’, ‘London’ ‘5’), and articulating patterns for our use 
and amusement (e.g. f = ma).  We are particularly fond of some properties—like position—
and some patterning tools—like geometry and mathematics—that have made the postulation 
of first ‘space’ and now ‘spacetime’ both common and useful.  Together, objects and 
spacetime create a fundamental ontology, which we have tried to use to accommodate the 
growing list of phenomena that include things like electrons, virtual particles, fields and 
gravity, with mixed success.  To better address the discrepancies we might try to tweak the 
categories for the new phenomena to fit, or we might alter the categories altogether.  
Exploring options for the latter is a central theme to this research, guiding the rejection of the 
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intrinsic/extrinsic distinction for more useful models, the consideration of singular substance 
ontologies, and the review of the main characteristics attributed to space. 
 The following chapters pursue this in greater detail, offering something of a selection 
of case studies where metaphysics and physics can inform each other, specifically in this (and 
not any possible) world.  This is part of a larger concern that metaphysics should be working 
in concert with physics, helping to scout out options and implications not only for physics (as 
practitioners and philosophers of the subject generally do), but for ourselves and our way of 
thinking critically about the world.  In light of this, I find each of the issues raised to 
demonstrate various ways that physics points away from completely self-contained and 
separable objects interacting in a background container.  If philosophy discards its strict 
taxonomies of separate objects, we might embrace new frameworks of explanatory 
coherence, new descriptions of causation, or new (and perhaps fewer) constraints on identity. 
 The work is divided into three parts, each comprising several related chapters.  Part I 
addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical 
concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction and even to reject it 
in favour of new classifications.  I begin with a review of classical objects and a quick survey 
of some of the roles of intrinsic properties that come with that view.  The role of intrinsicality 
in picking out the fundamental, global, properties of our world is particularly compelling, and 
I use it as a guide when looking to find the best definition we should give to intrinsic 
properties.   
 I also adopt David Lewis’ account of the term as those properties independent of any 
other thing, and try to make sense of the ancillary concepts of ‘dependence’, ‘duplication’ 
and an object in a ‘contracted’ universe in chapter 2, and in particular, I take causal 
dependence to be the most useful and accessible understanding of ‘dependence’.  Chapter 3 
focuses on physical phenomena like the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field and the 
blurring in principle of object boundaries and thus their dependence relations, as indications 
of the inadequacy of intrinsicality. In chapter 4 I review options for reconceptualising the 
distinction, but conclude that 1) far fewer properties (possibly none) are intrinsic than 
classically conceived, and 2) the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction is more trouble than it is worth 
in metaphysics and should be jettisoned. 
 Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise 
substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and 
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supersubstantivalism.  In chapter 5 I briefly survey each of these theories, noting their 
strengths and weaknesses, before ending with an in-depth review of supersubstantivalism as 
the newest member of the debate and as one of the ontological theories I find preferable to 
the substantival model.  In chapter 6 I examine phenomena like field theory, spatial 
expansion, spatial vacuum and the possibility of spatial emergence to emphasise the lack of 
rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’.  I argue that these 
phenomena are suggestive of a monistic, rather than dualistic fundamental ontology with 
spatial expansion in particular raising questions for substantivalism.  In chapter 7 I challenge 
the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’; while noting the useful options for 
object models that happened to come from substantival theorising, I note that these 
possibilities are not reliant on that framework and can be pursued under monistic substance 
approaches.  I also explore the challenge of interpreting substantival mathematical models 
into physical terms, whereby we often follow formulae blindly to such an extent that we lose 
connection with physical reality.  I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and 
its substantival framework are misplaced and that the latter should be put aside in favour of 
developing monistic ontologies.   
 Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it.  In 
chapter 8 I examine the expectation that space separates objects, reviewing several key 
experiments that indicate the nonseparability of space (spatial separation does not guarantee 
causal separation) before looking at nonseparability more generally.  In chapter 9 I explore 
the distinction between ‘physically real’ and ‘abstract’ spaces, highlighting the uncertainty 
surrounding distinguishing characteristics and suggesting several.  The remaining three 
chapters focus on dimensions, with chapter 10 outlining the confusion even physicists 
express toward such a ubiquitous concept in their theories.   
 Chapter 11 explores how we use dimensions, including as a means of theory 
unification, geometrisation and a tool for ordering information.  Chapter 12 looks at reasons 
for adopting a realist or instrumentalist approach toward them, arguing that much more work 
should be focused on this area.  I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new 
metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.  
Thus, when concerned with describing this universe—as this project is—the demise of ‘the 
classical object framework’ leaves us with reasons to develop more useful distinctions than 
intrinsic/ extrinsic properties, less bloated and mysterious ontologies than that of 
substantivalism, and to actively investigate dimensionality.
10 
 
PART I: Objects in Themselves: the Demise of the Classical 
 
Perfect Euclidean solids were once thought to give the underlying form to types of matter, 
and it has only been a lineage of small variants on that theme until the last century, when 
dramatically different and untidy models were favoured. The untidiness comes in the loss of 
sharp boundaries and in the development of interconnected systems, values and operations 
that affect both our conception of an object and the way we do science.  This scientific shift 
has been slow to infiltrate philosophical discourse for both good reasons (we have learned to 
be cautious of scientific claims) and bad (we’d rather not bother), and it is the collision of this 
changing physical landscape with classical conceptions of objects that I want to examine first.  
That is, I want to see what, exactly, we can say about objects themselves, particularly as 
concerns the idea of intrinsic properties.   
 This is important in itself, but also directly relates to larger theories of ontology; some 
relationalist theories begin and end with objects while other extreme substantival theories 
dispense with them altogether.  To really make sense of these metaphysical approaches, we 
should have some account of what sort of thing an object is in itself.  By looking at modern 
physics, we can assess whether ‘object’ and ‘environment’ are robust terms in modern 
physics and, specifically, we will investigate the long-revered notion of intrinsicality that is 
both somewhat mysterious and misshapen, a quasimodo concept that promises great fruits 
which, I argue, it is incapable of delivering in our world. 
 First, I examine several of the philosophical purposes intrinsicality serves, and briefly 
review how the literature defines intrinsicality; my goal here is not to trawl through the 
Lewis-Langton/Kim archives on the subject—which I think have received adequate 
attention—but to go straight to their best formulations and see what they can do.  Second, I 
explore some of the philosophical problems these definitions face.  Third, I argue that modern 
physics in particular fails to corroborate (and often contradicts) our traditional conception of 
intrinsic properties—not least because our traditional conception of an object fails to 
accommodate modern physics.  Fourth, I explore some of the implications of these 
challenges, and, finally, I review whether there is any reason to salvage the intrinsic/ extrinsic 
distinction and the ways in which we might do it, concluding 1) far fewer properties (possibly 
none) are intrinsic than classically conceived, and 2) the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction is 
more trouble than it is worth in metaphysics and should be jettisoned.  Although I review 
alternative conclusions in chapter 4, including the continued use of traditional intrinsicality 
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for practical purposes just as Newtonian mechanics is still often used in place of Einsteinian 
mechanics, a radical reconstitution of the general notion of intrinsicality is needed. 
CHAPTER 1: Classical Objects and Intrinsicality 
 
One of the principal ways we distinguish an object from its environment is by delineating the 
characteristics it has considered in and of itself, that is, its intrinsic properties.  The notion of 
intrinsicality has traditionally appeared prominently in metaphysical debates, including 
debates about persistence over time, defining duplicates, object identity, supervenience 
claims and ontology.  Although an exact definition of ‘intrinsic’ has proven elusive, the 
intuitive distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties seems commonsensical.  After 
all, it seems so easy to conceptualise extrinsic properties, to talk about the external relations 
that something has, that intrinsic properties must be the remaining properties of the thing as it 
is in itself.   
 Despite facing growing challenges from physics as well as philosophical issues, the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction—amongst properties in particular—is still liberally used1.  
Intrinsicality is so tempting because it offers the idea of how something really is, separate 
from any surrounding confusions of circumstance, precedence etc.; to be intrinsic to an entity 
is to be in virtue of the entity itself; to have certain properties intrinsically is to have them 
without reference to external objects.  On closer inspection, however, we find that the ease of 
separating the ‘object in itself’ from its surroundings is only superficial, and our traditional 
intuitions about ‘dependence’ are flawed.  In this chapter, I first survey and disambiguate 
common roles for intrinsicality, before critically reviewing popular definitions of the concept.   
1.1 Roles of Intrinsicality 
 
Some of the most important philosophical roles of intrinsicality are the following, which I 
will examine in turn: to 1) differentiate between mere circumstantial change and real change, 
2) help understand ‘duplication’, and 3) help determine which properties are the most 
fundamental.  As the world’s physical evidence grows more difficult for our intuitions of 
intrinsicality to accommodate, however, we find our expectations of intrinsicality doing us a 
disservice.  In advancing our understanding of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction I will review 
the connected and often explanatory notions of  ‘real change’, ‘duplication’, ‘naturalness’ and 
                                                          
1
 See Brian Weatherson’s ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties’ 2008 for an overview. 
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‘fundamental’ to see if we can better understand its uses before attempting a precise 
definition.   
1.1.1 Change 
 
Intrinsic properties have been used to define when something within a world really changes 
as opposed to a mere change in predicates, or ‘Cambridge change’ (e.g. acquiring the 
property has a sister).  Thus, many argue that “a change in intrinsic properties is a real 
change in an object, whereas change in extrinsic properties isn’t” (Vallentyne, 1997, p.209).  
As innocuous as this might seem, two rival theories of object persistence—endurantism and 
perdurantism—have arisen from different interpretations of this belief.  David Lewis 
controversially criticised the idea that objects can wholly exist at different times 
(endurantism) by claiming, among other things, that the same object could not then undergo 
real change: intrinsic properties would be “reinterpreted as relations that something with an 
absolutely unchanging intrinsic nature bears to different times.  The solution to the problem 
of temporary intrinsics is that there aren’t any temporary intrinsics” (Lewis, 1986, p.204).   
 That is, if a fire poker has the properties hot at t1 and cold at t2
 
then it looks like the 
poker never changed and statically holds those time-indexed properties for all eternity.  To 
avoid this traditional concern between ‘Cambridge change’ and real change, Lewis promotes 
the idea that objects only partially exist at each moment, persisting as the same object by 
having different temporal parts (perdurantism).  While others are certainly keen to avoid 
making an object’s location in time and space an intrinsic property, they do not all conclude 
that we must therefore subscribe to perdurantism (Vallentyne, 1997, p.215-17).   Indeed, one 
may be happy to define object change by the loss or gain of an intrinsic property without 
relying on a perdurantist view of persistence.   
 What one expects of intrinsic properties and their possible relations can thus affect 
one’s model of persistence, but I think we should be cautious of our assumptions for this role.  
First, it is certainly not obvious that intrinsic properties cannot change, and while it may well 
be that F-ness is a relation to a time, that property relation need not be seen as caused or 
dependent upon anything external, in the way that my mass can be a relation to my density 
but is not dependent upon it
2
.  That is, I do not think that allowing F-ness to be a relation to a 
                                                          
2
Since we measure time itself in terms of the perceived changes to an object (whether using the sun or a clock or 
a caesium atom), and relativity theory tells us that there is no privileged time frame, it seems we are making an 
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time means that F-ness is not intrinsic if we allow that it did not depend on that time.  It is 
also unclear whether time is an external entity to be in a relation with, or if it is something 
more substantial; for instance, it might be more accurate to speak—as many physicists do—
of the object’s own worldline3, and thus its own ‘spacetime path’ (much like an object’s own 
spin or charge).  If its time is intrinsic to it, then we have only established that one intrinsic 
property is related to another intrinsic property of the same spacetime object rather than 
depending on an extrinsic entity.     
Second, there is a concern about the time required to ‘capture’ an intrinsic property.  
That is, when we say that something has intrinsic property P at time t, is ‘time t’ an arbitrarily 
small philosophical instant rather than the smallest known physical instant?  How long is t 
and should it matter?  These concerns are generally not addressed because most discussions 
of intrinsicality ignore the history that led to a thing being the way it is, so presumably by 
‘intrinsic’ we mean that the properties of object X at time t are self-contained.  But this ‘time 
t’ and the rationale for establishing its particular parameters are not well-defined.4  Part of the 
importance of establishing a rationale for the parameters of t seems to lie with concerns over 
object change, and thus we ought to be aware of this often unmentioned temporal component 
in our formulations of intrinsicality in addition to any further metaphysical obligations (e.g. 
perdurantism).  Intrinsicality, then, plays an important if controversial role in discussions of 
change, as well as in the attendant theories of persistence and identity. 
1.1.2 Duplication 
 
Intrinsic properties are often invoked to help enlighten the concept of ‘duplication’ or as a 
means of understanding shared histories among possible worlds.  By duplication we 
understand that a duplicate of X will share all of the intrinsic properties of X, despite any 
variations of extrinsic properties and natural law.  Intrinsic properties thus let us compare 
objects and possible worlds for similarities, ideally using such thought experiments to test 
other philosophical hypotheses or analyse internalist theses in epistemology.  Duplication is 
closely connected with perfectly natural properties for Lewis, since the latter, along with 
perfectly natural relations, comprise the intrinsic nature of some particular, which in turn 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
object be both F (at one time) and not F (at another time) in relation to ‘another object being G and not G’.   
This does indeed sound extrinsic but I do not believe it is the sort of dependence we mean.  
3
 The path of an object through a four-dimensional spacetime. 
4
 This ‘instant’ can also get pushed down to the smallest known scale of the Planck length, at which point the 
notion of time becomes unclear. 
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determines whether something is a duplicate of that particular.  Both duplicates and natural 
properties are significant to Lewis’ work, but the web of definitions they create around 
intrinsic properties can direct us toward the next, and most scientific, role of intrinsic 
properties. 
1.1.3 Fundamental Properties 
 
Intrinsicality may be viewed as a marker of the most basic and inalienable entities of physics 
and of the universe’s fundamental properties.  Properties like spin, mass and charge seem 
plausible candidates for ‘intrinsic’ under this view, and it is this role of intrinsicality on which 
I wish to focus.  Philosophically, we might try to get a handle on these by following Lewis 
and linking intrinsic properties with perfectly natural properties (Lewis, 1986, p.61), though 
the latter are a subset of the former and are never rigorously defined.  In fact, aside from the 
intuition that some properties are more natural than others, this association with ‘perfectly 
natural properties’ does not seem to offer much insight.   
 There is some notion that ‘perfectly natural’ eschews disjunctive properties, but few 
people thought there were many disjunctive contenders anyway, and beyond this, 
‘naturalness’ seems as vague a guide as intrinsic.  For instance, it is unclear whether ‘natural’ 
encompasses everything (since it arises from nature) or whether it should include some level 
of arbitrarily designated fundamentality.  Lewis merely notes that while one would prefer to 
do without contentious judgments of comparative naturalness, they have to be made and will 
conclude that things like ‘mass’ are more natural properties than ‘my left foot’.  While I agree 
with this gradation, the description of ‘things like mass’ is certainly not robust enough for our 
needs nor, ultimately, is the vague idea of ‘perfectly natural properties’.  Thus, I will set 
‘perfectly natural properties’ aside and focus on the fundamental aspect. 
 The hope is that this would hit on the fundamental relations and properties of physics, 
allowing one’s property having mass to be intrinsic but not one’s property hearing 
Beethoven’s fifth, or the property wearing red shoes.  We might then assume that a world can 
be reduced to the intrinsic properties of things and the fundamental relations between them, 
with all else supervening on that
5
.  This is an appealing suggestion in that it narrows the range 
                                                          
5
However, there may be difficulty in distinguishing which entities possess some perfectly natural properties and 
in separating the properties from the relations (creating the same problem of separating the intrinsic and 
extrinsic).  For instance, what appears to us to be relations between objects may be a single higher-dimensional 
property. 
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of what properties count as intrinsic to the most basic physical components, thus reducing the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction to a question of fundamental reduction.  This approach is 
reflected in the physics literature as well, albeit with less rigorous standards of use, in that 
properties like spin, charge, or momentum are described as intrinsic and looked for in some 
form through all relevant interactions.  This approach is akin to Yuri Balashov’s  suggestion 
that some object or interaction might have a zero-value for such a property, say, zero 
momentum, rather than claiming that the object or interaction lacked the property momentum 
(See Balashov 1999).  It is roughly this application of ‘intrinsic’ as a tool to reveal such 
fundamental properties on which I will be focusing.   
 Following (Humberstone 1996), it may also be prudent to distinguish this sort of 
application of ‘global intrinsic’ as a type of (in some sense fundamental) property—as an 
intrinsic property tout court (Humberstone, p.206)—from a particular property’s local relation 
to an individual.  A global intrinsic property, then, is what we are looking for when we look 
to ‘the’ fundamental properties of our universe (spin, charge etc.).  A local intrinsic property 
is what is intrinsic (generally by definition) to a given thing.  That is, “whether a property is 
intrinsic [global], and whether some individual that has that property has it intrinsically 
[local], are different issues” (Weatherson 2008).  That is, local intrinsicality need not translate 
into global intrinsicality since all squares will have the property being a square or being next 
to a square even though not all objects that possess the property will possess it intrinsically; 
i.e. those that possess it in virtue of being contingently next to a square, rather than by simply 
being a square (Humberstone, p.228).  There is, however, an intimate connection between 
local and global intrinsic properties, particularly as we want some properties like having 
charge to be caught under both terms.  Sticking to cases outside geometry and abstract 
definitions, I will use both senses of intrinsicality, though with emphasis on the global sense, 
to see if the term really can deliver the distinctions in practice that we want it to in principle. 
1.2 Definitions 
 
There are several ways one might define ‘intrinsic’ and none of them come without 
limitations.  Although we frequently consult our intuitions, this approach proves suspect, 
particularly when addressing the unfamiliar worlds of modern physics where our intuitions 
are of little help.  Not only does physics challenge intuitions of identity but the fundamental 
interconnections it poses challenge traditional notions of completely self-contained objects.  
It is not simply when Theseus’ ship gets a board replaced that its constitution changes—it is 
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at every instant down to unmeasurable (even in principle) levels through minute interactions.  
Such limitations of intuition will be important to remember as we look at possible definitions, 
especially as physics offers us a universe of fields and wave-particle duality, a fluctuating 
interplay of energy and mass surrounded by virtual ephemera.   
 I will here explore what I see as three increasingly explanatory definitions of 
intrinsicality that one might offer, as much to get some sense of what intrinsic properties are 
not as to see what they are like.  I conclude with the definition most commonly invoked in the 
literature before discussing the many problems it (or indeed any of the definitions) faces.  The 
related concept of ‘dependence’ will be addressed later, but it seems worth keeping in mind 
that I adopt a reading of this as causal dependence (see Chapter 2).  
1.2.1 Essential 
 
Firstly, one may take ‘intrinsic’ to be synonymous with ‘essential’, such that I have a 
property intrinsically iff I have it essentially—and without it I would not exist.  The 
Aristotelian notion of essential properties is closely tied to identity and diametrically opposed 
to accidental properties, such that an object’s essential properties are those “which it could 
never have lacked and which it could not lose without ceasing to exist or to be what it is” 
(Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse, p.374).  I may have the accidental property of being happy or 
having a made bed, but none of that, the argument goes, changes what is essentially me, and 
neither does your having a cup of tea.  All of these states of affairs appear extrinsic to me, 
whereas my issuing from the exact zygote I came from and having the capacity to remember 
things seems essential to what makes me, me
6
.   
Accepting this construction of intrinsicality poses further concerns however, as on the 
one hand it may arguably be both too weak and too strong, and on the other hand, it is no 
more illuminating than ‘intrinsicality’.  ‘Essential’ may be too weak a synonym for intrinsic 
in that we could imagine some of my essential characteristics not existing without relational 
or extrinsic environmental influences (e.g. my cognitive functions may be essential to me, but 
they are not physically possible without a sufficient intake of oxygen from the environment).  
Perhaps the extrinsic property having a library nearby or, if one believes numbers to exist, 
being accompanied by the number 7 is essential to me.  But this acceptance of 
spatiotemporally disparate things and environmental influences does not appear specific 
                                                          
6
 I am not attempting to range over abstract objects such as sets that may possess their members essentially. 
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enough for what physicists, or indeed many of us mean by intrinsic.  Additionally, the 
definition may be too strong and depend too rigidly on internal or situational factors that 
overly restrict our notion of the intrinsic.  Whether or not we take overtly external things as 
essential, we may mean that everything about an object is essential to it, for being exactly as 
it is.  For example, depending on one’s conception of identity fragility, it may be that the 
molecules of a contained gas are in their particular arrangement essentially, and it would not 
be the same gas if the molecules were differently organised.  But this again is not what we 
tend to mean when we ask about something’s intrinsic properties.   
Essential, then, may carry further implications than we wish intrinsic to carry.  But 
even if we were to embrace something akin to the weaker definition of essential, there is no 
clear set of properties that constitute what it means to be something essentially.  That is, 
deciding what counts as an essential property seems as open to biased intuitions as deciding 
what counts as an intrinsic property.  It may be that intrinsic properties are a subset of what is 
essential to something, but it appears that there is a useful distinction between intrinsic and 
essential that is lost in collapsing the two together.  Regardless, the association between the 
terms does not get us any closer to a refined definition of intrinsic. 
1.2.2 Non-Relational 
 
Another tempting synonym for ‘intrinsic’ is the non-relational properties of an object.  
However, as (Humberstone 1996) highlighted, the two types of property are not synonymous, 
making ‘non-relational’ only a subset of ‘intrinsic’.  It is suggested that my relation to 
external bodies, systems etc. should not be seen as a property that I possess in any sort of 
intrinsic way—it is not something I possess across all or many possible worlds.  My 
orientation in my environment and my relations to the things in it (e.g. the property of being 3 
metres from a sheep) changes wherever I go, whereas my circulatory system or my mass are 
bound to me in a much more important and lasting way, and are candidates for intrinsic 
properties where my distance from the sheep is not.  This focus on external properties as 
being relations to other objects (or ideas etc.) might lead one to think the distinction rests on a 
question of relation, but it is not a reduction to simply relational and non-relational properties.   
 (Humberstone 1996) helpfully separates intrinsic properties from non-relational, 
noting that many proposed intrinsic properties can arise from internal relations of structure or 
function; for example, it is an intrinsic property of ‘normal’ water that it has the relation of 
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‘twice as many hydrogen atoms as oxygen atoms’ (or 2 hydrogen molecules and 1 oxygen).  
Additionally, we might say that it is intrinsic to a square that it have four lines related in a 
certain way—that is, possessing four line segments related by meeting end to end on a 2-
Dimensional plane.  Intrinsicality, at least in this local sense, is more than merely 
encompassing the non-relational properties.  Of course, one may object to this interpretation 
and discount all relational properties as intrinsic, and such reductionist approaches have used 
it to give a far more fine grained account of properties that appears closer to the fundamentals 
of physics (as we saw in 1.1.3).  Again, however, I agree with Humberstone that ‘non-
relational’ is not an ideal synonym, particularly if we are to allow any internal structure to 
objects possessing intrinsic properties.  It also difficult when invoking non-relational to 
distinguish ‘relational properties’ from properties that we pick out relationally; it may be a 
matter of current ignorance or language that we best pick out some property by relating it to 
others.  Guarding against this makes determining what counts as an intrinsic more difficult. 
1.2.3 Spatially Internal 
 
Thirdly, we may understand intrinsic properties to be those properties whose physical extent 
of manifestation are spatially internal to a decided object boundary and located at a particular 
region (e.g. the intrinsic properties of an egg are all those properties whose physical extent of 
manifestation are internal and inclusive of the shell such as having a yolk).  This does seem to 
be a more promising route, but boundaries are a tricky subject given the complex 
interconnections between bodies revealed by modern science.  Do we want absolutely 
anything within a boundary—assuming there is a clear one—to be intrinsic?  This approach 
has two key issues: 1) it inherits all the problems of establishing clear object boundaries 
associated with physics, and 2) even if boundaries were clear, not all internal properties are 
intrinsic.  Some internal things (like neutrinos or parts of the sandwich I ate at lunch) do not 
seem to be a proper part of us or dependent upon us in any way—they merely pass through.  
Thus, this definition does not seem to distinguish between the spatially internal properties 
that are unimportant happenstance and important properties arising in virtue of the object 
itself. 
Of course, one may be willing to take on the neutrinos and accidental properties by 
simply embracing this internal definition.  After all, under this conception we need not be so 
concerned with teasing out the surrounding forces from the structure of the object or with 
accurately gauging the proportionate strengths of the interactions; we can simply say that the 
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gravitational field that is within such-and-such a boundary is intrinsic (internal) to the object, 
regardless of what it depends on or how it arose.  What is intrinsic (internal) to the object at 
any given time may change and even depend upon disparate surroundings, but our concern is 
only with the properties the object displays in its set limits.  The sporadic and non-interactive 
property containing neutrinos or the property processing matter is an intrinsic property so 
long as they are within us; for a time, they are intrinsically part of us.  Under this definition of 
‘intrinsic’, one makes fewer claims on the origin and operation of fundamental forces and 
focuses instead on the activities within a certain region of spacetime, which might be seen as 
a benefit.   
However, even if we were to accept this definition of what it means to be intrinsic, we 
are left with unclear boundaries to objects that we may never be able to discern, which 
restricts our understanding of the properties solely dependent upon ‘it’.  The epistemological 
concern is forceful but the more pressing concern is the supposed fundamental indeterminacy 
of the quantum world.  In this definition, then, much more work needs to be done to 
determine the ways in which properties change, how we secure the identity of the changing 
region of spacetime and how that enriches our understanding of the object and perhaps that 
species of object (these latter concerns are more fully explored in chapter 4).  So for the cost 
of collapsing ‘intrinsic’ to ‘internal’ and taking on the evident accidental properties, our 
intuitive conception of intrinsic as something that captures how the entity really is in virtue of 
itself alone, has grown more demanding without receiving empirical benefits.  Arguably, a 
more refined definition is needed, one that is strict enough to meet the intuitions of Lewis and 
Jaegwon Kim, among others, who envision intrinsicality as something independent of all 
externalities—a definition to which I now turn.   
1.2.4 Independent of Externalities 
 
Finally, then, one might embrace the more stringent definition of ‘intrinsic’ and classify such 
properties as not dependent upon what is going on beyond the object’s boundary.  That is, an 
intrinsic property is one held by an object independently of any other thing distinct from it.  
This seems to best address our intuitive conception of intrinsicality—gaining the widest use 
in the literature (Ellis 2001, Lewis 1983, Weatherson 2008)—and will be taken as the 
accepted conception of intrinsicality throughout.  However, such a construction not only 
raises the concern of the previous definition (that of clear boundaries for an object), it also 
requires separating the object’s independent, ‘intrinsic’ properties from any property that 
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depends, even in part, on something else.  Lewis provided several permutations of intrinsic 
all following this basic pattern.  In this, he notes another role for intrinsicality in defining 
duplicates, which turns out to be a reciprocal relationship (addressed in the next chapter): 
The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic 
properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.  If 
something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; 
whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic 
properties (Lewis, 1983, p.197). 
This definition has proved very popular in the literature, and I will take it as the best 
encapsulation of common intuitions concerning the possession of intrinsic properties
7
.  Lewis 
went on to enhance his definition in later work, responding to Kim’s earlier suggestion that 
an intrinsic property was a property that could be possessed by an entity that did not coexist 
with any contingent and distinct object
8
.  This definition raises questions about what sorts of 
things are contingent, what counts as a distinct object and why this particular configuration 
reveals intrinsic properties.  To get at complete independence, Lewis’ own interpretation of 
this position portrayed the object as unaccompanied, or lonely, such that a property is 
intrinsic iff possessing or failing to possess the property is independent of loneliness or 
accompaniment (Langton and Lewis, p.334).   
 The thought was that, a property like being an unaccompanied cube could not be 
possessed when the object was both alone and when it was accompanied, so it would come 
out extrinsic.  The property being a cube, however, was thought to persist in both 
environments.  Interested in subsidiary taxonomies, Lewis (along with Rae Langton) argued 
for intrinsic properties using ‘combinatorial analysis’ (combining other modal desiderata with 
the search for intrinsic properties) that followed the modal profile of intuitively intrinsic 
properties, which: 
a) excluded troubling disjunctive properties (where each disjunct is much more 
natural than the whole disjunction),  
b) divided into basic and non-basic (where the latter supervene on the former),  
                                                          
7
 Because of the confusion surrounding intrinsicality, I am unable to distinguish the possession of an intrinsic 
property from the instantiation of one; that is, there is presently no way of knowing whether an object possesses 
an intrinsic property when not instantiating it so I will stay mute on this distinction. 
8
 See Kim’s ‘Psychophysical Supervenience’ 1982. 
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c) were perfectly natural properties, and  
d) which could be illuminated by discussions of duplicates
9
.   
Although these classifications limit our options they do not determine a list of unbiased (not 
subject to competing intuitions with recourse for arbitration) intrinsic properties, despite 
Lewis’ later claim that “we can confidently classify properties as intrinsic or not” (Lewis, 
2001, p.390).  Moreover, they are in danger of providing a tight definitional circle that “is too 
tight to be enlightening”  (Langton and Lewis, p.345).  It is not my business to get into the 
particulars of their arguments here, primarily because such classifications are most useful 
only when one already has a list of intrinsic properties at hand (Lewis, 2001, p.398).  Rather, 
I wish to highlight their focus on intrinsic properties as either properties possessed in 
isolation, or properties that are independent of their accompaniment.  This approach assumes 
that there is some objective ‘other’ world from which they may be viewed and in which they 
are ‘truly’ themselves. 
Peter Vallentyne has followed a similar approach by seeking to capture the range of 
intrinsicality by degrees, namely the broad and narrow.  In the broad sense, an intrinsic 
property is “appropriately independent of the existence of other objects…In the narrow 
sense, a property is intrinsic just in case it is intrinsic in the broad sense and is a qualitative 
property” (Vallentyne, p.215).  Vallentyne uses the specification of qualitative properties to 
allow duplicates to share intrinsic properties even though they are not at the same location in 
spacetime, (thus, qualitative independent properties might include redness and roundness).  
Stephan Leuenberger moves away from degrees to argue that there are two distinct concepts 
of intrinsicality—constructed in terms of duplication and combinatorial principles—arguing 
against unifying them.  Both concepts make use of the definitions of intrinsicality discussed 
in this section (namely, that intrinsic properties are those belonging to a lonely object in a 
certain way, and that intrinsic properties are those shared by duplicates), and rest on the 
independence of externalities.  In its combinatorial form, then, “intrinsic properties are those 
whose instantiation by a thing does not imply anything for things distinct from that very 
thing” (Leuenberger, p.5).  
                                                          
9
 In Lewis, 2001, he also admits of mixed properties that are neither purely intrinsic nor extrinsic (e.g. the 
property being a cube accompanied by another cube).  While this is an interesting compromise that may involve 
far more properties than the disjunctive examples considered, it is not adequately addressed and will be left 
aside for the sake of simplicity. 
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A similar account (‘contraction’) was given by Vallentyne in (Vallentyne 1997) that 
suggested intrinsic properties are those properties left to an object when all other objects are 
removed; that is, intrinsic properties are those left after a universal contraction to focus only 
on the object.  He suggests that one may define intrinsic properties as those that an object 
would have if all other objects had been removed from the world.  Although he grants that 
some objects may not be removable without simultaneously removing other objects or laws 
in general, and indeed, that there might not be a unique way of so contracting the world, he 
nonetheless posits that the end result of this contraction should demonstrate a thing’s intrinsic 
properties (Vallentyne, p.213-4)
10
.  Although operating in a slightly different metaphysical 
framework from Lewis, Vallentyne’s suggestion is somewhat similar to Lewis and Langton’s 
argument for intrinsic properties being those that an object has when lonely. 
The basic idea in all these accounts is still that intrinsic properties are possessed 
independently of the object’s environment, which seems central to our naïve intuition and 
expectation of what intrinsicality is, and is just the opposite of what it means to be extrinsic.  
As phrased by Stephen Yablo, an intrinsic property is what a “thing has (or lacks) regardless 
of what may be going on outside itself” (Yablo, p.479).  Where ‘essential’ and ‘internal’ were 
inadequate, particularly for our focus on global intrinsicality, this latter definition seems to do 
the job.  Indeed, it is this type of definition that has come to dominate the literature, offering 
an intrinsic/extrinsic distinction that is intuitively quite appealing, but upon closer inspection, 
the formulation of intrinsic as independent of externalities does not appear so satisfactory, as 
we will see in the next chapter. 
                                                          
10
 While noting the caveat that his notion does not distinguish between qualitative and non-qualitative 
properties, Vallentyne does offer the definition that property “P is intrinsic =df for any world w, any time t, and 
any object x: (a) if Px at t in w, then Ox at t in each x-t contraction of w, and (b) likewise for ~P” (Vallentyne, 
p.212). 
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CHAPTER 2: Philosophical Concerns  
 
Despite its popularity, the definition of ‘intrinsic properties’ given by Lewis (those properties 
of an object that do not depend on any other thing, pick out duplicates, and would exist in a 
contracted universe) pose several enigmas, including what the nature of the referenced 
dependence is, and how one is to get a purchase on the concept of ‘duplication’.  Using this 
definition of ‘intrinsic properties’ given in 1.2.4, I now critically explore the ancillary 
concepts of 1) dependence, 2) duplication and 3) ‘contracted’ universes for the true properties 
of an object.  In this, I challenge the utility of distinguishing between metaphysical, 
constitutive and causal dependence that Lewis and others seem to make, and I argue that 
neither duplication nor contraction is useful in determining intrinsic properties. 
2.1 Dependence 
 
Lewis argues that intrinsic properties do not depend on anything other than the thing itself, 
but in what does this dependence relation consist and does it clarify intrinsicality?  In general, 
dependence involves a complex family of relations that encompass the ways one being may 
depend upon one or more other beings
11
.  Dependence can be causal or ontological or 
metaphysical etc. and can be modally construed (Linnebo, p.77)
12, or simply understood as ‘x 
depends on y if, necessarily, x exists only if y exists’.  In teasing out the nuances of this 
relation, I will examine several interpretations of ‘dependence’ to see what use it might serve 
for Lewis’ description of ‘intrinsic’ and whether a clearer notion of ‘dependence’ can lead us 
to an intuition-neutral account of intrinsicality.  I conclude that metaphysical dependence 
fails to give instructive guidance when it comes to determining intrinsic properties.  
Additionally, the causal and constitutive interpretations of ‘dependence’ are neither helpfully 
different from each other nor able to accommodate many (if any) of the textbook examples of 
intrinsic properties.   
2.1.1 Metaphysical 
 
Bradford Skow suggests in (Skow 2007) that the type of dependence Lewis means is 
metaphysical, and understood in a modal way.  That is, the Lewisian definition of ‘intrinsic’ 
                                                          
11
 See (Lowe 2009) for an overview.   
12
 There are approaches that separate this classification into strong and weak dependence (as made by Øystein 
Linnebo) such that “x strongly depends on y if and only if any individuation of x must proceed via y. 
…[whereas] x weakly depends on y if and only if any individuation of x must make use of entities which also 
suffice to individuate y” (Linnebo, p.78). 
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seems to focus on whether an object’s properties metaphysically depend on other objects, 
since some of his examples (e.g. ‘shape’) clearly causally—physically—depend on extrinsic 
factors.  But it is difficult to get a clear grasp of what is special about metaphysical 
dependence and whether we should pin our understanding of the term to it.  Like Lewis, 
Skow argues for this weaker conception to allow intrinsic properties a wide range of 
dependencies.  For instance, the shape of sand in my hand physically “depends on the 
existence of my hands…But it is fine for an intrinsic property to physically depend in this 
way on the existence of other things.  Intrinsic properties merely need to be metaphysically 
independent” (Skow, 2007, p.114).  Skow allows for such renegotiations of dependence by 
appealing to possible worlds and thus steers the discussion of intrinsicality beyond the 
physical relations of our actual universe.   
I cannot make much sense of this.  If a property depends actually on other things, and 
perhaps may always actually depend on other things in our universe, what do we accomplish 
by imagining a scenario where things were different?  Moreover, how are we to all agree on 
which properties can be appropriately imagined to be different?  If by ‘metaphysical 
dependence’ we mean ‘not prima facie definitionally independent’, then we can get away 
with quite a lot and have no further tool to separate the intrinsic properties from other 
metaphysically possible properties.   
That is, suppose a chair has the property having a mass of 10kg, and I claim that such 
a property of mass does not metaphysically depend on anything else.  If you disagree, it does 
not seem that we can progress beyond this because we are ultimately only consulting our 
intuitions.  Indeed, there seems nothing to stop me from claiming that while all of the 
following properties are physically dependent on other things, having a sister, being in this 
exact location, or having weight Xkg are all metaphysically independent of other things.  If 
anyone disagrees there are no experiments we can use to determine which properties really 
are metaphysically independent, and the broad permissibility of the model makes it unhelpful 
for understanding real change, ‘naturalness’ or ‘duplication’.  Metaphysical independence 
tells us nothing about this world and, without addressing science, has no place in this study.   
These competing intuitions come across in significant examples; for instance, in his 
‘Defining Intrinsic’ (1998) written with Rae Langton, Lewis favours ‘weak-law’ intuitions—
where laws can be altered or removed while preserving the phenomena—that a property like 
the shape of a star should be preserved as intrinsic (Langton and Lewis, p.337).  If laws are 
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weak and we consider only what is conceptually possible, then perhaps there are possible 
worlds where a star has its shape (if we can still call it ‘shape’ in such different worlds) 
intrinsically and independently of its surroundings.  But if laws are strong (or we are simply 
concerned with this universe, as we indeed here are) and the star has its shape in virtue of the 
forces and other entities acting upon it, then its shape is not intrinsic.   
Here again, I cannot see any way for a unique set of intrinsic properties to be 
universally agreed upon unless we adopt this latter caveat of nomic similarity, since 
otherwise we have no external standard with which to arbitrate disputes of intuition.  Thus, I 
disagree with Lewis, and do not think that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should be a modal 
one.  This is particularly so given my intention to integrate metaphysics with our best 
physics—to engage with this world—and to see whether the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction is 
useful.  The permissibility of metaphysical dependence throws out any refinement in 
definition by allowing almost any property to be intrinsic and degrading the related 
understanding of things like real change and naturalness.  Such modal dependence is thus 
best suited for a metaphysics of possible worlds rather than the current focus on metaphysics 
in this world. 
2.1.2 Causal 
 
Causal dependence does not seem to be what Lewis meant by ‘dependence’ in his definition 
of intrinsic properties in section 1.2.4.  However, it is a central notion of ‘dependence’ and 
one that has more teeth in analysing dependence claims in the known universe.  Indeed, given 
the lack of traction with intrinsic properties as ‘metaphysically independent’, causal 
dependence seems like the obvious choice to test our definition of intrinsic.  That is, one can 
define an intrinsic property as a property that does not causally depend on any other thing 
(either immediately or ultimately): 
(1) An object’s property is intrinsic if it does not immediately13 depend upon, or is 
caused by, any other thing.   
This follows the traditional understanding of causation whereby, to say that x ‘causes’ y, or y 
is causally dependent on x is to say that whenever an event x occurs, a second event y must 
subsequently occur ceteris paribus.  Under (1), dependence consists in what actually caused 
                                                          
13
 I appreciate that causation is notoriously difficult to define, but for the purposes at hand, this simplistic 
formulation will suffice. 
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an object to possess the properties it does.  For example, my property having hair of length X 
was most immediately caused by my cutting it, and thus that property cannot be an intrinsic 
property because it depended, on something beyond the object possessing it (e.g. it depended 
on scissors and their application to the hair etc.).  This use of dependence excludes all 
properties as intrinsic if they have been immediately brought about by something other than 
the object, which generally includes such properties as speed, momentum, direction, potential 
energy, shape etc. (e.g. an object’s speed will depend on other objects directly interacting 
with it or indirectly interacting through force fields).  Presumably however, it would preserve 
such properties as spin and charge for elementary particles, at least prima facie.  The second 
form of causal dependence for intrinsicality can be understood as: 
(2) An object’s property is intrinsic if it does not ultimately depend upon any other 
thing.   
This allows for the existence of objects to depend upon one or more other objects at a given 
point in time, a dependence in which most objects in the universe appear to participate, 
making this a more exclusive criterion for grounding intrinsic properties.  Thus, the colour of 
my eyes ultimately depends upon the eye colour of both my parents (as well as the visible 
spectrum of the observer) even though my eye colour does not presently have any immediate 
dependence on them since my eye colour is mine whether they exist or not (again, assuming a 
consistent electromagnetic spectrum for the observer).  This allowance for a longer causal 
chain in the dependence relation may at first seem totally unwarranted, but there is a 
possibility that such a caveat would get at the initial cosmic properties that stand as good a 
chance as any at being intrinsic—in the fundamental, global sense—to the basic objects that 
possess them.  If we were to take ‘ultimately’ back to the nascent universe where all 
fundamental constituents were newly formed, the properties in existence then might be good 
candidates for intrinsic properties. 
By (2), then, the realm of intrinsic properties has shrunk to an extremely limited set 
since most objects owe the existence of their current properties to the existence of something 
else.  We would be hard pressed to find anything that didn’t ultimately depend on something 
else, but we might have some hope of finding properties that weren’t so needy in the 
immediate causal chain.  Thus, we could define an intrinsic property of an object as one that 
cannot immediately causally depend on anything other than that object.  Prima facie, 
properties like mass and charge seem to persist solely by virtue of the object and remain 
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whether the object is underwater or on a mountain.  If those intrinsic properties vanish then 
so too does that object.  For example, a clay statue will possess certain properties like mass 
that will persist when it is in a courtyard or on the moon but which disappear when dropped 
into a burning sulphur pool.  The clay statue would then cease to be, along with its properties 
(the properties may of course persist but be attributed to other things, say, sulphur-clay 
lumps).  The causal account also excludes obvious extrinsic properties like colour and smell, 
since they change with lighting, the surrounding medium and the characteristics of the 
observer.  This account is more helpful and accessible than metaphysical dependence by 
fitting with both scientific talk and other familiar models of causation. 
2.1.3 Constitutive 
 
Roughly, the intuitive distinction between constitution and causation follows the distinction 
between the component parts of something and the chain of events that leads to a certain state 
of affairs, respectively.  For instance, we might say that a particular chair was caused to exist 
by a chair maker—such that it causally depends upon the chair maker—but the chair, now, 
does not currently (constitutively) depend upon the chair maker for its various properties; the 
chair maker could vanish without really changing the chair.  So, we might understand Lewis’ 
definition of intrinsic properties as those that do not depend in terms of their current 
composition on any other thing.  Constitutive dependence, then, is that which currently, at 
that instant, constitutes the possession of an object’s properties:  
(3) An object’s property is intrinsic if it does not constitutively (currently) depend 
upon any other thing
14
. 
Under this interpretation one might argue that my hair length is an intrinsic property because 
it does not currently depend on my cutting it—it just is that length however it came to be that 
length and whether I am at home or away or falling down a rabbit hole.  This approach seems 
to preserve Lewis’ example and seems to fit a metaphysical niche, but disentangling 
constitutive dependence from environmental interactions and causal dependence is not so 
obvious, and this example fails.  Although we could adopt ‘constitutive dependence’ as our 
notion of dependence, I think it is merely a subspecies of causal dependence and therefore no 
better than the latter at picking out intrinsic properties. 
                                                          
14
 We may or may not wish to include non-material entities (e.g. spacetime) in this dependence claim. 
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 That is, when enquiring after the causes of something being the way it is, we should 
exhaust all the information that could be gleaned from examining the constitution of 
something; what is commonly called constitutive dependence is simply current causal 
dependence (though the reverse is not true: not all causal dependence is constitutive).  This 
can perhaps most easily be seen by comparing counterfactuals: although we might find it odd 
to say that the legs of a chair cause the chair to have various properties, we should agree that 
if the chair did not have legs, it would not have various properties.  Similarly, although 
appropriately conjoined hemispheres could be said to constitute the property being a sphere, 
they can also be seen to cause that property; without hemispheres there would be no property 
being a sphere.  Even though we can tease out some differences between constitution and 
causation, I do not think that they help us make sense of Lewis’ definition of intrinsic 
properties since any sort of constitutive account was modally conceived and unhelpful to the 
current project 
 In looking at the dependence relations that constitute the whole (e.g. hemispheres 
constitute a sphere), we are not told which parts are intrinsic and why, but understood as a 
type of causation gives us leave to physically test the relations (rather than imagining 
metaphysical alternatives).  Thus,  my hair length is constituted by molecules, energy and a 
complex sea of interactions with the environment including (as noted) surrounding chemical 
bond strength, gravity etc.  Speaking in terms of constitution does not let one ignore causal 
dependence, it only limits the causal chain under scrutiny, which at any given moment has a 
host of interactions and dependence relations with the environment.  Not all causes for object 
properties are constitutive, but anything found to have constitutive dependence can be 
understood causally, even if it is simultaneous to the creation of the property itself; certainly 
it would strike us as a great aberration if a property were not to be causally dependent on 
something else.  For example, the property being a cat constitutively depends on its cat parts.  
Some parts might support accidental or extrinsic properties, some might support intrinsic 
properties, but constitutive dependence is not a relationship that demarcates which properties 
fit into each category.   
 So although (3) may intuitively fit with Skow’s and perhaps Lewis’ idea of 
metaphysical independence—allowing the shape of sand to have constitutional 
independence—it does not seem able to do the desired work and collapses into a form of 
causal dependence.  My height and shape depend for their constitution, causally depend, upon 
the surrounding, and indeed pervading gravitational field (e.g. I am in part constituted by this 
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field and so will be taller on the moon than on Earth) such that my height always depends 
upon my environment.  That is, if the environment is altered in this way both my hair length 
and shape will change.  Thus, I do not see that constitutive dependence offers a significantly 
different or helpful take on dependence than that implied by causal dependence. 
2.1.4 Dependence revised  
 
To summarise, I have reviewed the best interpretations of ‘dependence’ featured in Lewis’ 
definition of intrinsicality and argued that a notion of causal dependence was the most helpful 
and accessible to our current project.  I do not see that claiming ‘metaphysical dependence’ 
delineates a specific set of intrinsic properties since it ignores all the objective physical 
restrictions on independent properties and appeals to our intuitions without any recourse to 
rigour.  Turning to possible worlds is no more than a turn to intuition; but when giving 
examples of supposed intrinsic properties we turn to science—we suggest mass, spin, 
charge—so why not turn to science for corroboration that our definition fits the data?  To 
imagine possible worlds where properties and laws are vastly different pushes us far beyond 
the limits of our knowledge and seems wholly unhelpful in attending to intrinsic properties as 
we perceive them (a theme I will turn to in the next section). 
 Further, although Lewis does not appear interested in causal dependence, I think that 
it a) is a clearer notion than metaphysical dependence and b) gives a rich philosophical lesson 
in the fundamental connectivity of our universe.  I also think that, in the case of intrinsic 
properties, it is artificial and ultimately unhelpful to separate constitutive from causal 
dependence since I argue that the former collapses into the latter; it is really just a distinction 
between historical and something like simultaneous causation.  Causal dependence—rooted 
in the physical universe—is the only appropriate sense of dependence for this study, 
concerned as it is with the intersection of modern physics and philosophy.  It is here that we 
can gain a foothold to see how well the classical conception of an object, with its properties 
separated from the surroundings, holds up.  With this in mind, I will review intrinsicality’s 
second ancillary concept of duplication, arguing that it fails to pick out intrinsic properties. 
2.2 Duplication 
 
Analysing the properties of duplicates across possible worlds is portrayed as a valuable tool 
by Lewis, despite concerns of circularity (defining intrinsicality in terms of the duplicate and 
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vice versa).  He states that any perfect duplicate of a thing possesses the original’s intrinsic 
properties regardless of environment, while its extrinsic properties may differ.  This approach 
raises concerns however, as to whether it is viable for our current physics-oriented study of 
this universe, and indeed, whether it can provide any new insight into intrinsicality.  I believe 
the approach fails in both respects, and conclude that this piece of Lewis’ definition of 
intrinsicality is really an organisational tool, useful only after a definition of intrinsicality 
itself is established.  In this, I argue that duplicates fail to determine which properties are 
intrinsic both because of their grounding in intuitions and the epistemic inaccessibility of the 
possible worlds they inhabit.  
Physical situations deal with what is physically possible, what (to the best of our 
knowledge) would occur if an object were moved from, say, the Earth to Mars, or to the 
surface of the sun etc.; possible worlds deal with what is conceptually possible, with what we 
find conceivable however awkward the changes to natural law or material constitution in 
such worlds.  Importantly, this latter type of possibility has many uses within philosophy,
15
 
but I do not think clarifying the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is one of them.  Intrinsicality’s 
role in helping us understand duplication and worlds with a similar history is impotent in 
such a closed definitional circle.  Since we do not all share intuitions, an external appeal is 
needed, which needs to be something decidedly more than each of us fabricating some world 
where something very like object x but lacks a certain property and then presenting the 
scenario to others saying ‘see! It must be an intrinsic property’.   
 Additionally, to admit possible worlds into our search for intrinsic properties is to 
vastly expand and diversify the type of situations we need to be classifying over, to no 
apparent benefit.  If I can work out all the actual dependence relations of a property, it does 
not appear obvious that I should further consult my imagination in deciding whether that 
property is intrinsic in our universe; my imagination will not determine which possible 
worlds are the relevant ones.  Arguably that is just sloppy philosophy.  Taking an object to a 
possible world and vaguely (a full account of the mechanics and particulars of substantially 
different possible worlds appears too complex) supplying a different causal history or 
different instantiation of laws offers only an insight into our intuitions about which worlds are 
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 And, indeed, many uses within science.  The idealisation of a frictionless plane, for example, is among such 
concepts which we do not expect to see within this world, but which are nonetheless useful tools in evaluating 
and understanding the universe. 
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more like ours and which properties are environmentally alterable in what ways.  It does not 
offer a clarification of physical law or material interactions.   
 Some examples may help to highlight the difficulties, although the details do not hang 
on these; rather, the following are meant to highlight competing intuitions which are not 
resolved through appeal to duplication or intrinsicality since they are defined in terms of each 
other.  The general pattern is as follows: Say property X of object O is a candidate for an 
intrinsic property.  Turning to duplicates in possible worlds, you and I decide whether we 
think property X is possessed by O duplicates.  Say the property X is having mass.  I think of 
a possible world where I claim a duplicate of O lacks the property having mass, leading me to 
declare that having mass is not an intrinsic property after all.  But you think of the same 
world and conclude that it does not matter that what I called a duplicate of O lacks the 
property because it is not a duplicate of object O precisely because it lacks the property 
having mass.  Since duplication and intrinsic properties are mutually defined, we are left at an 
impasse. 
 For instance, some philosophers appear comfortable suggesting possible worlds where 
electrons behave exactly as they do in our world (moving toward nearby protons, having 
1/1800
th
 their mass etc.) except that they have no charge.  I may argue that what is intrinsic to 
them is preserved and thus charge is not intrinsic.  But does this stipulation convince anyone?  
Moreover, could the contrary of such a claim be proved false?  Looking at the duplicate 
relation given by Lewis does not seem any more enlightening, since the duplication relation 
gives us nothing particular or concrete to work with.  We simply offer timid counterfactuals 
to see whether we think that a property of mine ought to persist despite significant changes to 
the environment.  Do we alter the laws of physics to maintain intrinsic properties?  We have 
already stipulated that it is a perfect duplicate in these distant worlds, but the difficulty lies in 
determining what this perfect duplicate is and what properties it possesses.  That is, we have 
avoided the difficult part entirely.   
 Further, one may question whether properties like electric or magnetic fields—the 
manifestation of which can depend on one’s frame of reference—are intrinsic properties of 
particles or certain objects and from what frame of reference they are to be attributed to 
objects.  Can an altered mass be allowed—and by how much?  For example, if we take mass 
to be an intrinsic property and one shared by all perfect duplicates, would we then deny that 
an electron travelling at 99.999% the speed of light is a duplicate of an electron travelling at 
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28% the speed of light because from a certain stationary perspective its mass appears 
significantly greater?  What frame of reference is to be privileged when we view an object 
across possible worlds?  Because there is no privileged frame in which to determine set 
properties, it is unclear whether we are to conclude that intrinsic properties are indeterminate 
or non-existent, but in neither case are our traditional intuitions secured.  There does not seem 
to be a theory-neutral way to define intrinsicality using duplicates.  Allowing any sort of 
room for duplicate variation means outlining the types of difference permitted, which is 
simply stipulating the intrinsic properties we had set out to discover. 
2.2.1 The problem with possible world intuitions 
The previous examples beg the question: how are we to know what is permissibly altered in 
our duplicate’s properties to define their intrinsic ones?  Is it more important that the same 
configuration and function are maintained, or is it better to maintain laws?  Whichever way 
chosen reveals our intuition about intrinsicality—but does it reveal anything more?  Arguably 
not.  It is not so much that we cannot conjure up some explanation for how something is a 
duplicate of me despite not having X (because we certainly can do that, as the fascination 
with zombies makes evident), rather, it is that whatever you are willing to sacrifice is a matter 
of your intuition, your prejudice of what really counts as intrinsic.  That is, neither 
philosophical reflection on duplicates  nor on possible worlds will give us objective intrinsic 
properties. 
Because worlds with different laws are so wholly beyond our experience, it is 
ineffective to speculate on the consequences of placing duplicates in such an environment, 
especially when we already have so many unknowns with the physical universe at hand.  
There does not appear to be an objective way of analysing possible world examples, nor do 
they appear to be able to tell us anything about the actual world (which is presumably our 
central enterprise).  Beyond the epistemic concern of ever gaining knowledge of intrinsic 
properties through possible worlds, there is thus the additional concern that possible worlds 
cannot tell us about the properties of this world.  
If there is a duplicate in a world that differs importantly from ours, one in which, say, 
there is no gravity and some other ‘force’ exists that makes everything look the same, some 
argue that it is not a duplicate at all.  Indeed, it may make “no sense to speak of a natural 
kind, e.g. being an electron, independently of the laws which govern its behaviour… 
Therefore, to speak of a possible world with a different set of laws to ours necessarily entails 
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speaking of a world containing different natural kinds” (Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse p.380-1).  
That is, we have good reason to suspect Lewis’ weak-law intuitions and metaphysical 
permissibility yield a situation that does not address this world at all.  If Bigelow, Ellis and 
Lierse are right, then we can only speak of duplicates in exceptionally similar worlds where 
the emphasis is on scientific continuity (e.g. same laws, particles, forces etc.).  This is a 
valuable caution on the use of possible world duplicates, since even if we could knowingly 
describe the behaviour of ‘duplicates’ in alien environments, we should be wary of calling 
them ‘duplicates’ in principle.  Such uncertainty concerning what counts as a duplicate 
prevents any clarification on which properties are intrinsic. 
Given our particular interest in the concepts and connections in this universe, the 
introduction of inexact (i.e. having no set calculus, no mathematical means of testing altered 
values in energies, laws, densities etc., in short having nothing but our own intuitions) 
possible worlds as a tool to better understand our world seems controversial at best and at 
worst misses the point entirely; it does not make sense to allow more than a very limited 
range of physically (rather than conceptually) possible worlds into our search for the way 
things are.  This caveat substantially restricts the analysis of duplicates to the history and 
extent of our universe, and should helpfully narrow the options considered.  Further, to make 
any useful predictions or conclusions about what would happen to an object when placed in a 
certain situation, something more than daily philosophical intuition is needed, and the 
equations, relations and proportionalities of mathematics and physics seem a preferred 
option.  This approach—along the same lines as the move toward causal dependence—offers 
a much more restricted and technical approach to duplicates than Lewis had in mind, but may 
offer the most productive way out of his explanatory circle. 
Thus, as I have been at pains to show, the study of duplicates reduces to an exercise in 
our intuitions about what counts as intrinsic, as we decide whether duplicates in such-and-
such a configuration and environment are really perfect duplicates and thus preserve intrinsic 
properties.  Understanding what humans naively think is possible is interesting in its own 
right, but such exercises can hardly be assumed to carve reality up at the joints.  Instead, we 
have A’s intuition that the properties having such-and-such a hair length, having memories of 
X, and possessing charge Y are intrinsic, and B’s intuitions that they are not.  Our intuition 
has repeatedly been shown inadequate concerning modern science, and if discussions of 
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duplicates do no more than showcase our intuitions, I suggest they be shelved for a more 
physically grounded metaphysics of intrinsicality
16
. 
2.3 Contraction and the Way an Object Truly is 
 
Although Lewis arguably side-stepped the worries with contraction by claiming intrinsic 
properties are those that an object possess whether lonely or accompanied, it is worth taking a 
moment to see why just the former stipulation is troubling.  The idea of total independence 
from externals through contraction has been offered—notably by (Vallentyne 1997)—as a 
means of clarifying intrinsicality (see section 1.2.4), but this claim is ill-attuned to modern 
physical theories and makes a dubious equivalence between how something is in itself and 
how something is alone in a universe of itself.  Even assuming we could happily settle on an 
object’s boundary, most objects do not remain impervious to their environment and so 
undergo changes in classical intrinsic properties (e.g. even protons are expected to decay).  
This being the case, how are we to separate objects from their environment as Lewis and Kim 
stipulate?  Vallentyne’s approach faces the same sort of difficulties as far-flung duplicates; as 
one contends with worlds very dissimilar from our own force-filled universe, we are left with 
fewer and fewer intrinsic properties as they vanish in the total isolation of a universe alone.   
Barring the immense difficulty in accurately calculating how an object would be as a 
universe unto itself or where, exactly, its borders lie, there seem to be many issues with this 
‘force-free’ account.  It certainly dispenses with many of the traditionally useful properties 
whose local intrinsicality we might wish to discuss.  That is, this approach does away with 
local intrinsicality and possibly all global intrinsic properties as we know and use them, and 
focuses on what properties a fundamental object possesses when it is removed from any 
natural setting and set in a make-believe world of isolation. 
That is a very strange prospect indeed, and removed from Lewis’ perfectly natural 
properties.  But if we were to take a definition of intrinsic like the one Lewis adopts and 
discard any properties that depend partly on things external to the object, then we are left 
with a much smaller set of objects to examine in a very unnatural way that severs them from 
the properties in which we are interested.  We seem far more likely to hit on what an object is 
truly like by considering it in light of how it actually always is.  It may be that Vallentyne’s 
cosmic reduction is meant to halt at some specified material distance, or in such a way as to 
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 Further, examining what physics has to offer on the subject appears an important step to take before 
postulating the closeness and internal organisation of possible worlds. 
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preserve a thing’s essential qualities, but much more needs to be said about how that is to be 
calculated, and what things in what relation are to be considered intrinsic or merely a 
necessary background to the object’s examination. 
We may find that the messy world of interactions with the object in situ is where 
‘intrinsic’ properties are located, and though they may (substantially) change over time, such 
a placement is more accurately an expression of what the thing is like in itself
17
.  This 
challenge turns most of the discussion of intrinsicality on its head, focusing not on what 
properties a thing has in total isolation but on what properties it really has in this universe.  
While such a focus may not adequately live up to expectations of intrinsicality, the pursuit of 
a perfectly closed system of one may not sufficiently align with the properties of our universe 
either.   
This link between intrinsicality and the scientific idea of a closed system is tempting, 
but problematic in telling ways.  For instance, we might think that argon gas in a lead box 
would possess properties intrinsic to that system regardless of the exterior conditions.  
Certainly, the placement of chairs around the room, or where I hang my coat seems not to 
affect the gas’ behaviour at all.  However, at a fundamental level (and thus in principle), this 
is not the case.  The surrounding orientation of mass, charge, heat etc. will all minutely affect 
both the lead atoms and the contained argon atoms in ways that make the attribution of 
intrinsic properties challenging.  Photons may behave differently, wave functions may be 
altered, momentum and temperature vary.  We feel comfortable in discounting such effects at 
fairly macroscopic scales, but it is at best an approximation and should be treated as such.   
I have critically looked at some of the key ancillary concepts in our definition of 
intrinsic properties (from section 1.2.4): dependence, duplication and contraction to how an 
object truly is, and found them unhelpful.  Distinguishing an object—as it truly is and with all 
its independent properties —from its environment is philosophically challenging, both 
because physical properties are more interdependent than they first appear, and because the 
common appeal to modal accounts relies on unarbitrated intuitions.  Understanding intrinsic 
properties in terms of duplicates does not provide us with any examples or assure us that 
intrinsic properties are an accurate and helpful way to carve up reality given the mutual 
definition, so I will dismiss the concept.  Contraction also gives us nothing concrete to work 
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 This approach may align with a dispositional properties framework, in that what is intrinsic to something may 
be how it interacts in certain circumstances (for example, electrons are attracted to sources of opposite charge). 
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with and leaves questions of dependence open for vastly unfamiliar states of affairs that again 
give us no insight into intrinsicality and likewise any of the roles it is meant to serve.  
Metaphysical dependence is too permissive to determine objective dependence relations for a 
metaphysics of this world, while constitutive dependence is merely a subspecies of causal 
dependence.  From this philosophical vantage, I will next look at physics with its accounts of 
causal dependence to get a better grasp on the problems with our traditional account of 
intrinsicality, and the classically precise separation of object and environment that 
accompanied it. 
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CHAPTER 3: Physical Exempla 
 
In the previous chapter we looked at several problematic philosophical components of Lewis’ 
definition of intrinsic properties (again: ‘the intrinsic properties of something depend only on 
that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on 
something else’).  Here, I will pursue the problem of (causal) dependence through modern 
physics, taking a step back to see just how great a challenge it poses to the classical 
conception of objects and to the notion of intrinsic properties that we attach to them.  In 
particular, I will be exploring whether traditional intrinsic properties like mass have any place 
in such a classification, as well as exploring several other elements of physics that make the 
precise formulation of object boundaries and the designation of any independent properties 
extremely difficult.   
 Here, I do not mean to claim that the physics broached in this paper is immutable or 
guaranteed—history has made such convictions embarrassing.  But even if current physics is 
mistaken, the suggestions provide the possibility of a conceptual alternative, and given the 
healthy interaction between theories of physics and applied physics, that is a valuable thing to 
possess
18
.  There is quite a bit of information thrust into this chapter, and given space 
constraints much of it is cursory, but I hope to get enough relevant physics on the table to 
support later discussions on the alternative options for conceiving objecthood and the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  To this end I will examine a) the acquisition and variability of 
mass, b) object boundaries, c) virtual particles and fields, and d) the unintuitive 
transformations of relativity and spacetime—all of which give an image of a universe that is 
far more interdependent and connected than the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and 
‘intrinsic’ allowed.  In general, then, this chapter examines the physical interdependence of 
most properties and the indefiniteness of classically distinct objects.  I conclude that the 
classical model of objects and their intrinsic properties is more trouble than it is worth. 
3.1 Mass  
 
Mass is a favourite property among philosophers when speaking of intrinsic properties—
readily pulled out as an example of what they mean by intrinsic, and often followed promptly 
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 There is an empirically derived concern that humans can never know the basic intrinsic properties, and thus 
building a metaphysics around them is misguided.  Such epistemological worries are important, though they do 
not stop researchers from pushing through previous barriers and addressing the universe as if it is explicable.   
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with an ‘etc’ instead of further elaborations (Weatherson 2008) 19, which is why I shall focus 
on it in particular.  If the poster child for an intrinsic property fails, we will have good cause 
to doubt the utility of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  Similar doubts may arise around 
would-be intrinsic properties like a particle’s charge20 or spin, which followers of standard 
quantum theory argue are indeterminate until measured; for if a particle has, in fact, a definite 
location and spin etc., then quantum mechanics is incomplete (Lange, p.261).  Although these 
properties are not directly addressed here, the failure of mass to meet ‘intrinsic’ criteria as 
well as the current scientific approach give reasonable doubt to their status and challenges the 
rationale of intrinsic properties in general.   
 Modern physical theories dispute the ‘intrinsic’ classification of mass (and similar 
would-be fundamental properties) while offering an unexpected reconceptualisation of it as a 
property acquired through interactions with a certain field.  Although mass is commonly seen 
as a property intrinsically possessed by many objects (local intrinsicality), what makes it 
seem like one of the globally significant properties is its believed specific and uniform 
possession by certain ‘elementary’ particles, a trait that is wholly lacking in biological 
organisms; while it may be intrinsic to certain objects that they have mass, the specific mass 
(e.g. 3kg) may or may not be intrinsic.  For instance, my mass is something that constantly 
changes because of external and internal processes (e.g. gamma radiation, the heat I give off, 
sweat etc.), but we think of an electron’s mass as being quite set.  If a particle interaction 
were to produce a relatively large negatively charged mass, we would expect it to produce 
several electrons rather than one really massive electron.  However, currently (and for several 
decades) the best candidate for the nature of mass is relational and does not depend solely on 
the nature of the object that possesses it. 
It will first be useful to review what we mean by the term ‘mass’ before investigating 
how it arises
21
.  Mass is generally interpreted in one of two ways, both of which are deemed 
equivalent through general relativity (in practice if not conceptually); either mass is the 
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 David Denby includes ‘mass’ in examples of intrinsic properties, along with some more controversial—and 
under my account erroneous—examples: “redness, roundness and being 3kg are intrinsic” (Denby, p.1).   
20
 It has been argued that elementary particle charges may have altered over time, whereby the extreme 
conditions of the very early universe could have seen neutrinos with charge that subsequently evolved into 
chargeless particles (Ignatiev and Joshi 1993).  Additionally, though a now unpopular theory, physicist Richard 
Feynman (via Paul Dirac) suggested viewing anti-particles as their paired normal particles moving backward in 
time (Feynman 1949), thus allowing charge to be a matter of directional (perspective) interpretation.  Less is 
known about spin, though it is still generally regarded as intrinsic to elementary particles. 
21
 There is a long history of regarding mass as a theoretical concept rather than an observational ontological 
primitive; for a thorough discussion of approaches to mass see (Jammer 2000). 
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property of an object that resists changes in its motion (typically regarded as inertial mass or 
mi), or it is the property of an object that determines the strength of its interaction with a 
gravitational field (gravitational mass or mg)
 22
.  Given these definitions—and particularly the 
former—one might wonder what exactly counts as resisting changes to motion; might an 
object’s mood, or surface area, or charge affect this resistance and thus be counted as ‘mass’?   
Such flexibility in the term is not so strange as one might think, and indeed, the idea of 
‘electromagnetic mass’ (as opposed to gravitational mass) has existed for over a hundred 
years since at least J. J. Thomson’s writing of it in 1886 wherein he noted that the additional 
resistance to motion felt by a charged (as opposed to an uncharged) sphere was not due to 
normal friction but “must be due to an increase in the mass” (Thomson, p.230).  That is, 
charged—and generally fast-moving—particles exhibit a greater mass than uncharged or 
stationary particles.  Because electromagnetic flux lines are directional, this observation lead 
to the further refinements of ‘longitudinal’ and ‘transverse’ mass that could be observed 
depending on the direction of observation to the field.   
Electromagnetic mass, however, like gravitational and inertial mass, fails to be 
intrinsic by our standards, since the mass of an object is tied to environmental interactions, 
most specifically with the surrounding field.  Another commonly used concept is of 
‘invariant’ or ‘rest mass’ which makes use of the energy/mass equivalence and denotes the 
total energy (including momentum) of a Lorentz-invariant system or object.  Such an 
interpretation allows for positive invariant mass values even when examining a pair of 
‘massless’ particles (e.g. photons).  Distinct from this definition and the others, however, is 
the hypothesised and unmeasurable (González-Martín, p.1175) ‘bare’ mass (attributable as an 
intrinsic property to an object free of any fields and interactions), which is presumed to be 
zero (Jammer, p.35).  It is perhaps this ‘bare mass’ that philosophers have in mind for an 
intrinsic property, since it is free of any environmental interactions, but such a formulation is 
arguably of little use since it is only hypothetical, requires a very unique and abnormal 
environment, and our predominant understanding of mass is as a relational property—as an 
environmental effect.  Thus, I will refer to the empirically observed mass in the gravitational 
or inertial sense. 
It is noteworthy that both these senses of the term are relational, that is, they depend 
upon how the object in question interacts with other entities.  Looking to the mathematical 
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 Gravitational mass may be further divided into active (the gravitational force exerted by the body) and passive 
(the body’s susceptibility to gravitational force), but the specifics are not important to our discussion. 
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formulation does not seem to be any different, as inertial mass (and thus equivalently mg) can 
be defined, via Newton’s second law of motion, as the ratio, or proportionality factor, 
between a force and its produced acceleration (f = ma).  As physicist Max Jammer notes, this 
is not a very satisfying definition, as we are prompted to either take both force and mass as 
primitives, and thus have an ignotum per ignotius, or we also take the meaning of force from 
this relation and are left with a circular definition.  If this is what we mean by mass, it is odd 
that it should so commonly be seen as an intrinsic property.  We may then ask if, say, an 
electron were not interacting with anything would it possess its mass of roughly 1/1800
th
 that 
of a proton
23—or indeed, any mass at all?  That is the question of intrinsics put to mass, and 
to which our best physical theories respond negatively.   
If, on the other hand, we assume (as philosophers seem to do) that the object 
possesses this property of interaction even when not interacting, then we might again be 
driven toward developing a metaphysics of dispositions, whereby a particle has the intrinsic 
disposition to produce the phenomenon of mass when interacting in such-and-such a way.  
My focus here is not on dispositions (though more in 4.4), as I want to continue with the 
notion of properties at hand.  For now, I will focus on non-dispositional intrinsic properties 
and pick up Bauer’s mention of the mass-generating Higgs field. 
With our definitions of mass, we can inquire just how particles get the masses they 
have.  Researchers began creating the modern answer to this question some 50 years ago with 
the hypothesis of an all-pervasive field that ultimately became known as the Higgs field
24
.  It 
is supposed that this is the field in virtue of which particles (and thus ourselves) acquire mass, 
and so will bear some investigation.  Along with work by Peter Higgs, in the early 1960’s 
Carl Brans and Robert Dicke suggested that Newton’s gravitational constant G might vary 
over space and time.  They calculated a new scalar field  (later reconstituted as the Higgs 
field) which was inversely proportional to G, surmising that “any measurements of an 
object’s mass would therefore depend on the local value of ” (Kaiser, p.537)25.  This Higgs 
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 Even to calculate a particle’s mass, a renormalisation procedure is required; the emission and subsequent re-
absorption of a photon by a bound electron leads to calculations of infinite self-mass (or energy) for the electron.  
To cancel out this infinity, the associated divergent energy shift is used, rendering a renormalization of mass 
(Jammer, p.39-40). 
24
 While this approach has been common knowledge among physicists for generations, it has not appeared to 
come to the attention of many metaphysicians, or if it did, was deemed inconsequential. 
25
 Specifically, particles of the gauge field would acquire a non-zero mass given by m
2
=2g
2
v
2
, where g is the 
coupling constant determining field interaction strength and v is the velocity (Kaiser, p.539). 
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field
26
 is a remnant of the turbulent start of our universe, uniformly pervading all of space 
like a giant net that at one stage embraced a symmetry among the particles (i.e. there were no 
separate forces and all energetic nodes—would-be particles—were treated the same).  But as 
temperatures dropped and space expanded, the energy fluctuations of the field settled into a 
stable state that took a non-zero value and broke this symmetry spontaneously, interacting 
asymmetrically with particles.  Indeed, researchers calculate that for space to be as stable as 
possible—to harbour as little energy as possible—the Higgs field will assume a non-zero 
value (Greene, 2004, p.260)
27
.    
That activity rather than immobility should be the most stable state may prompt us to 
wonder if interactions are not more fundamental and intrinsic to an object than ‘being at rest’.  
This is a similar, if not identical, concern to my earlier worries that isolating objects from the 
rest of the universe à la Vallentyne may be a poor model for getting at their intrinsic 
properties.  In both cases, the assumption I wish to challenge is that immobility and isolation 
are more accurate representations of objects (which are never in such situations) than how 
they actually are.  The Kim/Lewis tradition of denoting intrinsic properties as those an object 
has either in isolation or accompanied is a more thoughtful step, but I’m not sure their 
reasoning was ever along the lines given above.  I will return to the idea of interactive 
intrinsic properties in chapter 4, but for now we only need note that, though the exact way in 
which the Higgs field settles on its particular non-zero value is unclear, that it does so is 
critical for rendering mass. 
Once the field has broken symmetry to assume such a value, the field’s charge will 
manifest even when no particles are present, resulting in a weak charge pervading all of 
spacetime.  The field presents resistance to less-energetic entities and accelerated motion.  
Thus, when particles responsive to the weak force acquire enough energy they are able to 
navigate the Higgs field as if symmetry were preserved and it had a zero value, that is, such 
particles are then able to interact as if they did not have mass (Randall, p.216).  Relatedly, of 
the four fundamental forces
28
, the Higgs field is most concerned with the weak force (and, 
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 The field also “can occasionally cause the spin to flip…[but] for a rapidly moving particle this happens only 
rarely” (Wilczek and Devine, p.243).   
27
 It is conjectured that if the field gets trapped in a high-energy configuration, it will exert a negative pressure, 
which might account for the inflationary period following the big bang. 
28
 The four forces are gravity, electromagnetic, strong and weak forces, though some have taken to shortening 
this list by combining the electromagnetic and weak into the electroweak force, and still others are confident 
enough to have only gravity and an amalgam of the other three.  
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indeed, has been called the ‘weak field’), giving the bosonic carriers of the weak force alone 
a ‘mass’ as opposed to the other forces’ massless bosons.   
The massless photon is not perturbed by the Higgs field because it interacts only with 
electrically charged entities, and may thus pass through unscathed.  In addition to the gauge 
bosons, the Higgs field also provides all non-force carrying fermionic particles with mass
29
.  
It is believed that these weak bosons as well as the fermionic “quarks and leptons acquire 
mass by bouncing off the Higgs charge distributed everywhere throughout spacetime.  
Without the Higgs field, these particles would also have zero mass” (Randall, p.214).  And 
for the (brief) time the particles travel in between the ‘grid lines’ of the Higgs field, they 
would not have any mass at all.  Admittedly, the charge of the field is spread so thinly 
throughout the vacuum (with a density roughly corresponding to 10
-22
 cm) that particles 
cannot travel freely over very long distances (Randall, p.214).  Nonetheless, physicists argue 
that it is resistance to this field that creates what we call the property of mass, and without 
interactions with the Higgs field, “all fundamental particles would be like the photon and 
have no mass whatsoever” (Greene, 2004,p.263).  Under theory, then, mass is acquired 
through interaction with the Higgs field and does not belong to a ‘particle’ in virtue of itself 
alone. 
Beyond the constant acquisition of mass in interactions with the Higgs field, there are 
other strange effects that arise from ambient energy and within structured environments 
through the relations between particles that blur the concept of mass.  For instance, the 
energetic ‘vacuum’ that becomes more noticeable with fewer particles around, can behave 
much like the Higgs field, in that “any particle placed in a jittery vacuum will suffer an 
enormous increase in its mass” (Susskind, p.249).  Similar alterations crop up in the more 
structured environment of crystal lattices, wherein “electrons move around…as if they had a 
mass entirely different from their ordinary mass.  Not only can this ‘effective’ mass differ 
from the free mass by factors of ten or even a hundred…it may assume different values in 
different directions, and…it may be negative” (Ridley, p.136). That the effective mass is 
different from that observed for a free electron is not so troubling (since the accelerations are 
quite different for each environment) as the allowance for negative mass, which is brought 
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 In quantum mechanics, particles are divided into Fermions and Bosons according to their ‘spins’.  The former 
have half integer spin and include electrons, pions, muons, quarks and other matter constituents, while the latter 
have integer spin and are the carriers of the fundamental forces (via photons, gluons etc.). 
43 
 
about by the electron moving, in this case, “in a crystal in the direction opposite to that it 
would have in free space” (Jammer, p.38).   
We do not typically think of mass as a quality that could be negative, but it is often 
this aspect that we forget in forming our expectations, divesting ourselves of the same 
reasoning that made negative charge and negative energy
30
 palatable and instead focusing on 
mass as some sort of material essence.  We seem more comfortable with the notion of 
negative charge—perhaps even negative energy—but is there a good reason for this 
preference?  Physics suggests otherwise, using mass as an involved and interactive concept 
that takes account of its environment.  For instance, it is not just the quantity of matter but the 
separation distance of objects, energy and pressure that contribute to the strength of the 
gravitational field (Greene, 2004, p.276), which in turn affects the mass.  This is problematic 
for taking stock of mass as an intrinsic property; since general relativity tells us that any 
additional energy, in the form of pressure or otherwise, affects gravity—and thus our 
conception of mass—then a stretched rubber band is more massive than a relaxed band and a 
frog ready to jump is slightly more massive than it will be when sleeping.  The addition of 
pressure
31
 to our calculations (along with various concerns for properties like momentum) 
increases the complexity while highlighting the interactive and non-intrinsic nature of mass. 
3.1.1 Conclusion 
 
Mass has long been one of the few safe examples of an intrinsic property, as something that, 
unlike weight, does not depend on any externals, any other entity.  Modern physics does not 
subscribe to this thesis, finding this bizarre world of properties to originate not from a 
“difference…of quality, or even of degree, but of environment” (Ridley, p.137).  Physicist 
Bruce Shumm is likewise confident that “one of the most basic and common-sense attributes 
of a physical object – that of mass – has been removed from the conceptual lexicon by the 
juggernaut of modern physics, having been exposed as the combination of two illusory 
effects: those of internal mass-energy and of the Higgs field screening currents.  The notion 
of mass, it would seem, is a sham” (Schumm, p.306).  Even if our current theory on the 
nature of mass is faulty in some way, that physics operates within the framework that looks 
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 Because the full energy/mass relation is defined by E
2
= m
2
c
4
, both the traditional positive root equation and 
the negative root equation (E= –mc2) are possible, thus allowing for negative energy. 
31
 Pressure need not always augment mass however, regional pressure may be negative, and thus exert a 
repulsive gravity. 
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for how fundamental particles acquire their mass suggests that the description of mass will 
revolve around interactions with external entities, and thus, traditionally extrinsic elements.  
 One might object that this is all too quick, and that regardless of the mess of 
interdependent properties there is still some property that distinguishes, say, electrons from 
photons; there is something, at base, that underpins electromagnetism over here and no-
electromagnetism over there.  While I am somewhat sympathetic to this approach, I do not 
think it is argument enough to counter my conclusions.  First, there may be some physical 
difference between electrons and photons that grounds their different property 
manifestations, but we have no further idea what that is.  Much like Kant noted of objects-in-
themselves, we would not be able to say much more about them then that they may be there, 
which makes them far less useful to metaphysical debate.  For instance, to speak of real 
change involves our stating, without any particulars, that whatever is really object X has not 
changed.  The best we can do is say that there is something, we know not what exactly, that 
makes an object what it is, which is hardly an enlightening approach to understanding things 
like ‘naturalness’ or duplicate worlds.   
 Second, any relations between grounding properties or dependencies at such a level is 
equally mysterious such that there may be only one difference between, say, an electron and a 
photon that nonetheless gives rise to, or grounds—perhaps through interdependent means—
what seems to us to be several intrinsic properties.  That is, once we sacrifice the properties 
of which we have at least some knowledge (mass, spin, charge), we have no way of knowing 
what the underlying properties are, or how many there are.  It may also be the case, however 
unpopular, that there are interdependent dispositions
32
 all the way down (rather than distinct 
causal bases).  That is, whatever makes properties or objects different from each other might 
itself be dependent on other factors.  The range of unknowns attendant to these objections 
strikes me as overwhelmingly unhelpful, and though that certainly does not mean some form 
of underlying ‘intrinsic’ property does not exist, my argument is not so broad.  My 
conclusions on metaphysical utility and the extensive growth in extrinsic properties from 
classical accounts are not in jeopardy, and moreover, intrinsic properties like mass, as we 
now conceive them, are dependent on things beyond the object in question. 
If this is so, and environment proves so essential to an object’s properties, then the 
definition of intrinsic in 1.2.4 has a significantly deflated utility from its classical conception.  
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 For a discussion of dispositional intrinsic properties see section 4.4. 
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It gives us reason to doubt that the few other ventured ‘intrinsic’ fundamental properties 
(spin, charge) are wholly independent of the environment, or even whether we know where 
the environment ends and the object begins in order to ascertain this dependence.  Although 
we might yet protest that there is something that underlies mass and makes particle A 
different from particle B, the environmental dependence of mass as we know it should be a 
telling example to complacent metaphysicians and pose a challenge to the real-world utility 
of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  With only a handful of tenuous property options in one 
half of the distinction, the distinction looks less and less useful and more like an antiquated 
world view that is more trouble than it is worth. 
3.2 Object Boundaries 
 
The next few sections (3.2 – 3.4) focus on issues of indefiniteness; boundaries are vague and 
the environment in which objects are immersed make classical ascriptions of object extent 
and characteristics indefinite.  Our modern elementary particles are importantly different 
“from those of the atomists in antiquity by an absence of sharply defined limits that separate 
things being from things not being, matter from empty space” (Genz, p.216).  Part of this 
difference lies in (a) modern particles’ lack of sharp values in principle that we normally 
think bundle together in, or to make, an object (Davies and Gribbin, p.220), and part of the 
difference lies in (b) the particle’s constant immersion and participation in energetic fields 
and dependence relations.   
 Indefinite boundaries have long been a concern for philosophers in all areas of 
vagueness, from language to the Sorites paradox, and these concerns can certainly be seen as 
an extension of those worries (e.g. just where does the object end and the environment 
begin?).  But as noted in (a), there is a further conviction in these physical cases that the 
indefiniteness is there in principle and cannot be pinned to lazy language practices or 
inadequate measuring tools.  This is a drastic break with the classical conception of an object 
and thus I will take some time to give an idea of just how large a break it is.  In addition to 
this focus, I argue that this sort of vagueness of boundary is also significant to the attribution 
of intrinsic properties in at least two ways.   
 First, I take the classical conception of an object to assume a specificity of value and 
stability to its properties.  That is, when something is described as being coloured, we expect 
it to be some colour in particular for some useful period of time; likewise if something has 
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mass, we expect it to have some mass or other.  The classical intrinsic property, then, is 
something that has more stability than an instantaneous flash and is determinate (and definite) 
rather than just a determinable.  Physics gives us reasons to reject this and embrace property 
types, stopping short of specifying any definite property values.  This may not seem like 
much of a loss (revisited in section 4.1), since even while there was an expectation of further 
definition we were happy to speak of intrinsic properties in terms of property types (e.g. 
speaking of having mass rather than having mass of 3kg), but the loss of ‘definiteness in 
principle’ needs to be noted. 
Second, and more importantly, having indistinct object boundaries makes dependence 
relations indistinct as well, occluding a critical component of our working definition of 
intrinsicality.  In struggling to separate our most basic entities from the environment, we are 
at best left with indefinite dependence relations, and likely often with simply dependent 
relations, both of which are problematic for determining intrinsic properties.  Object 
properties that once appeared to be independent of anything else are now lobbed into a 
maelstrom of properties of the ‘object-environment’ system— not clearly possessed by one or 
the other.   
Additionally, it is possible that fluctuating or indefinite boundaries will alter which 
properties are intrinsic to a given object at any given instant.  It may be, for instance, that at 
one instant in this environment an object possesses property X while in another instant in that 
environment, the object lacks property X.  Even if we somehow knew the fundamental global 
properties, we might still struggle with attributing intrinsic properties to certain objects.  
With ‘intrinsicality’ conceived of in terms of independence, the failure of classical objects to 
meet traditional standards of separation from the environment thus casts the attribution and 
existence of intrinsic properties into doubt.  A serious engagement with our modern 
understanding of the relevant physics will go a long way in alleviating the anachronistic 
world view of sharp object boundaries in a mechanical, rather than quantum, universe.   
3.2.1 Indefinite boundaries 
 
One of the first concerns we might raise about the boundaries of objects like particles, is that 
they have vastly larger parameters than once thought, in the form of fields.  In some sense, 
particles are fields; indeed, as Fleming and Butterfield have argued, it may not be particles 
‘at the bottom’ at all, despite our common reference to them; further, “the single 
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particle/antiparticle position operators are not independent constructions: their existence, and 
our study of them, in no way entails commitment to a particle theory as ‘more fundamental’ 
than quantized fields” (Fleming and Butterfield, p.153).  To get an understanding of these 
particle-fields, physicists analyse data for ‘sharp values’ of the property in question (e.g. 
specific, determinate values for momentum, position etc.).  One might think these sharp 
values are properties of the object in virtue of itself alone, but they appear to be extrinsic; 
“there is good reason to regard sharp values of properties as relational, as opposed to intrinsic 
attributes” (Brown, p.63)33.   
Part of the problem is that formulating a sharp value is done in terms of something 
else, some reference point.  This then raises concerns involving relativity theory that make 
the needed relations to some other ‘frame’ body (rather than to an abstract coordinate grid) 
problematic, since in standard quantum mechanics the particle may not have a “sharp location 
relative to an inertial coordinate system or…to an external frame body, at the same instant” 
(Brown, p.66).  The chosen spacetime slice, the system’s reference points and how one 
classifies the system (e.g. as fields, particles or a mix of both) can all make a difference as to 
the values an object manifests.  Thus, the lack of definite boundaries through ‘particle-fields’ 
and the relational nature of sharp values, makes the attribution of object boundaries and 
intrinsic properties (properties of what, where?) quite slippery. 
Of course, particles are not just particle-fields, they are also particle/waves, and in 
either capacity their boundaries (because of their position) are fundamentally uncertain.  
Heisenberg’s well known uncertainty principle clearly relates the uncertainty involved with 
our observational intrusion into the microscopic world, but it also reflects the dual nature of 
particles/waves.  The physicist James Jeans argued that the electron, as a wave packet, does 
not appear to offer both an exact speed and position: when the wave packet is of an 
infinitesimal length it offers a fairly specific position but leaves no room for the wavelength 
qualities to develop, that is, there is not a clear speed.  However, as the length of the wave 
packet grows, it becomes an infinite train of waves that gives no reason to locate the electron 
to any particular point of it (Jeans, p.168).   
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 Much more might (and has been) said on this, as many interpretations of quantum mechanics seek out 
relational schemes for properties, specifying “state-dependent rules for assigning sharp values to some of the 
self-adjoint operators [local observables] representing magnitudes (or equivalently for assigning bivalent truth 
values to some propositions describing properties of the system)” (Brown, p.61, emphasis added). 
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The exact nature and substance of this wave is elusive, and is commonly understood 
as a probability wave (much like a proverbial heat or crime wave).  This energy or 
probability wave spreads out to infinity (Greene, 2004, p.90)—which of itself creates a 
problem for getting objects on their own away from any interactions so that we might observe 
their intrinsic properties—offering a range of locations that we might find the lump ‘particle’ 
at any moment and possessing articulate mathematical formulations to that end.  However, 
the probability wave is most useful when examining many electrons; physicist Mark 
Silverman stresses that  
the manifestations of wave-like behavior are statistical in nature and always emerge 
from the collective outcome of many electron events.  In the present [double slit] 
experiment nothing wave-like is discernible in the arrival of single electrons at the 
observation plane. It is only after the arrival of perhaps tens of thousands of electrons 
that a pattern interpretable as wave-like interference emerges (Silverman, p.9-10).  
This probability wave may also offer one of the better options for an intrinsic property of 
these fundamental particle-waves (e.g. giving an intrinsic property of probabilistic 
momentum etc.), although trying to be much more specific than that may cause problems.  
Because the wave is probabilistic, accurate predictions of specific outcomes are impossible, 
leading many physicists to echo Jeans’ comment on the built-in indeterminacy; “identical 
electrons in identical experiments may do different things.  There is thus an intrinsic 
uncertainty in the subatomic world” (Davies and Gribbin, p.209).  This also has repercussions 
for (b), separating the object from its environment.  
3.2.2 Interdependent environment 
 
To relegate this uncertainty to the quantum world alone would be over hasty and require 
explanation in any case.  In principle this uncertainty plagues the human-sized world too, and 
as such gives an unabashedly interactive take on the configuration of objects as we know 
them.  It may be that the very determinateness of visible objects issues from interactions with 
their environment, rather than external interactions merely degrading the object from its ‘real’ 
state.  It is supposed that 
In principle, even macroscopic objects such as people and planets have their 
individual quantum waves…[but] the length of the waves diminishes in proportion to 
the momentum.…A typical bacterium would have a wavelength less than the size of 
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an atomic nucleus, and a pitched baseball has a wavelength of only 10
-32
 centimetres.  
Each of these objects can only tunnel through a barrier comparable in thickness to 
their respective wavelengths (Davies and Gribbin, p.207).   
However finite it may be for familiar macroscopic objects, there is thus to be expected a 
blurring of boundaries as constituent particles occasionally tunnel into and out of objects and 
the objects themselves possess their own miniscule wave or ‘mode’.  This indeterminacy can 
generally be settled, often one property at a time, by an external entity interacting with the 
particle and forcing the so-called ‘wave-collapse’34, which happens countless times a second 
for large objects like chairs and people.  The wave nature of the quantum realm means that 
probability waves interfere and decohere, which allows the ‘fuzziness’ and indeterminacy of 
the wave aspect to blur and collapse to a sharp value even when instigated non-locally.  
While admittedly happening in very short time frames, the blurring and collapse of an 
object’s wave function (its decoherence) appears to thus depend on environmental 
interactions (Greene, 2004, p.210-11).  Such dependence on things beyond the object itself 
puts its shape and the sharpness of it property values (and likely certain properties 
themselves) beyond the definition of intrinsicality given in section 1.2.4.   
Thus, a cursory glance at delimiting an object’s discrete extent with definite values 
reveals that mass, coherence and even the adopting of sharp property values depends on other 
entities.  With the parent objects so fundamentally bound up and integrated with the 
environment, properties that we think stand a good chance of being intrinsic, have a high 
probability of likewise being integrated with and dependent on the environment.  This 
situation is only aggravated by pervading fields that draw out virtual ephemera from what we 
call ‘the particle’ that seem neither wholly a part of it nor wholly separate.   
3.3 Virtual Particles and Fields 
 
Virtual particles and vacuum energy do little to alleviate this messy articulation of 
boundaries, either encouraging a grander ontology or a review of what may count as ‘the 
object itself’.  Pertinently, we may ask if it is the vacuum that elicits these virtual particles 
from the particle or the particle itself.  And what is a virtual particle?  Although neither 
answer is entirely clear, the latter may be slightly more accessible and so I will begin with it.  
A virtual particle exists for a very brief moment such that we could not, even in principle, 
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 ‘So-called’ because there is little agreement on what this entails, and whether writing it into equations is the 
most accurate interpretation of events. 
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measure it, and possesses all the properties except the exact energy of its modelled ‘real’ 
twin.  For high-energy collisions or simply along the trajectory of fast moving particles, new 
particles and their anti-particles are created and “can be thought of as latent everywhere in 
space, as ‘virtual’ particles.  Normally, virtual particles can exist only very transiently, 
because the Heisenberg uncertainty relation allows them to ‘borrow’ their rest-mass energy 
for only a very short time” (Begelman and Rees, p.225).   
 However, the virtual photon exchange (between electrons for example) can also occur 
over longer periods of time and over (relatively) vast distances, say, of a kilometre.  This is 
permitted because “the energy of a photon can be as small as it likes.  There is no limit 
because the rest-mass energy of the photon is zero” (Ridley, p.123).  If the mass were greater, 
the distance would need to be greatly reduced such that the product of the energy and time 
would be within Planck’s constant (h).  The same sort of process can happen to a photon as 
well, allowing it to split into an electron-positron pair so long as it immediately recombines 
into a photon (although there is less flexibility for the distance and duration between 
absorption as both the produced virtual electron and virtual positron have mass).  The image 
that emerges from this virtual world is of electrons surrounding  
themselves with a cloud of virtual photons…[and these] virtual photons may [in turn] 
surround themselves with virtual pairs…So an electron moves about in the centre of a 
cloud of photons and electron-positron pairs.  Moreover, the [virtual] electrons…will 
be repelled electrostatically by their parent electron, whereas the positrons will be 
attracted…the electron has electrically polarized the vacuum! (Ridley, p.117).   
It is this ‘fuzz’ that has moved scientists to designate quantum fields instead of merely 
quantum particles, embracing an uneasy ontology of field and particle revolving around 
calculations of probabilistic centres
35
.   
I think that this creates a problem of identity—an indefiniteness and ontological 
blurring between ‘that object right there’, and ‘this pervading energy type’ (field).   In 
perhaps something of a strained analogy, if one person became blurred with all of personhood 
on earth, we could expect a noticeable change in intrinsic properties.  Whether your 
boundaries neatly follow your skin and hair, or whether they include a nearby dog and a 
flower vase will affect your identity and what properties ‘you’ possess.  That is, what sort of 
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 Particles, then, are essentially part of the fields they contribute to and inhabit; some argue that they are “tied 
physically to the field and can never be considered as a separate entity” (Ridley, p.118). 
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physical parameters, interactions and sphere of dependence an object has, importantly defines 
that object; boundaries matter.  So when we find a particle/wave or particle/field duality 
creating and annihilating in immeasurable times
36
 particles of opposite charge, of varying 
spins and masses, we should at least pause and evaluate whether our classifications are as 
straightforward as we take them to be.  Virtual particles may be persistent enough for us to 
wonder how they contribute to the object’s boundaries. 
  The vacuum itself is a source of particles of all types, but interacts in specific ways 
with particles travelling through it to produce certain virtual particles.  Indeed, the vacuum is 
not empty at all but is a huge reservoir of energy that can distort space, expanding it with a 
positive value or shrinking it with a negative one (Randall, p.298).  While such quantum 
contributions seem to partly depend upon the energy of the vacuum, they are also important 
to the ‘real’ parent particle, since “the quantum contributions must be added to the classical 
mass to determine the true, physical mass” (Randall, p.246).  With this connection to mass 
through the virtual particle formation around particles, part of the real particle’s total mass 
lies in the area around the particle and extending to infinity (Ridley, p.134).  Indeed, when 
looking at the fields generated around the quarks of neutrons and protons, “we find that the 
quarks themselves provide very little of the total mass and that the fields created by these 
particles contribute most of the energy…and, hence, the rest mass” (Krauss, p.70).  The 
extraordinarily transient and directly unmeasurable virtual particles issuing from and 
collapsing into energetic ‘space’ thus significantly blur the object/environment distinction. 
And these contributions not only affect mass but the strength of fundamental forces as 
well.  Quantum mechanics calculates the strength of an interaction as the sum of interactions, 
or ‘quantum contributions’, that would occur from all possible paths37 taken by a force-
carrying gauge boson.  For instance, the electromagnetic force decreases with distance 
because photons, which do not interact with each other, will encounter more and more virtual 
particles en route, diluting the initial electron’s force as the photon’s virtual positrons and 
virtual electrons polarize space.  On the other hand, the strong force is enhanced over 
distances since its gauge boson, the gluon, can interact with itself and thus gives rise to a pair 
of virtual gluons (and so on) that enhance the strength over distances (Randall, p.232).  These 
quantum contributions/ virtual particles seem far more natural to an object in the universe 
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 It is daunting to sift through the Planck length bursts of virtual particle formations and try to settle on a time t 
(or a spacetime slice) when the real particle is truly itself, replete with intrinsic properties. 
37
 Taking the ‘sum of all histories’ is a standard approach in quantum theory and has lead to, among other 
things, the Many Worlds interpretation.  
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than static boundaries and, as I suggested earlier, motivate a much more dynamic notion of 
object and a rethinking of how and to what we apply intrinsic properties.  Those who feel that 
the more traditional examples of intrinsic properties are more important to defining the term 
(e.g. mass), will need to seriously consider section 1.2.4’s modal characterisation and defend 
its strengths against the interactive and interdependent picture science provides.   
3.4 Relativity and Spacetime 
 
The conclusions of relativity and the variability of spacetime are another concern for the 
separability of objects, and thereby attributions of intrinsicality, and while the difficulties 
they pose in this respect might be incorporated by using more refined expressions, or 
‘patching’, of intrinsicality (e.g. taking into account the spacetime slice or the background 
temperature), they might simply confuse issues.  The lack of an absolute reference frame 
makes a particle’s ‘real’ intrinsic properties difficult to state absolutely and may even 
encourage an events-based rather than an object-based ontology whereby qualitative 
statistical centres are the fundamental stuff of the universe rather than particles or objects.  As 
Simon Saunders has argued, “we think there is an essence, an underlying identity, which is 
there before us, rather than a particular event or sequence of events of such-and-such a kind. 
This is the picture that must be given up.  Here as elsewhere relativity requires the language 
of events, not of things” (Saunders, p.93-4).  To see why he might suggest such a 
metaphysical overhaul would require more space than presently allowed, so a brief overview 
will have to suffice. 
We know that many of a particle’s properties appear tied to its environment as well as 
to other particles, but included in this list is a particle’s frame of reference, or how fast it is 
moving relative to other bodies, which can alter some of its most basic characteristics.  For 
example, its size “cannot be meaningfully separated as a concept from the dynamic quantities 
energy and momentum” (Ridley, p.54).  By factoring in momentum, one must examine the 
motion of a particle, which is bound up with its relation to other bodies (and how it is 
constantly changing position with regards to them), as it is unclear what motion would mean 
in a universe of one object.  Motion is certainly an integral component to the characteristics 
of an object, but it is unclear whether it should be considered an intrinsic property or whether 
anything dependent on it should be.  After all, it is defined by relations to something else (the 
earth or otherwise). 
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Because relativity theory disallows privileging any particular reference frame, there is 
no reason to suppose that a particle’s mass at rest in one frame of reference is more 
fundamental than its mass at a high velocity or at rest in a different reference frame; mass 
(like the electromagnetic field) appears in different frames as different combinations of its 
energy and momentum (Lange, p.240).  For instance, general relativity predicts that massive 
or rotating objects warp spacetime itself, and this frame dragging gives two very different 
perspectives when, say, an observer is falling toward a massive star.  The falling observer 
will perceive himself falling straight down to the surface, while his starship crew, watching 
from a safe distance, will see him spiral down to the star in a curve (Greene, 2004, p.416).  
This sort of encounter will offer a different set of intrinsic properties depending on one’s 
vantage point and can easily lead to calculations of mass exceeding the sum of the constituent 
masses (Lange, p.231).   
Furthermore, the particle’s inertial mass also “increases apparently without limit as 
the particle velocity approaches the speed of light…energy of motion manifests itself directly 
as increase of mass” (Ridley, p.105).  Because of the viability of any reference frame (and the 
alteration to spacetime through object motion) this alteration of apparent mass and similar 
properties is not so easily discounted.  Not only does this approach break with classical 
conceptions of an object, it has the potential to change  even the property types of properties 
attributed to an object (e.g. having mass may disappear from some perspectives).  
3.4.1 Temperature 
 
Intrinsic properties are affected not only by their own interactions, but also by environmental 
differences to those values, notably through temperature and spatial density.  As noted earlier, 
temperatures are closely tied to our conception of mass, in that, as temperatures increase, the 
Higgs field is predicted to vanish and particles will lose their mass.  In addition to this change 
in the properties of matter, temperature (and thus energy, and even the size of the universe
38
) 
seems to be responsible for the variety of forces we have and the world as we know it.  Thus, 
a possible world where temperatures are substantially increased would likely wreak havoc on 
our laws and ontology in a way that armchair philosophy has little chance of foreseeing.  
Physicists are confident that  
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 All these elements follow a related progression in our universe, where during its early moments it was quite 
small and quite hot and did not differentiate between bosons. 
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the strengths of all three nongravitational forces depend on the energy and 
temperature of the environment in which the forces act…there is indirect theoretical 
and experimental evidence that at very high temperatures, such as occurred in the 
earliest moments of the universe, the strengths of all three forces converge, indicating, 
albeit indirectly, that all three forces themselves may fundamentally be unified, and 
appear distinct only at low energies and temperatures (Greene, 2004, p.526). 
Trying to patch our attribution of an intrinsic property to include some specification of 
temperature will be one patch among many, and may require stipulating cosmological time as 
well, which looks to be more effort than it is worth. 
While temperature certainly implies a strong temporal element in our intrinsic 
property calculations given its correlation to universal age (and how far back we want to take 
property dependence), pressure indicates the importance of spatial positioning.  For even the 
life cycle of a star cannot be told without mention of its surroundings (indeed, it would be 
difficult to classify anything as an individuated object without some background from which 
to separate it), as the star’s eventual implosion, and implosions in general, need pressure 
differences between places rather than simply high pressure (Begelman and Rees, p.229).  
Pressure of itself has no force and it is this relation to an other, to a substance of different 
density that allows the billions of stars and many other processes to continue.  While large 
objects admittedly suffer little change in their important properties from their pressures, 
pressure is nonetheless “a source of gravity…[and] in the excited quantum vacuum…the 
pressure is so great that its gravitational effect actually exceeds that of its mass-energy” 
(Davies and Gribbin, p.165).  This elevates spatial density differences to a very consequential 
plain in the quantum world, and makes it even harder to abide by the contraction and 
independence theories of intrinsicality posited in section 2.3.   
3.5 Discussion 
Let us take stock of our interlude with modern physics and review the physical challenges to 
the traditional ‘object vs. environment’ world view it presented.  First, focusing on mass as an 
exemplar intrinsic property, we saw that mass not only has a fundamentally relational 
definition but that it is assumed to be something that is dependent upon the Higgs field.  And 
because mass’ definition lies with an object’s relative resistance to motion, we saw that it is a 
property that appears to undergo drastic change depending on its environment (e.g. in crystal 
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lattices or at high speeds).  It seems clear that mass is not a property that depends only on the 
object that possess it—that the object has its mass in virtue of itself alone, and moreover is a 
property it would have independently of any other thing.  This account does not bode well for 
the other candidates of the commonly proffered small set of intrinsic properties of say, spin 
and charge, (although their particular tenability is not dealt with here) and leaves the 
traditional separability of objects from their surroundings in jeopardy by highlighting a 
fundamentally interdependent world.  Additionally, any move toward a more fundamental 
something that gives rise to properties like mass also seems lost in unknowns to such an 
extent that metaphysical discourse would receive more harm that help to include it (e.g. it 
does not enlighten the concepts of chapter 1). 
 Second, we looked at object boundaries through wave/particle duality, state-
dependent sharp values and environmental decoherence.  Standard quantum theory gives 
particles an inherent uncertainty in the values for their local observables (e.g. momentum) 
which suggests such entities may not have clear boundaries to be found.  At the very least 
their nature is something much more exotic than our human-sized objects, and trying to dress 
such particles in the same sort of ‘clothes’ as chairs and cats is inappropriate.  This is 
especially so when we investigate what our best theories say of how those familiar everyday 
objects acquire their seemingly determinate boundaries.   
 That is, generalising from the quantum world of single particles to the human-sized 
amalgamation of trillions and trillions of them, physicists argue that the particulars we see—
all the properties and sharp values of position etc.—are produced through interactions with 
other entities ‘collapsing’ the wave functions to set values.  The boundary between the 
particles that count as, say, ‘outer cat fur particle’, and the proximate but somehow distinct 
‘environmental particle’ at a given instant may be indefinite, even in principle and thus 
presents a notion of ‘object’ distinct from classical conceptions as well as a fundamental 
hurdle for our attempted attribution of specified intrinsic properties.  Furthermore, this 
interdependence of object properties with environmental properties at best makes the 
determination of intrinsic properties (as purely independent things) unclear and at worst 
leaves the classification without metaphysical merit. 
 Third, and relatedly, we reviewed the strange indeterminacy of object boundaries and 
property allocation surrounding virtual particles and the vacuum.  From the continual and 
spontaneous production of particles—either from a real particle or the vacuum itself—we are 
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lead to reject notions of an isolated discrete particle.  At least currently, the constant 
fluctuations can seem to come from nothing at all, and while this may not be the case at 
deeper (yet unknown) levels of magnification, it has led physicists to remark that “even when 
no real particle is around, the field is gently, but persistently, bubbling with activity…the 
field indulges in virtual processes quite spontaneously!  Everywhere in the universe the 
electromagnetic field is busy creating ghostly photons out of nothing and just as busily 
annihilating them” (Ridley, p.119).  The inability to clearly define objects and clearly define 
upon what the nearby properties depend is an unhelpful approach to carving up the world (at 
least at microscopic levels) that should be replaced with more useful approaches.    
Fourth, we briefly explored these concerns with relativistic spacetime slices and the 
effects of spacetime—as more than a mere background—on an object.  Here, the lack of an 
absolute reference frame seemed to directly affect attempts at establishing an absolute 
delimiting of an object or a set of intrinsic properties, certainly as concerned the particular 
value of an intrinsic property (e.g. the property having spin ½, rather than just the property 
having spin simpliciter) and perhaps the property type as well.  How an object moves and 
relative to what can affect the nature and possession of significant properties, and the 
interactions with its environment—simply through the density or shape or energy content of 
spacetime itself—can be critical to defining it as the object it is, rather than as the object it 
might be if the rest of the universe did not exist.  The variation of spacetime thus offers no set 
footing for selecting the reference frame in which we can attribute the ‘real’ intrinsic 
properties to the ‘real’ object—much as the earlier reviewed indefiniteness of object 
boundaries prevented definite attributions of intrinsic properties—and the definition of 
section 1.2.4 cannot even get off the ground.   
We might think intrinsicality doomed under its traditional model, or we might be 
tempted to continue ‘waiting out the storm’, and only weigh in when physics has cleanly and 
clearly settled on a fundamental ontology.  But not only could that take centuries, it is less 
vibrant and, I suggest, less rigorous philosophy.  It would be pleasing if our philosophical 
theories were robust against the uncertainties or incompleteness of physics
39
, but in order to 
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 Although I cannot properly address it here, it is a rich topic to consider the way we access physical 
phenomena in regards to intrinsic properties.  Kant, of course, counselled epistemic humility about knowing 
‘things in themselves’, though there always seemed to be the underlying thought that despite their 
inaccessibility, there were, in fact, intrinsic properties.  I see the interpretations of modern science as strongly 
weakening that conviction.  The nature of how we study objects (and the microscopic in particular) is inherently 
relational, involving interactions with other objects of interest or with our own measuring apparatus, and this is 
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approach such a position, wherever the disciplines intersect, metaphysicians should benefit 
from working alongside current physics rather than in spite of it.  And so it is with this 
appreciation for the dynamics and discoveries of modern physical theories as well as the 
philosophical misgivings concerning intrinsicality that the implications for the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should be examined.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
thought to be the case in principle: “not even nature herself knows how this uncertainty will resolve itself the 
next time the object makes its influence known, say, by the interaction with another object by way of one of the 
four forces” (Schumm, p.42).  This sort of identity, however, does not entail identity of intrinsic properties, and 
thus, as Michael Esfeld puts it, “the natural sciences – the statements of laws of nature that they contain – tell us 
something only about the way in which things are related to each other” (Esfeld, p.8).  If this is how we 
encounter the world, with no guarantee that our experiments yield intrinsic properties, then perhaps we ought to 
re-examine whether carving up reality into the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is a good programme.  It is worth 
pausing to reflect on whether intrinsicality makes good sense as a concept for our world and whether our 
inability to access it is more problematic than supposed.  Moreover one might question whether such grounds 
are preferable for grounding our metaphysics upon.  
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CHAPTER 4: Alternatives and Conclusions 
 
Taking the philosophical and physical concerns onboard, how might we reformulate 
intrinsicality?  Section 1.2.4 characterised ‘intrinsic’ as a concept accessible through 
duplication and as a type of property that a thing possesses that is totally independent of any 
other thing.  I argued that this was philosophically problematic because a) the nature of the 
intrinsic property’s independence is unclear and physically dubious, b) duplication does not 
tell us what is intrinsic, only what we can do with the distinction once we have it, and c) it is 
questionable that one should take intrinsic properties as those present when an object is in a 
universe unto itself.  I also argued that the definition was physically problematic because i) 
interdependence predominates in the formation and allocation of properties, ii) the lack of 
distinct object boundaries hampers the clear attribution of dependence relations and intrinsic 
properties, and iii) relativity removes the idea of a preferred reference frame from which to 
locate an object’s intrinsic properties.  Our difficulties, then, are in defining a distinct 
independent object and defining ‘intrinsic’ in a way that directly applies to our universe and 
gives useful guides for testing whether a certain property fits the definition.  
I will outline what I see as the four most promising approaches to reformulating 
‘intrinsic’, concluding that we should pursue a more relational, in situ account of properties 
and their interactions than the one given by the classical intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  One 
approach to characterising objects in modern physical terms might take the indeterminacy of 
quantum physics to prompt a reduction in the specificity of intrinsic properties to cover only 
qualities, rather than quantities.  Or we might favour a reduction in the generality of our 
formulation of intrinsic properties to include a much more specific and strict criteria, a ‘patch 
up’ to include all the problematic variables (e.g. time, temperature, frame of reference etc.).  
Similarly, the importance of systems and structures in the subatomic realm may 
suggest that they are the entities that possess intrinsic properties rather than mere objects.  
Many objects may be systems, but we do not think this of the fundamental objects, and the 
emphasis in describing something as a ‘system’ is on a connective network or structure rather 
than a distinctly bound and singular thing.  We may also side with the concern raised in 
section 3.5 and decide that our inability, in principle, to discover intrinsic properties weighs 
in heavily on what we are confident to do with the distinction.  Indeed, as physics finds the 
number and complexity of the calculations involved with integrated fields and systems to be 
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much more vast and uncertain than the mechanistic calculations of classical physics, we may 
find that intrinsic properties have lost their utility.   
With these concerns in mind, I will discuss several possible outcomes and effects of 
the re-conceptualisation of intrinsicality, looking at 1) its application to qualities and 
determinables, 2) a ‘strict’ specification, 3) intrinsicality as applied only to systems or 
structures, and 4) whether an interactive or dispositional formulation of intrinsicality makes 
sense.  Far more might be said about the implications, but these topics should provide an 
overview of the issues for discussing what should be done with the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction in section 4.5.  I conclude that 1) there are far fewer options for intrinsic properties 
than classically supposed, and, relatedly, 2) the traditional intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is 
more trouble than it is worth in metaphysics and should be jettisoned. 
4.1 Qualities but not Quantities are Intrinsic (determinables but not determinates) 
 
As noted earlier, we have a classical expectation that if something has a determinable 
property, say having colour, it will have a further determinate property, like being red (as 
taken from W.E. Johnson’s classic distinction).  Where modern physics makes this untenable, 
we might try for an intermediate indeterminism.  That is, it might prove more appropriate, 
and would certainly simplify things, if intrinsic properties ranged only over possession of a 
property rather than any specific or measurable amount of it, if, for instance, ‘intrinsic’ 
ranged only over determinables and not determinates.  Similarly, we might distinguish 
between a quality, which we could say determines a mode of existence (e.g. mass, 
momentum), and a quantity, which further specifies the number or type of that quality (e.g. 
12kg mass).  This approach easily accommodates the view (as argued by (Balashov 1999)) 
that even when not instantiating a property, the object may possess a zero-value of it.  Under 
this view, that electrons possess the intrinsic property mass and photons do not is all we need 
say
40
, so that it does not matter if the quantity of mass appears to fluctuate across different 
situations so long as the object still possesses mass.   
 Giving up on specifying information like ‘quantity’ in the formulation of an intrinsic 
property allows a more stable canon of simply qualified intrinsic properties.  It would thus be 
a mistake to specify that something possesses the intrinsic property of a mass of 12g, perhaps 
                                                          
40
 At the subatomic level, fundamental properties are defined in terms of other fundamental properties (e.g. mass 
in terms of energy and momentum relations). 
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precisely because the context matters.  This approach favours a type of local intrinsicality in 
that biological organisms and quarks are on equal footing in both possessing the intrinsic 
property mass; but it is their characteristic possessing of the property as well as its being a 
fundamental property (e.g. rather than the property having hair) that is important in a global 
sense.  Indeed, many are happy to refer only to qualities in discussions of intrinsic properties 
and do not invoke the electron’s particular mass or its unit of charge—perhaps because such 
properties are (seemingly unavoidably) defined in relation to other properties.   
 However, this approach does not really help the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction if we 
still find that determinable properties are dependent in some way (and reject Balashov’s zero-
value interpretation of properties).  We might be able to dismiss the vagaries of an electron’s 
mass in different contexts, but its having mass at all will still be a relational quality.  
Additionally, there may be challenges in securing the identities of the objects in question to 
ascertain whether and when they lose their ‘intrinsic’ properties (e.g. possess spin at time t0 
and then not possess it at time t1), and thus we will be left with classifying which types of 
properties should be considered (and why), for which a return to physics would be in order.   
 Alternatively, we might take a ‘qualitative approach’ to encompass matters of degree 
such that properties are specified according to probabilities or by how closely they 
approximate a value.  In this case, a particle’s spin might be much more intrinsic than its 
location, perhaps because the spin is much more statistically applicable to it than its location.  
I certainly think there is something to be said for the degree approach (like Lewis’ appeal to 
some properties being more natural than others).  However, this also sounds like Lewis’ 
mixed properties that are somehow not purely intrinsic or extrinsic (e.g. being a cube that is 
accompanied by another cube), and do not seem a particularly fruitful classification to 
preserve unless it leads to more significant reappraisals.  It again seems confused to force 
such an old term like ‘intrinsic’ onto a new and fluid classification.  It would not be the first 
time, however, that science persevered with a term in such a way (e.g. the ‘atom’), and so this 
may offer a marginally satisfying compromise.  
4.2 Strict specification (patch-up) 
 
We may conclude that the difficulties in delineating an object and its intrinsic properties, are 
only difficulties and may be overcome by more rigorous specification methods that would 
result in intrinsic properties, however severely circumscribed.  We may thus do a very 
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particularised ‘patching’ of all the articulations of intrinsic properties to include a precise and 
diminutive time t with background temperature T and pressure p in a reference frame where 
object F is at rest’ that might capture all the exact properties of an object.  Under this 
approach, we could not list the intrinsic properties of ‘an electron’, but only of ‘an electron of 
relative velocity v to frame of reference F at time t etc.’ so as to leave no room for physics’ 
complaints save for where inherent indeterminacy cannot be patched up.  And where 
indeterminacy cannot be accounted for, we might happily accept the indeterminate property 
into our list of intrinsic properties in recognition of that aspect of nature.  After all, we should 
not expect to do better than nature herself, and the discovery that a property is indeterminate 
in some way can be usefully incorporated into our discussions, leaving intrinsicality no worse 
off than any other branch of metaphysics. 
 This approach bears a similar onus as the previous in that, in addition to deciding 
upon a set of properties that count as intrinsic, we will need to gather a set of relevant 
specification criteria and give good reasons for it.  In trying to give the salient variables for an 
electron in situation Z, we will need an analysis of the contributing factors that may always 
include certain elements—say, reference frames—and perhaps only a range of others—say, 
background temperatures between X and Y Celsius.  Presumably physics will again need to 
be consulted for such a list, although if it proves too unwieldy, which seems likely, it is liable 
to be removed from metaphysical discussions; such specification , particularly to a time, is 
certainly at odds with the earlier desire for unencumbered intrinsic properties to pick out real 
change.  As such, this approach may prove far too idealistic to be practically used or readily 
supported by both our intuitive notions of intrinsicality and our desire to give useful and 
significant metaphysical distinctions that follow physics’ lead.  Indeed, this arguably presents 
intrinsic properties in such a constrained way that we may be doing the concept and ourselves 
a disservice.  Whether the success of preserving intrinsicality is a real one, or whether its 
modification is more beneficial on the whole may be a topic for review, but I think such a 
salvage operation only highlights the disutility of such a term.   
4.3 Intrinsic Properties of Systems 
The substantial modifications to our traditional descriptions of an intrinsic property may 
prompt us to take several steps back and readjust our ontological lens to focus on systems—
which may be ‘objects’ by another, modern, name—rather than capricious classical objects, 
so that what is intrinsic is intrinsic to some system (perhaps some physically vague region 
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delimited only by a certain qualitative value range, e.g. ‘the region around a black hole that 
would absorb photons).  Because of our difficulties in precisely separating objects we may 
opt for a seemingly less-exacting entity as that which possesses intrinsic properties.  
Physicist’s formulations of the behaviours and properties of minute objects are already 
overwhelmingly described by stochastic calculations, such that exact boundaries are less 
important than the average centre of mass or charge, or simply in terms of systems; for 
instance, “in general relativity, mass can only be defined globally.  In other words, we think 
in terms of the mass of an entire system, enclosed in a figurative box, as measured from far, 
far away (from infinity, actually)” (Yau, p.59).  It is appropriate, then, to follow suit and 
encourage a wider discourse of intrinsic properties as probabilistic or some other 
mathematical expressions delineating relevant systems—defined by statistical contributions 
to a certain value.  One might thus try to pinpoint a system’s limits to the level of 
involvement of entities or quanta (perhaps within a given region of spacetime, or at certain 
intensities etc.) that expresses a majority influence from the forces, entities and interactions 
that designate the system.   
Indeed, we seem compelled to this sort of conclusion in regards to fields, which are 
described by Ernst Cassirer as a system of effects rather than a thing; “from this system no 
individual element can be isolated and retained as permanent, as being ‘identical with itself’ 
through the course of time.  The individual electron…‘exists’ only in its relation to the field, 
as a ‘singular location’ in it” (Cassirer, p.178).  Although fields41 are often taken to extend to 
infinity, the component forces and characteristics that make up the central and/or 
fundamental part of the system (e.g. the direction of movement, momentum, gravitational 
force, pressure change etc.) may be used to determine the limits of the system by their 
influence on entities.  Thus, if, say, a particle responds to one of the central characteristics of 
the system rather than to any other system/entity exerting the same characteristics, then we 
can include it within the system.   
It also seems reasonable that an entity may belong to several systems in different 
capacities, as it may respond to other forces (in other systems) that do not constitute the 
central characteristics of the system in question while still being a part of it.  Intrinsic 
properties may be thus circumscribed under a sophisticated (if often statistical) model of 
physical systems, where some systems may be so small that they approximate traditional 
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 The ontological status of fields (usefully explored by Marc Lange) does not seem widely agreed upon 
however. 
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conceptions of an object, while other systems may extend throughout the universe.  To 
implement this strategy effectively, we will still need to a) discern which things, if any, and 
which interactions
42
 are free of influence from what appears to be their surroundings, b) 
establish satisfactory parameters for systems that reflect natural divisions, if possible, and c) 
consider whether it is appropriate to have intrinsic properties of just the system, or both the 
system and its parts.  All of these requirements represent a good deal more research into the 
sufficiency of systems as the preferred bearers of intrinsic properties, but it offers at least the 
possibility of reconciliation between intuitions and physics. 
Additionally, a systems-based approach may move us away from an ‘object-centric’ 
metaphysics to focus on the relations of the system as much as the relata.  This in turn may 
damage such distinctions as that which we hold between objects and events.  While the 
distinction is certainly useful in everyday terms, it may not be an appropriate distinction at a 
fundamental level, or at least, will require a very careful definition.  We have already seen 
how the constant interplay of the minute physical constituents of entities with the 
surroundings leave an elusive (and at the quantum level seemingly necessarily indeterminate) 
boundary, which directly affects several criteria we use to separate the ‘static and persisting 
object’ from the relatively sudden interaction of an event.  I do not claim this distinction to be 
of great significance in the metaphysical literature, but the change in interpretation is an 
important indication of a more general approach that focuses on the interactions and 
unfamiliar scales—a view that considers the implications of viewing objects as events.  If 
intrinsic properties helped distinguish the object as a ‘settled and structured persisting 
manipulatable thing’, then perhaps with the rise of extrinsicality, objects may appear more 
like events in the system or structure of more inclusive things. 
Of course, one might argue that, just as with objects, the interconnections between 
systems and their surroundings may make this approach no better off.   Determining the 
intrinsic properties of a system, whether it be a rabbit or a microclimate, is exceptionally 
difficult, if not implausible, as, strictly speaking, they are not properly closed systems and 
have sometimes incalculable ‘external’ interactions that contribute to their fundamental 
constitution.  From Edward Lorenz’s influential reflections on the sensitivity of climate 
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 Behaviours may be no less fundamental or intrinsic than internal structures, although that seems to be a 
common supposition. Indeed, adopting a systems approach may encourage us to view the dispositions and 
interactions as more intrinsic than the properties attributable to an object in imagined isolation.  
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dynamics to the burgeoning growth of chaos theory
43
, there has been an increasing awareness 
of unpredictability in how interdependent (intuitively extrinsic) systems and their constituents 
are; for instance, “in systems like the weather, sensitive dependence on initial conditions was 
an inescapable consequence of the way small scales intertwined with large” (Gleick, p.23).  
From this confusion surrounding complex dependencies, there appears a seemingly inevitable 
confusion about what properties count as intrinsic, given our working definition revolves 
around independence from other things.  It is not enough that we know the rainfall in region x 
and the speed and direction of the wind at time t, we must also know the migration patterns of 
birds on the other side of the planet, or the position of the moon, or the onset of spring in 
Patagonia.  These sorts of wide-ranging dependencies for a given property of an object again 
suggest 1) that there are far fewer intrinsic properties than classically supposed, and, 
relatedly, 2) the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction is more trouble than it is worth. 
4.3.1 Universal intrinsic properties 
The push to find a closed system, free of influence from its surroundings, may lead us to a 
more radical reconceptualisation of systems intrinsicality that applies only to the largest, 
rather than the smallest things; that is, we might posit that only the largest of systems, the 
universe, has intrinsic properties,
44
 embracing a monistic approach.  Natural laws would then 
be intrinsic properties of the universe, as “laws neither ascribe properties to things within the 
world, nor describe correlations between things in the world.  It is natural to construe them, 
rather, as characterizing not natural kinds within the world, but the world as a whole—as 
describing the kind of world in which we live” (Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse, p.384).  Similarly, 
qualities like mass, acceleration and spin
45
 may be taken as intrinsic properties of our 
universe, opposed to, for instance, the qualities Gmass, Gacceleration and Gspin that might 
be intrinsic properties of a different universe.  Under this view, objects might simply be the 
localised spatiotemporal expression of several intrinsic properties, and what we perceive as 
‘behaviours’ might be re-categorised as internal structure.   
 This is akin to distributional properties like being polka-dotted, such that the universe 
can have properties located in some but not all regions, and further, that they could be 
inhomogeneous (something like the property having lumpy mass).  Existence monists, who 
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 See James Gleick’s Chaos (1987) for a good overview. 
44
 Multiple universe theories may complicate this, depending on how the universes interacted. 
45
 That these properties vary across the universe does not seem illogical; for instance, mass certainly varies 
across the spacetime region of an atom, with a dense nucleus and surrounding hair of electrons. 
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claim “that exactly one concrete object token exists (the One)” (Schaffer 2008) would 
presumably have to embrace such intrinsic properties.  If there is only the One, then there are 
not the various chairs and cats whose intrinsic properties we need to worry about. 
It may be that the correlated system is always a better candidate to possess intrinsic 
properties (in macroscopic realms as much as microscopic), or it may be that our desire for 
reduction has carried us past the point where entities can meaningfully possess intrinsic 
properties.  This confusion about, or at least interchangeability of, objects and properties can 
be indicative of a lack of understanding or, more worryingly, a larger problem in our 
metaphysical project.  Alternatively, it may simply prompt a readjustment in the attribution of 
intrinsic properties to systems, whose connection types or structural elements might more 
meaningfully exist if the ‘rest of the universe’ were taken away, or if the universe is all there 
is.  I suggest that at least paying more attention to the systems approach will be useful in 
order to make a more robust account of intrinsicality.   
4.3.2 Structural Realism 
 
Closely allied to systems are structures, differentiated largely by approach as both comprise 
interdependent parts, though structures may be less of an active network than systems.  
Stewart Shapiro defines structures as “the abstract form of a system, highlighting the 
interrelationship among the objects, and ignoring any features of them that do not affect how 
they relate to other objects in the system” (Shapiro, p.74).  There seems to be a greater 
readiness to ignore the haecceity of individuals in structural approaches, and this focus on 
structures is reflected in such theories as ontic structural realism (OSR) where the ontological 
primacy and even reality of objects gives way to the structure they inhabit.  Under OSR, we 
might discuss the intrinsic properties of patterns and certain types of motion rather than the 
intrinsic properties of, say, a stone.  
 The exact formulation of OSR is unclear, not least because of its many permutations, 
but it gives a philosophical framework to many of the concerns voiced over the last century 
(notably from Kuhn) that “the permanent aspects of reality are not particular materials or 
structures but rather the possible forms of structures, and the rules for their transformation” 
(Wilczek and Devine, p.70).  Indeed, structural realism was introduced by John Worrall as a 
more accurate model of theory change in the scientific realism debate, and has since taken on 
a life of its own, moving beyond its epistemological uses to modelling what actually exists.  
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Worrall argued that the progressive abandonment of theories maintained an important 
continuity of structure rather than content.  Accordingly, our epistemic commitment should 
lie with the mathematical or structural aspect of scientific theories, rather than claiming to 
know the real furniture of the universe.   
In their important overview of the subject, French, Rickles and Saatsi (2006) broadly 
characterise the modern structural approach as moving the fundamental ontology from 
objects to relational structures; “inasmuch as objects exist at all, they derive their properties 
and individuality from the relational network in which they are embedded” (French, Rickles 
and Saatsi, p.4).  They argue that, really, the quantum world is made up of intersections, 
interactions and structural cohesion rather than objects.  As with mathematics, the symbols 
themselves and their size or complexity is not the issue, but how they interact with the other 
system components, their structural role: “the property of inherent individuality that 
characterizes more complex, higher-level entities—such as a particular crystal in physics, or a 
particular cell in biology—is lost.  Using some old philosophical terminology, I say that a 
level has been reached, at which the entities characterising this level posses quiddity but not 
haecceity” (French, Rickles and Saatsi, p.55-56).  In other words, entities of different natural 
kinds exist (e.g. quarks, photons) but appear to lack unique individuality—and any haecceity 
they do possess is only by virtue of the structural relations they inhabit. 
 This focus on structure brings relations, rather than relata, to the fore, endorsing a 
long-standing suspicion held by the likes of Arthur Eddington: “in regard to the nature of 
things, this knowledge is only an empty shell—a form of symbols.  It is knowledge of 
structural form and not knowledge of content” (Eddington, p.200).  For OSR theories, then, 
the object’s structural placement in the fundamental fabric (whatever that may be) is what is 
important, though beyond this general interpretation there is much disagreement.  A brief 
overview of the main permutations of the OSR thesis will thus be helpful in reviewing what 
options are available for reformulating intrinsicality, in which I follow Ladyman’s (Ladyman 
2009) structure. 
 Under a more extreme interpretation of the thesis, our ontology shifts radically and 
only the relational structure itself is a candidate for possessing intrinsic properties: 
[1] There are no individuals (but there is a relational structure). 
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This eliminativist formulation appears as one of the most counterintuitive interpretations of 
OSR, as it is not at all clear that one could discuss structure without the individuals that 
compose it.  Assuming this is feasible and well motivated, we might then interpret this 
definition in one of two ways: first, we might focus on relations being of primary concern, 
with relations such as ‘beneath’ or ‘lighter than’.  This places the formal relations, the 
principles, as more primary than the particular instantiation.  Second, we might simply argue 
that individuals themselves reduce to relational structures, perhaps even that there is no 
fundamental level and it is relations all the way down
46
.  
 In such an approach, arguing that there are no individuals does not mean we are 
necessarily getting rid of relata, rather we are stipulating that the relata cannot be individuals.  
Sceptics (e.g. Chakravartty 2003) have found this eliminativist idea non-sensical and 
applicable only to certain systems, as well as criticising its shortcomings in accounting for 
causation.  But in support of the formulation, one might use mathematics as an example of 
such a structure, a scheme that relies on the patterns between imaginary points or place 
holders—the proportional distances between points that when repeated, subtracted, separated 
etc. yield other relations within the structure—perhaps without ever requiring a real entity to 
occupy the end points (or any points) of the section of pattern.  What is intrinsic, then, is 
intrinsic not to an object but to a pattern, to the manipulations allowed or to the proportional 
relations of sub-structures.   
 A second interpretation of OSR focuses on the traditional notion of supervenience 
upon intrinsic properties by claiming that not all relations need supervene on intrinsic and 
spatiotemporal properties, and indeed, the dependence relation may go in the opposite 
direction: 
[2] Facts about the identity and diversity of objects are ontologically dependent on the 
relational structures of which they are a part. 
In allowing the individuality of objects to be ontologically equivalent or dependent upon their 
larger relational structures, this view could allow more options for intrinsicality.  We might 
still meaningfully speak of the intrinsic properties of objects while noting the intrinsic 
structural relations on which they may be dependent.  This view (like most other OSR 
theories) redefines the traditional notion of a structure, which seems to follow a set theoretic 
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 See, for instance (Ladyman and Ross 2007). 
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model
47
 whereby it is fundamentally composed of individuals and their local qualities (or 
intrinsic properties) on which everything else supervenes.  Such a view of Humean 
supervenience has been challenged by interpretations of quantum theory, which argue that the 
world is not simply a collection of items existing independently of all the others where 
relations come second to the more fundamental relata.  As Esfeld argues, at least “as far as 
quantum theory is concerned, there is no need for the correlated quantum systems to have 
intrinsic properties over and above the correlations in which they stand” (Esfeld, p.19).  Thus, 
under this interpretation of OSR, a range or perhaps class hierarchy of intrinsic properties 
might be adopted, with a primary relational set and a secondary relata set.  This classification 
may seem too complex, however, or simply open to the same concerns about the intrinsic 
properties of objects, such that one might prefer to eliminate intrinsic properties altogether.  
 If we are presented with a choice between preserving objects and preserving intrinsic 
properties in our metaphysics, many may be moved to reject the latter and give up on 
intrinsic properties for the fundamentals of physics (see 4.6).  I think both classical 
conceptions require reformulation, but a less drastic compromise may be simply altering the 
intermediary notion of individual objects as those which possess intrinsic properties: 
[3] Individual objects have no intrinsic natures. 
On this account, quantum particles lack primitive  thisness and are qualitatively identical to 
other members of their kind (e.g. electrons, pi mesons etc.).  This lack of individuation
48
 may 
prompt us to preserve intrinsic properties as properties attributable only to kinds, or 
universals rather than to individuals.  For instance, it would be meaningless to speak of the 
intrinsic properties of an ‘individual’ electron; rather we might speak of the intrinsic 
properties of the electron class (or kind), of what it is to be an electron.  Specific particles 
may be numerically distinct from other particles but the situation may so wholly determine 
the particular instantiation of that particle that it is constituted by its external structural 
relations and cannot be said to have intrinsic properties itself.  This might be thought of as an 
intrinsicality of universals, focusing on the universals present in a given region or system and 
thereby relieving much of the pressure to distinguish an object and its intrinsic properties in a 
given context, although one may wonder how we justify the broader classification of the 
universal through such indistinct instantiations.   
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Although Jonathan Bain has advanced a category-theoretic account of OSR to this end (Bain 2011).  
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 Steven French and Michael Redhead have argued that either quantum particles are not individuals, or they are 
individuals via some empirically transcendent way (Ladyman 2007). 
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 Under a similar account, traditional intrinsic properties are removed, but individual 
objects are allowed to remain and retain something particular to themselves, even if that 
something is a collection of relations: 
[4] There are individual entities but they don’t have any irreducible intrinsic 
properties. 
A close variant of [3], this view is most notably advanced by Michael Esfeld who argues for a 
moderate structural realism where all the properties of an object are relations to other objects.  
By allowing individuals to exist, Esfeld might respond to Russell’s criticism—that to be 
anything at all things must be intrinsically something—by making the object’s structural 
properties account for its intrinsic properties.  Arguably, “how a thing can be a bundle of 
relational properties is no more – and no less – a problem than how it can be a bundle of 
intrinsic properties” (Esfeld, p.11).  While this approach has the potential of salvaging the 
concept of an object and perhaps even that of intrinsic properties, it appears to reformulate 
intrinsicality in terms of relations (more of this in the following section).  Indeed, this view 
looks like it is more concerned with what is essential to an object, rather than what is 
intrinsic, which seems a difficult concession. 
 Finally, we might find that the indeterminacy of objects moves us to take an 
instrumentalist or constructivist approach that rejects our epistemic access to objects and 
intrinsic properties: 
[5] Individual objects are constructs. 
In this, objects and their properties have an instrumental role; they are useful tools for 
humans to orient themselves in the universe and help us make sense of structure, but there 
may be nothing that fits our conception of an object.  While reaching a similar conclusion to 
[1] and [2], this approach gets there by different means and with its own further implications, 
whereby it is our epistemic claims that must be reformulated.  This approach would 
presumably make intrinsic properties constructs as well, if they existed at all, but in this it 
rejects the scientific realist project (even if using its findings as support for its doctrine) and 
so is an aside to our current interests.  
All of these permutations, however,  are open to criticisms that the structure of an 
entity and its nature are not separate, and at the very least we cannot distinguish between 
theories about one and theories about the other.  In which case, our attribution of intrinsic 
70 
 
properties to structural relations may prove no better defined than to objects.  If, however, we 
can meaningfully separate structure from nature or reinterpret them into a new holism, we 
may be encouraged to adopt a modification to intrinsic properties that applies to something 
more abstract than our definition of section 1.2.4.  
4.4 Interactive or Dispositional Intrinsic Properties 
 
Given the interactive and relational method of scientific experiment and the concerns raised 
in chapter 2 about defining intrinsic properties, we might try to negotiate a wholly new take 
on intrinsicality rooted in the typical ways an entity interacts rather than how it ‘rests’ in total 
isolation.  Admittedly, this seems disconcertingly similar to extrinsic properties and is 
arguably in danger of making the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction no distinction at all.  
However, it might also be argued that how an object interacts to certain types of stimuli may 
be just as good a candidate for bearing the intrinsic moniker as would non-interactive 
properties
49
.  Indeed, this may simply be the position of the dispositional essentialist (Bird 
2005) that I mentioned earlier, arguing for an immense catalogue of intrinsic properties (or at 
least powers) made manifest only through interactions.   
Although I think this approach has potential, I will briefly indicate why I think this 
route is problematic, though that is not to say it is insoluble.  To maintain the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in terms of dispositions seems undesirable, since even when cast 
as a disposition mass is either no different from other properties, or is extrinsic.  That is, we 
do not acquire further tools to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties simply by 
switching to dispositional talk.  For example, philosopher William Bauer argues that for the 
same reasons that weight is seen as an extrinsic disposition, mass also should be seen as an 
extrinsic disposition: for an object x,  
existing in a certain gravitational field activates x’s disposition to gain a specific 
weight.  I suggest that if weight counts as extrinsically grounded due to the necessity 
of an object being situated in a gravitational field in order to have a specific weight, 
then this enhances the plausibility that mass is extrinsically grounded due to the 
necessity of a particle being situated in the Higgs field (Bauer, p.91).  
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 Even if we were to pursue this interactive framework, it is difficult to adequately define an intrinsic property, 
as, arguably, no single role (e.g. behaviour in such-and-such a circumstance) is sufficient to define it.  So we are 
either left with a huge array of intrinsic properties, or with the task of narrowing it in some significant sense and 
focusing on a certain set of dispositions to represent the globally intrinsic properties. 
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I share Bauer’s view and find dispositional intrinsic properties troubling.  First, I dislike them 
because they seem to be applicable to all behaviour.  To say ‘I have the dispositional intrinsic 
property disposed to have mass in such-and-such scenarios’ seems no different from saying 
‘I have the dispositional intrinsic property being 3 metres from a sheep in such-and such 
scenarios’.  That is, they already look extrinsic and adopt the same model we employ for 
decidedly extrinsic properties (like weight).  Second, I dislike the idea of dispositional 
intrinsic properties because we tend to formulate them (or should, given what we care about) 
in terms of what they will bring about in conjunction with some other thing.  Unless we want 
to reduce dispositions to some configurational property of the object (e.g. having energy 
arranged thusly, which is fine but not dispositional), we are again constructing intrinsic 
properties along modal lines, and how they would be given certain extrinsic stimuli.  Third, 
this approach gives us the framework to couch nearly all properties in intrinsic terms, which 
does not seem right; it does not help us distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic properties. 
 Despite my misgivings, this view pleasingly parallels our experimental techniques 
that seem to leave us with only indirect knowledge of the thing in itself; as physics does the 
vast majority of its experimental work through interactive measurements, we have an 
epistemological gap whereby we learn about what exists through a thing’s behaviour and 
actions, rather than by some direct and comprehensive knowledge acquisition of how things 
are in themselves.  Our epistemological gap means that “the fundamental qualities we don’t 
understand in themselves, and science can never, even in principle, learn what the ultimate 
causes are like in themselves” (Lange, p.80).  If, however, we were to take the interactions, 
the disposition to behave in such-and-such a matter, as intrinsic, the epistemological gap 
narrows (if not completely vanishes).   
 Additionally, given that we expect fundamental particles to be without any parts (or 
microstructures on which we could pin the causal basis for a disposition), it seems then that 
their properties will be dispositional (Mumford 2006).  While this approach may meet my 
concern that intrinsic properties should not be classified according to supposed instantiations 
in some possible world, it of course lies open to criticisms that the concept is so far removed 
from traditional intuitions that it is inappropriate to call it intrinsic.  Certainly the 
indeterminacies surrounding object boundaries persist in this approach, but at the very least, 
it is useful in considering the role of interactions in how objects are constituted, which 
modern physics compels us to do.   
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To recapitulate, then, I briefly considered adjusting the specificity of ‘intrinsic’ by 
first focusing only on determinables and then embracing all the particulars in a patching 
attempt.  Though neither cost seemed worth the unhelpful or unwieldy gain.  I also looked at 
moving from an object-based property attribution to a systems-based one, with an allowance 
for probabilistic formulations.  This seemed a promising way of dealing with some of the 
indeterminacy, and in this respect was similar to the structural approach looked at later, 
though both could use more work.  Finally, I suggested reconceptualising intrinsic properties 
in terms of interactions or dispositions, which may get at how the object really is, but I think 
jars with our intuitive definition of ‘intrinsic’ in how it is formulated and in what utility it has.  
Even though all of these sketches are inconclusive about what to do with the 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, they all highlight the insufficiency of the current formulation. 
4.5 What to do with the distinction? 
 
If the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction breaks down, what does that do?  How we choose to 
interpret the distinction is important for several areas of metaphysics, including defining 
duplicates, tracking changes, revealing fundamental properties, as well as with laws and 
causation.  However, the intrinsic/extrinsic disintegration may do very little, simply excusing 
itself from the configurations of future metaphysics or taking on a different definition. Then 
again, it may encourage a much more radical understanding of our world—of the way things 
interact and our conception of property possession; in a somewhat Machian fashion, it may 
be that for something to be a certain way is for other things to be a certain way.  That is, it 
may be part of a new interdependent and holistic approach to the systems, structures and 
movement of energy that constitutes our universe. 
 Intrinsicality goes to the heart of metaphysics by giving us a tool with which to carve 
up reality, to define its primitive components and understand what there is and how it 
interacts.  It used to appear that we could isolate some thing, an object or property, and 
abstract it into an idealised realm for analysis.  In this realm we could manipulate and test it 
and discover its particular properties, how it was in itself alone, and when we were finished 
we could put it back in situ with this new understanding preserved.  But this is no obvious 
undertaking; abstracting objects away from the rest of the universe can drastically change 
their character while manipulating them in abstracted foreign surroundings can result in even 
more bizarre property manifestations that seem to fall well clear of our intuitions and 
speculative knowledge.  This suggests that our approach of looking at the world in terms of 
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objects, events and forces is outdated, unhelpful and likely erroneous.  In losing the 
traditional intrinsic/extrinsic distinction we seem left with three options.  
1) Keep the traditional distinction and define the vast majority (possibly all) of 
properties as extrinsic. 
 
We may decide that our interpretation of intrinsicality is fine and accept all the challenges of 
physics, to acknowledge that there are simply fewer properties that meet its definition than 
once thought.  Thus, where properties have any immediate causal dependence on seemingly 
external entities, the properties are extrinsic.  What might this mean for philosophy?  At base 
it means that what a thing is, in itself and on its own is not much.  Lonely objects are exotic 
creatures and we should not expect them to be accessible to our intuitions.  When discussing 
the more familiar zoo of properties, we might resort to creating new subsets or degrees of 
extrinsic properties to better capture characteristics we wish to discuss, turning to more 
dynamic models of properties.  On the other hand we may start avoiding talking about things 
in themselves and instead follow structural realist approaches to viewing a world of 
connections, which are more important than any leftover properties of an isolated object.  In 
practice, then, this action is similar to removing the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. 
2) Abolish the distinction altogether; the merit of the distinction rested on the 
intuitiveness of the classical examples which now appear mistaken.  
In a more radical approach we could remove the distinction entirely, as an outdated 
classification that is doing us a disservice.  Following Dennett in his rejection of the term 
‘qualia’, we might replace it with ‘intrinsicality’ and proclaim that it  
is not just that the various technical or theoretical concepts of [intrinsicality]…are 
vague or equivocal, but that the source concept, the ‘pretheoretical’ notion of which 
the former are presumed to be refinements, is so thoroughly confused that even if we 
undertook to salvage some ‘lowest common denominator’ from the theoreticians’ 
proposals, any acceptable version would have to be so radically unlike the ill-formed 
notions that are commonly appealed to that it would be tactically obtuse—not to say 
Pickwickian—to cling to the term (Dennett 1993, p.382-3). 
Indeed, taking the loss of intrinsic to heart, one might side with some physicists and suggest a 
much broader reorganisation of properties in general, arguing that “the classical notion of a 
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property is inappropriate to quantum theory….A quantum measurement should be regarded 
neither as revealing a property of the system nor as creating that property” (Hughes, p.302).  
Something along these lines will need to be considered, as the notion of intrinsic went hand-
in-hand with classical conceptions of clean objects in the familiar world, and one might argue 
that with the diminution of that conception intrinsicality loses its significance.  Indeed, the 
parameters it set and the intuitions it bolstered are really just cleverly disguised 
anthropocentric views of the universe.   
 It is not the minute particles or the interplay of massive conglomerations of matter 
that are the rare and exotic phenomena; our human world is the rare and exotic phenomena 
perceived through very rare and environmentally grounded observers.  The bias that our 
observed world of chair-sized ‘objects’ and 70mph trains (with our negligible quantum waves 
and relativistic blurs) is the only world of consequence needs to be removed, and perhaps like 
geocentrism the notion of intrinsicality is simply another hallmark of its decline.  This move 
may also make us embrace a more holistic outlook with an ontology that focused on 
connections and ‘behaviour types’ rather than location and ‘object types’ with their attendant 
intrinsic properties. 
(3) Hold on to some form of the distinction, but give it different parameters and 
definitions. 
If we would rather not have most properties collapse into extrinsicality or throw out the 
distinction entirely, we can attempt a compromise.  We might take the criticisms on board 
and try to give an updated account of intrinsicality that preserves something of our intuitions 
while accommodating physics.  In this I think it may be feasible to redefine intrinsic in terms 
of systems or structures, or to have different contexts of description for intrinsicality, used 
either for the more unfamiliar phenomena or for the common everyday world.  Indeed, it may 
be that following its different usage in other areas of philosophy (e.g. value theory), we 
articulate a wholly different species of intrinsicality for biological, abstract or emergent 
entities.  Or it may be that we turn intrinsicality into a matter of degree, a mathematical limit 
toward which properties tend by meeting certain criteria.  I suspect that we could comfortably 
accommodate this contextual approach in much the same way we still use Newtonian 
mechanics rather than the more accurate Einsteinian mechanics for practical computations.  
But along the same lines, we need to take note of the technical distinction and should be more 
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open to alternative approaches that do not privilege a bunch of individuals that come 
together, rather than a cohesive system. 
 Of these I think (1) is the least helpful, though perhaps an important first step, while 
(3) is the most likely.  I favour (2), abolishing the distinction to look toward more interactive 
theories for further information.  With so many properties appearing to extend off toward 
infinity from an energetic nucleus (or ‘object’) and bound up with the surrounding properties, 
holding on to the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is simply part of the leftover furniture from an 
outdated worldview.  To try and maintain (1), the distinction as it now stands with science 
pushing nearly all (if not all) properties into the extrinsic half of the distinction, leaves 
exceptionally little to work with and hampers the philosophical exploration of more dynamic 
models that could better adhere to physics.  To try (3), holding on to the distinction but giving 
it different parameters (perhaps along the lines of earlier suggestions), is perhaps tempting, 
but again ultimately onerous.  If we find old classifications unfit, we should at least have a go 
at formulating new and more appropriate ones than gerrymandering the old ones.  Regardless 
of what changes we employ, I conclude that changes are needed—there are far fewer intrinsic 
properties than classically conceived and the distinction is more hindrance than help to 
metaphysics. 
4.6 Conclusion    
 
Some familiar properties may survive the challenges of modern physics, but it is unclear how 
many such properties there are and how best we might go about defining them.  I have argued 
that it is unhelpful here to employ the contraction approach and try to account for the 
particular physics that would result in a universe made entirely with a single object (e.g. 
could we know that it would be sufficiently static etc. for our thought experiment to work?).  
I also argued that without turning to physics as an arbiter of dependence relations and as a 
guide to our world’s metaphysics, we seem to be left with a human-tailored abstraction of 
what we wish to call intrinsic.  We simply choose an ‘object’, call certain properties 
‘sufficiently’ and comfortably reflect on our ‘good enough’ abstraction, but this is not a 
coherent approach given our expectations of other properties and should be discarded as it is 
more trouble than it is worth. 
 Many of the problems with intrinsicality in physics arise from indefinite and 
inconstant boundaries of objects.  In a world of such interconnections what questions should 
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we be asking?  With persistent boundaries gone we may look to statistical centres instead—
not finding a discrete electron but the probabilistic centre of certain energy fluctuations.  
Arguably, the line separating bodies (internal from external) is a scientific convention not 
built into the universe.  The fluctuations of these ‘objects’ reveal the problem of separating 
their structures, properties, and dependence relations from their environment.  The clean 
mechanical motion and clear divisions of Classical physics may have thus unnaturally 
preserved the notions of ‘object’ and ‘intrinsic’ into a world of quantum fluctuations, and we 
need to mould our conception to match our changing world view.  The challenges and 
alternative approaches offered by physics invite a more interchangeable account of ‘object’ 
and ‘environment’ that is not so strictly classified, with more emphasis on the interactions 
and characteristics of the whole than in its supposedly isolated parts, an interaction that will 
be more closely examined in Part II. 
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PART II: The Interface Between Objects and Space 
 
In the previous Part, I argued that modern physics gives us reason to reject the classical 
conception of an object, comfortably separate from its environment with a small stable list of 
intrinsic properties.  I have not proved that such a description fails to apply to all objects, 
since that is a pursuit appropriate for science in any case, but I hope to have made a case for 
moving beyond the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction to find a more useful metaphysical device 
and to actively explore new models of objecthood.  Having at first examined classical objects 
in themselves, I here examine models for the interaction between objects and space, with a 
focus on substantivalism.   
 Although this theory—along with its old rival relationalism—has received a good 
deal of attention over the years, I want to review the debate in light of physics and with the 
aim of again moving beyond such classical accounts to examine more interactive models.  
Substantivalism, despite its geometric success at scientific modelling, comes with the 
confusing philosophical baggage of substance dualism and a mathematical interpretation that, 
in some forms, encourages the reification of points.  The Cartesian model of substance 
dualism has been criticised for its mysterious form of interaction, but comparatively little 
concern is raised over space-object substance dualism, and I think without good reason.  The 
reification of points in some of the more mathematically compelling versions of 
substantivalism is a further point of concern given their supposed interaction with material 
extension, and part of the larger problem with interpreting mathematical formalism in many 
of these theories. 
 Substantivalism also struggles with various physical phenomena, either offering no 
account of it or dubiously (if not incoherently) modelling it.  These problems need to be 
addressed by the substantivalist if the model, with its large ontology, is to remain viable.  
There are other theories, of course, like relationalism and supersubstantivalism that might 
offer a better fit, particularly as they avoid the mysterious ‘occupation relation’ and support 
the substance monism suggested by various physical phenomena.  To examine the traditional 
model of space and object, I will first canvas the traditional debate between substantivalism 
and relationalism, along with the modern addition of supersubstantivalism, exploring the 
latter in slightly more detail and outlining some of the principal difficulties with 
Substantivalism.  Second, I will look at physical phenomena that struggle to fit the 
substantival mould.  Third, I will look at the theoretical challenge of making sense of 
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location, or the ‘occupation relation’.  Fourth, I will raise concerns on the reification of points 
(for both substantivalism and supersubstantivalism),  and conclude 1) that substantivalism is 
inadequate in both its points-based and regions-based formulations and 2) monistic 
ontologies should be developed to take its place.  Supersubstantivalism is one such theory, 
but the points-based formulation of it inherits several of substantivalism’s problems, leaving 
room for other singular ontological theories to address the issues.  This offers the beginning 
of an attempted reconciliation between objects and space—a much more intimate 
reconciliation than is often assumed.  I conclude with a rejection of substantivalism and an 
endorsement for other singular ontological theories (like dense relationalism).   
 
CHAPTER 5: Relationalism, Substantivalism and Supersubstantivalism 
The Newtonian and Leibnizian rival theories of substantivalism and relationalism, 
respectively, have doggedly persisted to the present, albeit with new physics to inform their 
arguments.  Some, like (Belot 1999) claim that the general consensus among philosophers of 
physics is in favour of substantivalism—with its reified spacetime points—as that which best 
fits scientific practice.  Indeed, “the intuitive feeling for Euclidean space has become so 
deeply ingrained in any trained physicist that it takes a real effort of imagination to identify 
precisely the actual evidence” (Barbour, 1982, p.265).  There are persistent problems with 
substantivalism, however, that still make relationalism appealing, not least of all the former’s 
reliance on points.  I will review these theories and consider the merits of the newer 
supersubstantivalist approach.  Given the discoveries of quantum theory, the assumptions 
embodied by the classical versions of these theories need to be reviewed, and perhaps 
reclassified as unwarranted metaphysical prejudices.  I conclude with an endorsement of 
singular ontological theories that can develop to take substantivalism’s place. 
5.1. Relationalism   
Relationalism, broadly, argues for a basic ontology of material objects and the relations 
between them; in geometrical terms, relationalists use “physical geometry as describing the 
possible spatiotemporal relations between material bodies and events, actual and possible.  
On their view, the spatiotemporal relations between events are direct rather than being 
parasitic on the relations between underlying points” (Belot, p.4).  Following a relationalist 
perspective, Patrick Suppes suggests conceiving of spacetime as the set of possible positions 
of bodies, such that spacetime is “the set of all possible trajectories of bodies” (Suppes, 
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p.395).  For him, the points in spacetime are akin to the possible sequences of flipping a coin, 
as they have no concrete existence save for the one actualised sequence (i.e. the set of 
occupied spacetime points).  Making objects primary in this way is appealing both to pre-
theoretic empirical accounts of what exists and to the parsimonious metaphysician, but it is 
also appealing because of the problems it can avoid (such as the notorious hole argument 
discussed below).  The familiar conceptual framework was advanced by Descartes
50
, Leibniz 
and Mach and taken up again in modern discussions prominently by Gordon Belot and in 
(Barbour and Bertotti 1982) and (Pooley and Brown 2001), where it continues to find 
relevant subject matter in areas like quantum gravity (Belot 1999).   
Reasons for endorsing relationalism include its parsimony, pretheoretical appeal, and 
ability to account for various models of spacetime (in the works of those above).  The 
relationalist account also usefully revealed through discussions of object motion, which is 
generally described by the altered set of distance relationships an object bears to its 
surrounding objects.  In such accounts motion is not about moving 3 parsecs from the ‘centre’ 
of the universe, but about the “the transfer of one piece of matter or of one body, from the 
neighborhood of those bodies immediately contiguous to it and considered at rest, into the 
neighborhood of others” (Descartes, Principles II.25).  Spacetime points do not exist, let 
alone share the same existential status as material bodies.  Under this account, spacetime is “a 
means of expressing relations.  The spatial relationships between material bodies are regarded 
as no more requiring the existence of a special physical substance called ‘space’ than the 
relationship between Englishmen requires a physical substance called ‘citizenship’” (P.C.W. 
Davies, p.2). 
For the relationalist, then, location can be seen as a relation not between an object and 
the spacetime region it occupies, but between an object and other objects.  Thus, to locate 
electron β is to give an appropriate set of relations to nearby material objects.  The directed 
distance vectors can be extrapolated from measurement theory, whereby the relation ‘being 
five metres from X’ is ascertained by the possibility of laying five measuring rods one metre 
in length end to end from the object to X.  The relationalist need not be concerned with 
‘covering limits’ across the arithmetic model of a spacetime array of points, nor with 
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 Descartes describes a relationalism of motion, but it is much less clear that he favoured a relationalism of 
ontology, and his theory of motion remains compatible with other substantivalist views (Skow, 2003). 
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determining the ‘occupies’ relation to those prolific number of points.  But there is a 
significant cost to this freedom.   
One might not choose to be a relationalist since there is a concern that they must 
deviate from the ontic commitments of common scientific discourse and seek to offer “some 
more extended theoretical basis for physics in which space-time points are constructions 
introduced by definition.  Or again, some other relational structures (e.g. between events) 
might be found isomorphic to…our space-time systems” (Harrison, p.190).  Such projects to 
support a relational framework have not yet proved satisfactory, though one of the more 
successful integrations of relationalism with physics was achieved through the work of 
(Barbour 1982).  Here, he takes the dynamical relationalist view of the universe as a whole, 
made up of moving bodies, which is determined intrinsically to that system (and not relying 
on extrinsic references to points).  That is, he looks at the whole of the universe in calculating 
the dynamics or characteristics of any one part, because it is all of the other bodies that 
determine any one value for this body here (Barbour, 1982, p.269-70).  Employing such 
Machian principles to dynamic physics and field theory, Barbour claims to recover a range of 
equations from modern physics’ canon, including variational principles in general relativity 
and relativistic time (Barbour, 1982, p.273). 
Philosophers like Oliver Pooley and Harvey Brown have found that such “theories are 
arguably more explanatory than their conventional rivals” (Pooley and Brown, p.185).  
Barbour’s approach seeks to account for what actually exists rather than what might, which 
can be seen as a disadvantage and certainly a limitation of applicability.  But when it comes 
to such aspects as describing a universe with zero-angular momentum, Pooley and Brown 
even suggest that it is a predictive asset, given that all our observations thus far support it.  
Gordon Belot is more cautious, seeing relationalism’s inability to describe a universe with 
non-zero angular momentum as a point of concern; it may be only a fortuitous contingency 
that our universe appears to have such a property, and while it does not debilitate 
relationalism, perhaps it is a strength of substantivalist theories that they can embrace a 
greater range of contingencies (Belot, p.16-17).  Although Belot finds no satisfactory 
relational scheme for relativistic spacetime, it may be that further success in relational 
interpretations can be achieved when more conclusive and comprehensive theories are 
developed, i.e. when relativity and quantum theory are given one overarching explanation.  In 
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the meantime, relationalism often gets rejected because of its more scientifically burdensome 
point-free language as well as its handling of modal properties. 
That is, while the relationalist may agree with the substantivalist about the 
geometrical structure of the world, she will disagree and be more restrictive about its modal 
properties.  Following Leibniz, the relationalist argues that when there is no difference in the 
set of relations between bodies (say, if everything moved 3 metres to the ‘left’), there is no 
difference at all.  This is his well-known verificationist criterion of the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles, which can be seen to challenge the substantivalist’s attribution of 
particular identities to indiscernible points.  For the relationalist, it is not the conceivable 
range of geometric relations between two objects that matters but the range of relations 
available given the geometry of the world in question; the relationalist’s set of modal 
properties are limited to the particular distribution of objects in a given world.  The possible 
options for the relationalist seem more exclusive than those for the substantivalist, and this 
difference has implications for the possibilities considered by physics:   
Substantivalists and relationalists disagree about how to count possibilities—where 
the relationalist sees a single possibility (particles with such and such relative 
distances) the substantivalist sees many (particles with such relative distances, 
embedded in Euclidean space in many different ways). Consequently, the two parties 
differ as to the structure of configuration space (Belot, p.38). 
But relationalists may not find this difference very problematic as it is no charge against their 
account of the way the world actually is; after all, it is only a matter of conceptual 
possibility—a limiting of considered counterfactual situations (involving universal rotation 
for example)—where they are known to lack the interpretive framework that substantivalist 
theories can claim.  While it is unclear just how damaging relationalism’s account of 
possibility is, it may yet provide a satisfactory account of the actual properties, locations and 
entities of our universe.   
To give such an account in a way that conforms to the mathematical descriptions of 
physics will be important if it is to play a viable role in debates on the nature of spacetime 
and objects.  I suggest that relationalism can be found to approximate the mathematical 
model by populating the universe with extended material bodies—the energetic minima of a 
discrete ‘spacetime’ now refashioned as material substance.  Call it ‘dense relationalism’, 
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which adopts a particularly dense distribution of minute material things (perhaps including 
the energy stored in the ‘vacuum’) that may even allow spacetime to be an emergent 
property; thus, dense relationalism might recognise a similar set of elements to a substantival 
point array and so better integrate itself with the account of modern physics.  All non-zero 
values of fields could account for material objects, or further, one might then have Planck 
size (or whatever the object minima is found to be) oscillations of strings instead of points, 
which macroscopically approach the point-like particles of our calculations.  As we will soon 
see, such density of material objects may also be seen to mirror the supersubstantivalist’s 
identification of ‘material objects’ with spacetime points, only in this case it is the spacetime 
points used by physical models which are to be identified with real material objects.  Indeed, 
it may be merely a semantic difference that separates the dense relationalist from a 
supersubstantivalist who associates objecthood with every region of spacetime. 
Dense relationalism might also be a compelling model for suggestions that spacetime 
is an emergent property or other theories that place movement of objects at the centre of 
property formation.  That is, it is difficult to view spacetime as a substance on par with matter 
if it only emerges from the interactions of objects, and so depends upon matter for its 
existence.  While certainly not in the orthodox canon, it might be interpreted that fundamental 
accounts of the universe—such as superstring theory—rely on motion to explain properties 
rather than some static background array.  For instance, ‘charge’ is defined as a particular 
type of vibration that responds in set ways to magnetic fields.  This view recalls the primacy 
of interaction from the previous chapter and, if correct, would appear to pose an advantage 
for relationalists.   
5.2 Substantivalism 
 
Substantivalism, favoured by philosophers like John Earman, Graham Nerlich and Hud 
Hudson etc., argues for a fundamental ontology of material bodies and spacetime upon which 
the material bodies are pinned.  Spacetime is typically conceived as points (points-based or 
pointy substantivalism), although it can also be a minima of regions (regions-based or regions 
substantivalism).  The latter view is less common, but in both views, these points or regions 
exist in the same way as material bodies and are not reducible to them or events (Gilmore, 
p.1248).  In other words, “the substantivalist thinks of a physical geometry as being 
comprised of points standing in relations to one another, and of the spatiotemporal relations 
between material objects and events as deriving from the relations between the points which 
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they occupy” (Belot, p.34).  Substantivalism, then, has a larger ontology than relationalism 
and an ‘occupation’ relation that holds between bodies and points.  For Hud Hudson, such a 
model is preferable, and is described as “a concrete particular with an ontological status not 
reducible to relations between those material objects and events” (Hudson, p.97).  
 Reasons to be a substantivalist principally include the long tradition of scientific 
support, as both classical space and relativistic Minkowski spacetime “are composed of 
instantaneous, spatially unextended, mereologically simple spacetime points…[although] 
they differ with regard to the spatiotemporal relations that hold amongst their constituent 
points” (Gilmore, p.1225-6).  Modern field theory also relies on the point model (with further 
topologies etc.) of reality, which takes its cue from mathematics, and has constituted 
remarkably successful theories that integrate mathematical and geometric models with 
material bodies (Earman, p.159).  Having a substratum of points is additionally useful to 
explain the propagation of light, free fall, and acceleration (Hoefer, p.12), while Earman 
thinks substantivalists can also account for “the need to support the structures that define 
absolute motion, the need to support fields, and the need to ground the right/left distinction 
when parity conservation fails” (Earman, p.173)51.  For many, the traditional Leibnizian 
concerns levelled at substantivalism (such as shifting all objects 3 metres to the left) do not 
seem compelling reasons for rejecting it compared to the utility in physics. 
The ease with which our physical theories fit a substantivalist model may be a reason 
to commend it, but that certainly does not prove it is the case.  Indeed, since the 1980s people 
have cited the ‘hole argument’ as a reason to reject substantivalism, or at least to greatly 
modify its ‘naïve’ formulation in terms of the manifold, as it presents a glaring break in the 
smooth fit between the implications of physics and those of substantivalism (Pooley and 
Brown 2001).  The two central components of the general relativistic universe are the (at least 
four) dimensional manifold of events, and the metric field that specifies spatiotemporal 
distances between the events on the manifold.  For the substantivalist who believes the 
manifold of spacetime points exist, with a variety of modal properties, independent of the 
metric (and therefore fields) applied, this creates a problem of indeterminacy.   
 
 
                                                          
51
 The failure of parity conservation refers to the ‘directedness’ of certain phenomena that, for instance, decay to 
the left with a greater likelihood than to the right. 
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Figure 1. Spacetime metric with a ‘hole’ in it. 
To see this, the hole argument uses the general covariance property (no in-built 
coordinates in nature) of general relativity (GR) to redistribute the same metric over different 
events.  If we choose to redistribute only over a small region (the hole), we will be left with 
mathematically distinct regions that allow for spacetime trajectories to meet at different 
events (or points) within the hole.  That is, the complete specification of spacetime enabled 
by GR is provided by the field equations and the distribution of a metric and stress-energy 
tensor across the manifold that nonetheless do not specify the distribution within a ‘hole’: 
 given a complete specification of space-time and its contents (how the metric and 
stress-energy are distributed on the manifold) everywhere outside a compact region 
(“the hole”-not necessarily empty), this specification, together with the field 
equations, fails to determine how the metric and stress-energy fields will be 
distributed over the points inside the hole…If A is a space-time point that will (in 
fact) exist around here sometime tomorrow, the past plus the field equations do not 
determine whether A will underlie me, or you, or some part of a star in a distant 
galaxy (Hoefer, p.9). 
Outside the hole there is observationally nothing to determine the properties within it; “the 
manifold substantivalist is committed to factual differences between the two spacetimes that 
are opaque [to] both the observation and to the determining power of the theory” (Norton, 
p.283).  That is, it appears that substantivalism commits us to indeterminism (about which 
specific points will be connected with which events), which, most believe, is not a matter for 
philosophy but for physics to decide.  
This problem spawned a range of responses to side-step the hole argument and 
replace simple manifold substantivalism with more sophisticated models.  Many either 
argued that spacetimes with and without the hole represented the same state of affairs, or 
rejected the manifold as the sum of spacetime points, arguing that the metric be included as 
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well (Pooley and Brown, p.184-5).  Perhaps one of the more interesting examples is Carl 
Hoefer’s rejection of the individuality of points and endorsement of a ‘metric field 
substantivalism’ that is not concerned with the above kind of observationally-inert 
indeterminism.  In this he finds the real culprit behind the ‘hole’ debacle to be “the ascription 
of primitive identity to space-time points,  [which] can and should be rejected” (Hoefer, 
p.11).  Hoefer adopts Leibnizian equivalence, where two putatively different sets of 
indistinguishable points represent the same possible world.  Thus, Hoefer is happy to go 
along with, say, talk of electron A and electron B interacting even though there would be no 
difference if their positions were reversed.  Curiously, his account leads to the same 
conclusion, by his own admission, as Paul Teller’s relationalist view that denies point 
haecceity and takes the metric field to be the set of possible object positions.  This similarity 
raises concerns about the physical interpretation of models in general as well as the integrity 
of such a substantival formulation.  If contorting substantivalism to fit scientific theory brings 
one closer to relationalism, we have good reason to doubt the utility and rationale of 
substance dualism. 
 Indeed, one could argue that giving a “sophisticated substantivalism…would require 
considerable ingenuity to construct…and if one were to accomplish this, one’s reward would 
be to occupy a conceptual space already occupied by relationalism” (Belot and Earman, 
p.248).  That is, in trying to get a handle on what exactly space is, we seem in danger of 
reverting to a singular ontology like relationalism.  While it is not obvious that the hole 
argument can be evaded so easily, substantivalism’s effective fit with modern physical 
theories means that it has been the most common framework within which theories of 
location are couched.   
Although, metaphysicians tend to be more concerned with cashing out the possible 
ways objects can be located at these points (or regions) than with explaining exactly how the 
object interacts with (e.g. ‘occupies’) spacetime, i.e. giving a full account of the occupation 
relation.  If we are to take substantivalist accounts as the best model for spacetime, then we 
should surely try to cash out the nature of its interaction with objects, and whether and how 
this interaction may vary.  As it currently stands, however, substantivalism does not meet 
this, or several other, challenges and other theories should be explored.  One response to 
describing this relation is to dissolve it altogether, by eliminating material bodies as a 
separate substance and embracing a single supersubstantivalist ontology. 
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5.3 Supersubstantivalism: the best of both worlds? 
 
Supersubstantivalism argues for a fundamental ontology of spacetime alone, where ‘objects’  
are identified with these 1) points or 2) regions (with points-based and regions-based 
versions).  That is, all material objects are identical to the region of spacetime that they 
occupy, and “space is the only first-order substance in the sense that space points or regions 
are the only elements of the domains of the intended models of the physical world” (Earman, 
p.115).  Much like relationalism, this view has the advantage of parsimony over 
substantivalism, reducing the latter’s dualistic ontology to a metaphysics of spacetime points/ 
regions and their properties only.  Beyond this consensus there are several varieties—though 
few stated proponents beyond Jonathan Schaffer—that give varying emphasis to the relations 
and properties of spacetime regions.   
 On the extreme view of supersubstantivalism, simply the geometrical structure—
confining terminology to points, lines, vectors etc.—of spacetime can account for all the 
objects and history of the universe, such that the model of explaining gravity in terms of 
curvature is expanded to cover all forces and particles (referred to as geometrodynamics).  
However, this project has not been achieved and is thought empirically inadequate by many 
(Schaffer, 2009, p.134).  The more moderate view of supersubstantivalism (SS) preserves the 
non-geometrical properties thought to be instantiated by fundamental particles and simply 
makes regions of spacetime the bearers of these properties.  Thus, certain regions of 
spacetime become ‘particle-like’ or ‘mass-like’, and manifest properties in such a way as to 
become ‘blue whale-like’, or in Schaffer’s terms—it allows the fundamental properties to be 
pinned directly onto spacetime.  This more common view is the one I shall be addressing as 
SS, as it is much more easily made to fit with the current understanding we have of the 
universe.     
 There are positive reasons for endorsing this view of spacetime, often as natural 
extensions of interpretations of theories like GR in which “spacetime and things interact in a 
much deeper way than ever before…powerfully suggest[ing] a picture in which things are 
parts of spacetime” (Nerlich, 1994, p.208).  Indeed there is an increasingly popular 
supersubstantivalist approach that endows space with all the properties of objects: “as we 
currently view things, matter or particles sitting (or moving) in a space are actually part of 
that space or, more precisely, spacetime” (Yau, p.19).  It is because of such merits and its 
relative newness to the debate that I wish to give a more in-depth discussion of SS than was 
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given with the more familiar positions of substantivalism and relationalism.  To this end, the 
literature often begins tentatively by noting the lack of reasons against supporting such a 
view.  Physicists and philosophers have both pointed out the conventionalism of science, as 
an accident of history, that may unfairly focus on only one approach, but as John Wheeler 
and Edwin Taylor observe, such conventional practice need not prohibit alternative 
interpretations. 
The best current thinking does not claim that particles are not built out of 
spacetime….For the time being, as a means to get on with the world’s work, and to 
deal with particles on a practical working basis, it makes sense to treat particles as if 
they are foreign objects.  This working procedure does not exclude any longer-term 
possibility to account for a particle in terms of geometry—as one today accounts for 
the eye of a hurricane in terms of aerodynamics, and the throat of a whirlpool in terms 
of hydrodynamics (Wheeler and Taylor 1963, p.193).   
 
Following this last suggestion of a hydrodynamic analogy, it is not so difficult to imagine 
space as some sort of ocean composed everywhere of a ‘fluid substance’.  Suppose in this 
universe, observers were constituted such that they could observe only relatively large scale 
motion, and were particularly attuned to perceiving angular momentum.  In this case, 
observers would notice ‘objects’ like whirlpools, small eddies and the occasional swelling 
and subsiding of object-waves.  As they could not perceive the calm ‘liquid’ they inhabited 
and which composed all the ‘objects’ they could observe, they might find their objects rather 
strange—prone to rising out of nothing and vanishing away again.  Objects of a certain 
‘spin’—say, left-moving waves—would be tracked as moving a specific way and perhaps 
annihilating with objects of the opposite ‘spin’ (right-moving waves of the same size).  If the 
sizes of the object-waves are unequal they would expect to find a scattering of lesser such 
objects produced, or simply a smaller (they might think ‘more fundamental’) object-wave.  
Extensive study might lead them to suspect that some other force was affecting many of the 
interactions they perceived, as if they were somehow slowed or contorted by influence from 
some sort of ‘dark matter’.  I trust the analogy is not lost on the reader, as these observers 
may be suspiciously similar to ourselves; the idea of spacetime relating to, and indeed 
forming objects in this way is plausible enough to generate the supersubstantivalist position. 
 Beyond such stories, why might one wish to be a supersubstantivalist?  A 
parsimonious ontology and the models of physics seem to give a good deal of motivation.  As 
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already noted, SS makes for a tidy fundamental ontology with at least apparent room for 
adequately and even gracefully explaining the cosmos; spacetime regions can account for 
everything that we want material objects to account for and they can do it more cheaply.  
Additionally, physics already standardly applies a substantivalist model to its understanding 
of General Relativity, fields, forces and interactions (Hoefer, p.5-6) and, as Wheeler and 
Taylor pointed out, we certainly have not excluded the possibility of a unity of object and 
spacetime.  There may also be further motivation from the problems faced by simple 
substantivalism, not least of which is the mystery of the ‘occupation relation’ between two 
distinct substances.   
5.3.1 Supersubstantivalism: a closer look 
 
Given its relatively recent emergence in the debate, supersubstantivalism has a very modest 
literature and could use more thorough investigation, and in this I will focus on Jonathan 
Schaffer’s treatment of it in ‘Spacetime: the one substance’ (2009).  In it, he argues for the 
merits of SS, under the terminology of monistic substantivalism (however, to maintain 
consistency I will refer to it as SS throughout).  In particular, he advocates a version of SS 
that “identifies every spacetime region with a material object” (Schaffer, 2009, p.134).  It is 
this ‘identity view’ of SS that he argues is superior to substantivalism in virtue of seven 
advantages: 1) its ontological parsimony, 2) the harmony between the geometrical and 
mereological properties of material objects and of their spacetime regions, that is, that 
spacetime regions are exactly the same shape as their material occupiers, 3) its explanatory 
ability to reject co-location, known as ‘monopolisation’, 4) its explanation for why material 
objects cannot exist without spacetime, 5) it explanation for the prohibition of multiply-
located objects, 6) its coherence with GR and 7) its coherence with quantum field theory.  
Although Schaffer makes his arguments in terms of superiority to substantivalism alone, I 
will review some of the suggested merits in the broader discussion of spacetime theories.  
Ontological parsimony already having been mentioned, I will follow the remaining six as he 
presents them. 
 SS’s strengths in explaining both the ‘harmony’ between objects and their spacetime 
regions (2) and the reason for monopolising the occupied spacetime region against other 
material objects (3) seem easily matched by rival theorists.  Beginning with (2) for the 
argument from harmony, the relationalist dispenses with it offhand, since any talk of 
spacetime regions is only in virtue of objects, while the substantivalist may argue that it is 
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only a matter of trivial definition that my hand occupies a hand-shaped region of spacetime, 
and thus harmony is nothing special.  We only denote that particular region of spacetime 
because this object—with its shape—is present.  Certainly we do not think there are special 
pre-fabricated shell-shaped regions of space that lie in wait only to be occupied by shells, and 
there does not seem to be any mystery in the fact that object shapes match region shapes.  If 
any substantivalist clings to a more involved relation whereby the region seems to have the 
shape of its object either by unexplained coincidence or because the region causally gave the 
object its shape, then there may be more work for the substantivalist, though I do not think 
they need worry;  it aligns with our intuitions and demands no special twist of natural law or 
any special explanation.  For Schaffer, however, the supersubstantivalist is particularly well-
equipped to explain such ‘harmony’ by responding i) that shape is typically viewed as an 
intrinsic property of an object—and thus the real ‘object’ includes the spacetime region—and 
ii) the allocation of geometrical and mereological properties to spacetime is an objectification 
that is in effect supersubstantivalist in approach.   
 However, given what Schaffer has to say about field theory (discussed shortly), it 
seems that he cannot put much stock in the first response, in that—as noted in Part I—shapes 
are not intrinsic but largely depend upon environmental factors, with contributing properties 
like ‘pressure’ defined in terms of the relation between an inner and outer boundary.  His 
second response ii) may be more compelling by following Skow in saying that the 
supersubstantivalist may simply say that to be a spatiotemporal thing is to be a region or part 
of spacetime.  The substantivalist is, however, obliged to say that to be a spatiotemporal thing 
is “either to be a region of spacetime, or to bear the occupation relation to some region of 
spacetime” (Skow, 2003, p.75).  This further stipulation of the substantivalists makes them 
accept a necessary connection between the region occupied by parts and the region occupied 
by wholes (if x is a part of y, then y must occupy the same region that x does), whereas the 
supersubstantivalist does not have two fundamental relata to worry about making such a 
relation between.   
 However, it does not appear implausible that a substantivalist could come up with 
some explanation as to why certain properties are ‘pinned directly’ to spacetime and others 
are not: it may be a distinction resting with laws, or structural properties of the universe, or 
the nature of the properties themselves.  Alternatively, there may be substantivalists that 
embrace a spacetime that does not exactly cohere with the shape of objects.  Such a failure of 
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mereological supervenience between spacetime and object allows for gunk and simples, 
which may be an asset for seeking more permissive theories. 
 Second, although Schaffer makes a strength of SS’s dismissal of co-location (3), 
endorsement of monopolisation, I am not convinced that he is using a more basic relation 
than the substantivalist.  One way of looking at the rejection is that both denials of co-
location seem to assume a uniqueness of place for substances—different substances may 
intermingle for the substantivalists, but neither they nor the supersubstantivalists allow 
doubling up of the same substance.  That is, unique spacetimes and objects can coincide, but 
not unique spacetime regions with other unique spacetime regions, or unique objects with 
other unique objects.   Thus, I find that “no two distinct regions can exactly occupy one and 
the same region” (Schaffer, 2009, p.140) for the very same reason that no two objects can 
occupy the same region
52
.  Regions may not have an occupation relation, but they are located 
in some sense (perhaps relationally), and no two unique regions can be located in the same 
region, i.e. no two regions can co-locate.  Similarly, objects are located at regions (it is part of 
what being an object is); that is, the substantivalist may simply define the ‘containment’ or 
‘occupation relation’ between spacetime substance and material substance to mean the 
principle of harmony that Schaffer alludes to and so make that relation do all the work.  In 
that case, it is the nature of objects, spacetime, and the containment relation that objects 
exactly and entirely occupy spacetime regions (perhaps in much the same way that objects 
put underwater occupy a region of ‘no-water’ that is their shape).   
 Third, there is the argument from ‘materialization’ (4) that appeals to the intuition that 
an object cannot exist outside of spacetime, allowing SS to give an easy explanation for why 
it cannot.  While it may be too much to speculate here on the physical need for spacetime for 
the existence of objects, the claim does reveal important expectations and uses for spacetime 
in our conceptual processes.  It is not mysterious to the substantivalist that her contained 
items (objects) should always be found in a container (spacetime), indeed, they may not find 
it a difficulty at all, but a primitive relation or entirely ‘natural’ (see Hudson p.4).  This is a 
strong intuition but it does take more primitives and an additional location relation than 
supersubstantivalism needs, and that is arguably an additional reason for accepting the latter 
position. 
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 Alternatively, co-location may be equally possible for either theory in terms of multidimensional regions and 
objects. 
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 Fourth, Schaffer sees SS as rejecting the possibility of multiply-located objects (5).  
However, it is not yet empirically obvious that the possibility of multiple-location is a 
problem, and it may be even useful in addressing phenomena like entanglement (see chapter 
8).  Indeed, some may view it as a weakness of his SS that it ostensibly silences this 
possibility of multiply located objects.  There may be ways out for the supersubstantivalist 
though, in allowing the definition of an ‘object’ to range over geographically disparate but in 
some sense unified properties in much the same way that the substantivalist can contemplate 
such objects.  Philosophers (Hudson 2006, Parsons 2006) have taken great interest in 
discussing such exotic objects in a substantival context, which the supersubstantivlist is just 
as able to use.   
 The philosophical justification that Schaffer invokes is similar to what he used for 
rejecting co-location: “material objects are spacetime regions, and no one region can be two 
different regions” (Schaffer, 2009, p.142).  He takes this as a much more obvious claim, it 
appears, than one involving the occupation relation, which the substantivalist might as easily 
define as being exclusive; for instance, the substantivalist might say that ‘to be a material 
object is to be contained in one spacetime region, and no one spacetime region can be two 
other regions’.  That is, substantivalists can give a different and more exclusive definition of 
the occupation relation (perhaps in terms of a containment relation) than Schaffer gives them 
credit, or they might again focus on the exclusivity of the same substance while allowing the 
mixing of different substances.  
 The last two defences Schaffer rallies to the cause are standard interpretations of the 
very successful theories of general relativity (6) and quantum fields (7).  The absence of 
material bodies as we typically think of them in such theories (ranging over both the very 
large and very small) gives a compelling endorsement of SS.  Such an approach is not 
without its problems however.  There is the concern—for SS as much as for 
substantivalism—that we take mathematical models of reality too literally or simply end up 
with no way to translate the one into the other.  On the other hand, a large explanatory gap 
remains between analysis of relativity and the quantum world that may reverse the primacy of 
substances such that spacetime is an emergent property of some deeper material order 
(Seiberg 2006).  On balance, however, and giving cautions where they are due, SS possesses 
much to commend it by embracing the science and streamlining the philosophy of the 
relationship between objects and spacetime.  Indeed, despite finding Schaffer’s arguments 
somewhat modest, I think the strengths of parsimony and agreement with physical theories 
92 
 
remain compelling and sit well in a world picture where particles appear and disappear amid 
an energy sea. 
But if it is such an able means of tying up our loose threads, what reasons do we have 
for not adopting SS?  The common responses generally rest on intuitions and the unnatural 
phrasing, which is noted so vividly by Ted Sider: a region of spacetime bounded out the door 
and barked at the mailman’—it sure sounds strange to say! Indeed, it sounds like a 
‘category mistake’.  But this is not a good reason to resist the identification, any more than 
the strangeness of saying that pain is located in the brain is a good reason to reject the identity 
theory of mental states” (Sider, p.110-111).  Nonetheless, we might object that, beyond our 
expectation of traditional objects, spacetime points or regions are a) not the sort of things that 
move, or, as with substantivalism, b) not the sort of things that could be anywhere other than 
exactly where they are—that is, the de re modal properties of SS are different and more 
restricted than those of substantivalism.   
To these concerns I add c) the conceptual discomfort over using points to ground 
concrete properties.  Given our experience of object motion and an indeterminate universe, 
the first two should be concerns for SS.  Taking a) first, Skow, for instance, suggests that “it 
seems necessary that the distance between any two points of space be the same at all times” 
(Skow, 2003, p.81)
53
.  In order to maintain both the observation of motion and the notion that 
points in space do not change position over time, Skow suggests one might either deny what 
he calls mereological essentialism (whereby points stay the same but the regions 
encompassing them can change), or deny that particles really move.  Although he finds both 
views distasteful and rejects them in favour of a four-dimensional spacetime, I want to linger 
on whether both are so obviously unsatisfying. 
 The first option does not appear much removed from our everyday conceptions of 
identity, whereby we have, say, a persisting region of ‘mother’ despite that region being 
composed of different constituents at different times (cells, atoms etc.).  Under this rejection 
of mereological essentialism, the supersubstantivalist might understand material objects as an 
arrangement of property instantiations that held in certain relations even as the particular 
points manifesting those properties changed.  The second option also seems a relatively easy 
concept to entertain, particularly as the illusion of movement is something we regularly 
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 This assumption may also be a problem for substantival models of universal expansion where presumably 
points either move or have new space appear between them. 
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encounter.  Indeed, it is quite palatable to conceive of spacetime points instantiating 
properties in a sequence to produce the ‘motion of particles’ in a way that is similar to the 
‘motion’ observed on computer screens.   
 The minute array of pixels (spacetime minima) may light up in such a sequence that 
we perceive a single unified object in motion, but that is not what actually happens.  One 
need not accept a 2-dimensional universe to consider such an illusion, and further, it is an 
option for the supersubstantivalist toolkit.  This account of motion may also be able to model 
problematic quantum phenomena in a new light; that is, SS may be able to explain the 
phenomenon not by looking at the permeability of spacetime but by allowing non-adjacent 
spacetime regions to instantiate the set of properties that denotes a ‘material object’.  Under 
this view, we need not explain why the object appears to move faster than light (there is no 
object in that sense), rather we would need to explain why there was a non-adjacent 
instantiation of the property set that constitutes the object. 
Objection b) contrasts the intuitions that spacetime points are necessarily positioned 
as they are and that material objects have the possibility of being located elsewhere.  This is 
seen to pose a challenge to SS since objects and spacetime points are equated, but the 
supersubstantivalist can offer several replies.  First, she may say, as Skow suggests, that such 
modal talk about objects is context dependent, and that the two claims are never both true in 
the same context so that we might find geometric duplicates of spatial regions without finding 
material duplicates exactly overlapping.  That is, one might specify that in  
contexts in which we are thinking about regions of spacetime as regions of 
spacetime…we use a counterpart relation that values geometrical similarity [while] in 
other contexts…in which we are thinking about regions of spacetime as material 
objects…we use a counterpart relation that values other kinds of similarity—like 
similarity with regard to mass and charge distribution—over geometrical similarity 
(Skow, 2005, p.84-5). 
Second, the supersubstantivalist may reply, assuming she does not want to commit herself to 
a deterministic universe, that spacetime points are not necessarily positioned as they are and 
thus dispense with the further concerns of context;  spacetime points, then, do not have their 
geometrical properties essentially.   
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 Third, she may argue that there is no contradiction and that SS may accept both that 
spacetime points could not have been otherwise located while material objects could have 
been otherwise located because there is nothing in the proper interpretations of object, motion 
or location that prevent this from being the case.  This third option amounts to the claim that 
even if spacetime points could not be otherwise positioned, the properties they instantiate 
could vary over possible worlds.  Any viable SS theory will have to allow for spacetime 
points to alter their instantiated properties over time anyway, and this allowance coupled with 
our description of illusory motion does not require spacetime regions to move, but only some 
set (whatever it might be) of relations or properties to hold.  As for c), the grounding of all 
concrete ‘matter’ in points, I think the supersubstantivalist can embrace a region-based 
approach instead, though I do not know that this is more beneficial than pursuing dense 
relationalism.  I take up my concerns with points in chapter 7, so I will here merely note the 
conceptual disconnect between points as we mathematically understand them and the 
perceived properties instantiated in the world.  This connection could use more elaboration 
and explanation to make it accessible, for points-based SS as much as for substantivalism. 
 In summary, I think the three approaches examined—relationalism, substantivalism 
and SS—all have merits and weaknesses such that they should be eligible for physical 
testing.  However, I think there are particular problems for substantivalism—beyond the 
explanatory deficiencies arrayed by Schaffer and Skow—that will occupy the bulk of the next 
two chapters.  I cannot discount the possibility of substantivalism at some point developing 
better responses to questions about the occupation relation or the fundamental difference 
between spatial and material stuff, but as it stands and as I will argue, it is under significant 
pressure such that we should look to monistic ontologies.  That is, I think there are good 
reasons to more thoroughly examine a singular ontology theory, whether supersubstantival, 
relationalist or another new one.  Given the concerns about isolating objects and intrinsic 
properties of Part I, SS and dense relationalism are particularly philosophically appealing for 
their a) parsimony and b) relaxation of the classical object/space distinction, and c) the 
mathematical retention of a points-based system.  That is not to say that we cannot formulate 
a rigid set of criteria that still distinguishes this thing here as an object, but it does relax the 
quest for ontic separation since, technically, everything—whether classed as an event, object 
or space—is made of the same fundamental stuff.  Such singular ontological models offer a 
compelling substitute to bear in mind when reviewing some of the challenges traditional 
substantival theories face in light of physical phenomena in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: Physical Phenomena 
 
The previous chapter gave a critical overview of the main philosophical theories of the 
relationship between objects and space, with an extended look at supersubstantivalism (SS).  
Fairly oblique references were made to the intersections with physics, so I will here explore a 
selection of the more challenging phenomena (as in Part I) to substantival explanation.  
Again, I will use ‘space’ and ‘spacetime’ interchangeably unless there is a relevant distinction 
to be made or unless otherwise specified.  Space is often measured by objects, but it is not 
clear if the objects are in space or are a part of it; it is not obvious we have good reasons to 
think one way rather than the other, and there are problems with standard dualistic 
frameworks of the former case.   
 First, I will look briefly at objects through space, generally interpreted as fields, which 
are often claimed by both relationalists and substantivalists as material or spatial stuff, 
respectively.  Second, I will explore ‘empty’ space, arguing that its fundamental energy 
values make it a stronger candidate for material substance rather than a unique spatial 
substance (as substantivalism claims).  Third, I will argue that spatial expansion is similarly 
an issue for traditional substantivalists who owe us an explanation.  Finally, I follow a similar 
concern looking at the possible emergence of space from dynamic quantum networks, thus 
removing space from our fundamental ontology.  I conclude that there are significant reasons 
to pursue other singular ontological models than substantivalism. 
6.1 Objects through Space: Fields 
 
One way a substantivalist understands an object’s relation to space is to invoke fields, though 
their ontological status is uncertain, applicable to either objects or spacetime; indeed there is 
a tradition from at least Michael Faraday onwards that has attempted to explain physics in 
terms of a unified field theory, which a single ontology may be particularly able to address; 
given the interplay between matter and energy (discussed below), it is insufficiently 
motivated to assume space is a separate substance, and thus, that substantivalism is 
warranted.  Part of the impetus for embracing a basic ontology of fields can be traced through 
discussions of object borders and what constitutes ‘contact’.  The majority of such 
discussions assumed space and time to be continuous, and so wondered whether the 
volumeless point of contact between two objects, spheres, say, could belong to both, to one or 
to neither object.   
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 While no answer was particularly satisfying, fields offered a way of understanding 
forces and interactions that allowed two objects to come into ‘contact’ through their 
respective fields with a boundary that neither one possessed.  Indeed, phenomena like 
electromagnetic repulsion can be understood entirely through fields, either by surrounding 
matter, or matter being entirely composed by fields of repulsive force (Lange, p.169).  Thus 
the location of a particle is just the centre of a field, which is thus in principle capable of 
passing through or coinciding with other fields in the same point.  The energy of a particle 
will be a multiple of the field’s frequency (Nimtz and Haibel, p.82), and it is such differences 
in energy potentials between particles and their surroundings that in turn determine the field, 
leading to a curious and sometimes unclear interdependency, suggestive of an underlying 
connection and posing a challenge to substance dualism. 
Fields have been critical in accounting for the behaviour of many particles and forces 
such as electromagnetism, and the distinction between such fields and space is particularly 
unclear concerning gravitational fields that are thought to warp and contour space itself.  
Gravity is thought to be exchanged through massless gravitons, however, and thus adheres to 
a particle ontology as well as constituting space.  This blurring between object and space 
occurs at the minute level as well; “in quantum field theory, the distinction between particles 
and fields seems to disappear, or at least to become much more difficult to draw” (Lange, 
p.171).  This merging of disparate metaphysical entities is disconcerting, and perhaps even 
alarming when one notes a long-standing disagreement in the scientific community about 
whether fields are in fact real.  Marc Lange’s thorough investigation of this debate reveals 
marked confusion between and within textbooks that take sides on the issue or even call 
fields a reality or a fiction from one page to another.  Nobel laureate Percy Bridgman argued 
that electric fields were a fiction never subject to direct observation (Lange, p.41) while many 
modern theorists claim that fields are “a physical quantity that exists and has a particular 
value for each point in space” (Randall, p.462, emphasis added). 
 So what is the ontological status of fields and how are we to understand the 
relationship between objects and space in terms of fields?  The answer is an issue of ongoing 
debate, though, again, our uncertainty as well as explanatory simplicity give us cause to 
explore non-substantival options, especially as our understanding of fields has wider 
metaphysical implications.  For instance, if fields are real, then electromagnetic interactions 
between bodies are spatiotemporally local; if they are not real, then there appears to be non-
instantaneous action at a distance (proceeding at the speed of light).  And given relativistic 
97 
 
concerns prohibiting a preferred reference frame, then merely electric or magnetic fields are 
want to disappear depending on the observer—making only their unification in an 
electromagnetic field, which can be referenced regardless of the observer’s position, an 
appropriate candidate for a real entity.  While the debate concerning the reality of fields is 
interesting in itself, I will assume that they are real in some sense, and thus that gravity and 
electromagnetism are local forces.  Under this assumption, one can compare the different 
properties attributed to fields, objects and space to better understand how the latter two 
interact. 
 Perhaps the most curious property of fields is their scope, as was referenced in Part I.  
They are perceived as extending out to infinity with properties such as mass or charge 
‘centred’ in some region.  They are also able to thus extend and have non-zero values 
whether or not there is any body—any recognizable ‘object’—there to experience it.  These 
aspects certainly seem to partake of both spatial and material properties, and, I think, 
challenge substantivalism’s traditional dualism.  For instance, while a body can cause electric 
force only around other charged bodies, the electric field can have a non-zero magnitude even 
in ‘empty’ space.  Such quantum fields are thought to be “eternal, omnipresent objects that 
can create and destroy…particles…[and] permeate spacetime…For example, an electron or 
photon can appear or disappear anywhere in space…Each particle is created or destroyed by 
its own particular field” (Randall, p.158).  This may be an unintentional designation of a field 
as an object but it is not an uncommon view.  The ‘vacuum’ state of space is then filled with 
(or composed of) fields that may change at any point into a state that can “contain fields with 
bumps and wiggles corresponding to the particles” (Randall, p.158).   
 If the basic constituents of matter (objects) are created and destroyed within their 
particular field (e.g. photons in electromagnetic fields), then one may wonder whether fields 
are really the fundamentals of matter or whether fields simply are space, or perhaps, as I have 
suggested, some combination of the two.  Although more physics would go a long way in 
determining the confusion over field ontology, I think this interchange between what are 
typically seen as material objects (particles) and the form of space (fields) is suggestive of a 
unified singular ontology of substance.  Indeed, given the interchange of energy and mass, 
which characterise, respectively, spacetime fields and most objects, we should be 
immediately struck by the underlying unity and find any theory of dual substances 
concerning.  If there are any fields identified with ‘space’, rather than fields in space, and 
they are found to produce particles, then a dual theory of substances is very much in trouble.  
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Both points-based and regions substantivalism are so appealing because of their fit with 
science, but if space is interchangeable with matter, then the model can hardly be worthwhile.  
Relationalism, dense relationalism and SS all appear better fits to the above field models, but 
perhaps a closer approximation to spatial fields can be found in ‘empty space’. 
6.2 Empty Space? 
 
Another key point of interface between matter and space for the substantivalist should be 
visible in ‘empty’ space, where an absence of matter could better reveal spatial nature.  
Although we have a verbal distinction between space and ‘empty space’, there is a tendency 
in common parlance—and to an extent in some scientific discourse—to think of space as an 
empty container for matter.  We might inscribe a metric in or over it, and space may be seen 
to rather mysteriously curve and respond to matter, but we traditionally do not expect it to 
change type, that is, to allow the ‘something’ of material objects to come from the ‘nothing’ 
of empty space.  However, something very much like that appears to occur, and clarity of 
definition will be particularly important here.  Bede Rundle notes this concern so that,  
may or may not say that a space is empty if there is light or gravitational waves 
passing through it, and we have to devise criteria for saying that a field permeates 
space. These are conceptual issues, but I do not think that logic extends to ruling out 
the very possibility of (an) empty space.  Rather, having decided what is to count as 
something in space, it is then an empirical issue whether a space is empty or not. 
What is hard to fathom is the claim that space is totally empty and yet that that 
emptiness coexists with such properties as that of curvature, which is referred to space 
itself and not to something within space (Rundle, p.215). 
Rundle’s concern with space possessing matter-like properties (such as curvature) is often 
dealt with through the mediating influence of fields, which provide an accepted means of 
characterising certain properties throughout some sort of extent, presumably a spatial extent.  
‘Field’ is a slippery concept, itself worthy of extensive analysis, but it might roughly be 
thought of as “some aspect of the properties of a region of space that can be quantitatively 
assessed at every point in that region” (Schumm, p.51).  While useful practically, this sort of 
working definition reveals little about the theoretical underpinnings of a field or how best to 
interpret it.  Nonetheless, if we keep with such a working definition we can define empty 
space in terms of either an absence of fields or a zero-value for all fields.  Physicist Brian 
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Greene assumes that this latter option is the more intuitive, but argues that such a notion of 
emptiness “is incompatible with quantum mechanics.  A field’s value can jitter around the 
value zero but it can’t be uniformly zero throughout a region for more than brief moment” 
(Greene, p.330-1).  Indeed, physicists conclude that “emptiness is unstable” (Wilczek and 
Devine, p.244).  
 Furthermore, if we take the standard interpretation of fields to be an instantiation or 
property of space, then “such quantum jitters mean that the shape of space fluctuates 
randomly” (Greene, p.333).  This kinetic view of space is what keeps it from being empty; 
the movement of the field values and that change in potential energy reflect a structured 
‘something’ that suggests space is not empty, at least not empty of matter-forming energy; 
indeed, ironically, “the vacuum is generally regarded as full…with an immense energy of 
fluctuation” (Bohm and Hiley, p.38).  This view is shared on a basic philosophical level 
where space is certainly not totally empty—it is full of itself, of spatial substance (e.g. 
points).  But if we mean it to be a substance that tolerates points and the abstractness of 
mathematics, it is unclear how it could ever interact with the concrete world we perceive.   
Whether abstract or no, an empty space does not equate with philosophical 
nothingness.  Indeed, for the theory of general relativity, “space itself can assume properties, 
and, as a consequence, ‘empty space’ does not automatically qualify as ‘nothing’.  Theories 
that include quantum mechanics don’t admit any empty space at all, simply because the 
uncertainty relation and the special theory of relativity force onto it vacuum fluctuations that 
will fill space” (Genz, p.307).  Part of this energy seems trapped in the structure of ‘space’ 
itself, which is often assumed to encompass the Higgs field and its mass-giving properties.  
Such a structure gives a negative energy to space that cancels the positive energy of the 
field’s own existence (Genz, p.230).   
So while this relation gives a good reason for why our universe is a structured one (by 
being the lowest equilibrium state), it also preserves “a remaining ‘ground state energy’ even 
at absolute zero temperature, which cannot be removed from any volume” (Genz, p.181).  
Indeed, ‘nothing’ in this sense, is unstable, with quantum fluctuations and the negative 
pressure of space countering gravity and implying ‘that, under the right conditions, not only 
can nothing become something, it is required to” (Krauss, p.156).  That the matter and fields 
with which we are familiar are thought to issue from the ‘nothing’ of space, and indeed that, 
given initial conditions, there is a certain inevitability about it, indicates a fundamental 
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connection and shared constitution between space and objects—a monistic substance of 
‘spacematter’ that need not make one or the other traditional substances more primitive. 
If we allow empty space to be inhabited, and even determined, by quantum material 
fluctuations—which seem to give rise to material particles—then we have reason to question 
the space/matter distinction.  Contrarily, if we interpret ‘empty’ to mean devoid of quantum 
material fluctuations (including virtual particles and energy values), and if the laws of physics 
prohibit a completely empty space, then we have reason to dismiss space as a substance and 
embrace a dense relationalism or supersubstantivalism in our world.  Indeed, it is often 
assumed that what we refer to as a fundamental particle is only the ordered excitation of 
fluctuating space, or a type of quantum fluctuation (Genz, p.215).  These excitations could 
take the form of strings or fields with compact centres as our best theories suggest, portraying 
interactions as the collision of certain types of fluctuations with other types.  In either case, 
this sort of conception is sympathetic to the interchangeability of ‘space’ and ‘matter’ and it 
is along these lines that a form of dense relationalism or supersubstantivalism looks 
particularly appealing.  ‘Empty space’, then, may pose a problem of definition, but it also 
suggests a much more intimate relation between objects and space through the convertibility 
of both to energy.  This integrated account can easily coincide with a monistic substantivalist 
approach and the expansion of interdependent properties referenced in Part I.  Again, the 
interchangability of matter and space makes substance dualism seem a hyperbole that should 
be left in favour of other models. 
6.3 The Creation of Space: Expansion 
 
Part of the traditional substantival picture portrays spatial points as stationary and as a firm 
background on which to ‘pin’ mercurial objects and phenomena, and so we might wonder if 
under this view space is something that can be created or ‘moved’.  The expansion of the 
universe and the suggestion that spacetime might be an emergent feature of certain quantum 
processes both seem to press the issue and require some sort of philosophical explanation.  
While the scientific community readily agrees that the universe is expanding, there does not 
appear to be a rigorous theory about what this means for space.  We do not know whether this 
means that spatial fabric is stretching, new spatial material is forming, or simply if the 
distance between visible matter on our cosmic horizon is increasing.   We lack so much in the 
way of details about space that there does not seem to be any exclusively obvious 
philosophical or physical interpretation.  Our best physics states that observations indicate a 
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substantive ‘dragging’ of energy waves that is generally interpreted as space expanding, 
though again this need not be the case.   
 For instance, physicist Steven Weinberg states as an aside, and without much in the 
way of explanation, that “it is misleading to say that the universe is expanding, 
because…space itself is not expanding” (Weinberg, p.34).  It is unclear what he takes spatial 
‘expansion’ to mean, particularly as he doesn’t offer an alternative interpretation.  Although 
vague, we get a slightly more revealing suggestion from physicist Leonard Susskind who 
thinks “space itself is reproducing to fill the gaps.  One might say that space is cloning itself – 
each small volume giving birth to offspring, thereby growing exponentially” (Susskind, 
p.299).  Such a cloning process is entirely mysterious and neither physicist gives a clear 
expression of spatial expansion in these terms or otherwise, though this account may find 
greater purchase in combination with an emergent view of spacetime that takes quantum 
fluctuations as more basic.  Whatever specific explanation is given, an understanding of the 
relational and theoretic underpinnings would be advantageous.  Presumably, philosophy is 
well placed to analyse the implications of various models, chief of which may be its own 
favoured options, substantivalism included.  
There are a few key physical reasons to think space is expanding, all of which rely on 
the beliefs that 1) the volume of space is in some way importantly confined to our universe, 
2) our universe is expanding, and 3) we can know this by the growing distances between 
galaxies coupled with our central cosmological theories (especially the big bang theory).  
Notably, these beliefs are heavy in the way of philosophical assumptions; denying 1) or 2) 
will do away with the issue of spatial expansion altogether, but since we only have empirical 
access to 3), this is where we will start.  There are many astronomical sources that could be 
used, but I will take advantage of Giovanni Macchia’s paper on the subject, given his 
background in astronomy and philosophy.  In (Macchia 2010) he argues that cosmological 
expansion gives us reason to favour a substantivalist perspective over a relationalist one.  He 
follows J. R. Peebles in defining such expansion as indicating that “‘the proper physical 
distance between a [typical] pair of well-separated galaxies is increasing with time, that is, 
the galaxies are receding from each other’ (Peebles 1993, p. 71) with velocities proportional 
to their distances” (Macchia, p.104).   
Describing universal expansion as merely an ‘increase in distance’ may be motivated 
by our inability to define absolute velocity across a large non-Euclidean universe, but it 
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sidesteps all the ontologically significant particulars.  Through a compelling analysis of the 
mathematical expressions, Macchia interprets this stretching of photonic wavelengths as “a 
relation between emitter and observer operating just through space, not across it: light is 
redshifted just because it ‘clears a path’ through an expanding metric that, point by point, 
influences its wavelength” (Macchia, p.127).   He further aligns redshifts, along with the 
absence of kinematic terms in its cosmological formulation, with “a universe consisting of 
expanding space (in which a continual expansion of space is ‘pulling along’ galaxies fixed to 
it)” (Macchia, p.108).  Our conception of the expansion of space is most notably derived from 
the ‘recession velocity’ of observed galaxies, which Macchia argues is not merely local 
movement of objects within a container spacetime, but rather the global rate of increase of the 
metric itself (i.e. the basic units of measurement are themselves growing between but not 
within galaxies).  The movement of light is a privileged observational tool here, as in many 
other instances, because noncoherent objects like photons have wavelengths that are affected 
by cosmological evolution in a way that galaxy-bound objects are not.
54
   
The received understanding that Macchia explores
55
 takes the empirical data from 
galactic optics to mean that there is a “global recession of galaxies [which] originates in the 
dynamical evolution of the universal spacetime metric, and not from the effective motion of 
galaxies through a static space” (Macchia, p.104).   Thus, he argues that observation reveals 
an evolving fundamental metric (spacetime), and this evolution is in turn interpreted to mean 
the fundamental metric is expanding.  Macchia concludes with a final endorsement of 
substantivalism, interpreting redshifts as demanding something physical to propagate the 
wave energy “between the times of physical phenomena of emission and reception… 
Therefore, both in the cosmological redshift and in the gravitational wave cases, a 
substantival metric field, i.e., a structure that can carry and store energy, is needed for the 
explanation of these cosmological phenomena” (Macchia, p.128-9).  But this physical 
structure that can carry and store energy seems, as defined, to be commensurate with the 
description of a material field.  Indeed, it is not obvious that spacetime substance should have 
claim on such a field rather than material substance, despite Macchia’s claim that the metric 
field “can exist without any material content, but the opposite is not true” (Macchia, p.131).   
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 It is thought that at scales the size of galaxies and smaller, the cosmological expansion does not hold because 
all the other forces (as well as the local gravitational fields) are so much stronger than those between widely-
separated galaxies.   In a steadily expanding universe, the compromise between local forces reaches equilibrium 
to maintain a certain size (that nonetheless would have been smaller or larger if global gravity were different).  
It is only in a universe of accelerating acceleration that we should be concerned about a great ‘rip’. 
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 See, for instance (Davis and Lineweaver 2004). 
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  Substantivalist theories are appealing, here, because they preserve the explanatorily 
valuable idea of expanding spacetime, which itself gives a useful framework for explaining 
many of the interactions and properties of fields and objects.  Rejecting the idea that the 
energetic, field-rich vacuum is of the material substance, Macchia thinks the relationalist has 
to give a less satisfying account, which “would be sustainable only in arguing in favour of 
effective galactic motions through a non-expanding space; in particular, relation[al]ists would 
have to resort to Doppler interpretations and accordingly fall back on cosmologically 
unfruitful descriptions based on Special Relativity” (Macchia, p.105).  While it is true that 
resorting only to Doppler effects would limit relationalism’s viability, it is still possible that a 
reinterpretation of the data along other lines (perhaps taking ‘dense relationalism’ more 
seriously or perhaps when the effects of the hypothesised dark matter are better understood) 
may leave the relationalist’s position tenable and even give her an advantage since she does 
not need to explain what ‘spatial expansion’ means, though prima facie her tool kit seems no 
better suited than the substantivalist’s; the possibility of spatial expansion is more a hurdle 
than a falsification of relationalsim. 
While generally sticking to the safer structural talk of spatial expansion in terms of 
increasing distance, Macchia admits a brief moment of reflection and tantalisingly asks what 
it really means; “is it an actual incessant creation of space, that is a kind of production of a 
larger spatiotemporal container added with vacuum?  Is it a sort of stretching of an infinitely 
elastic substance that ‘extends’ its points?” (Macchia, p.118).  Unfortunately, he only raises 
such questions to show them the door, following Misner in dismissing that sort of thinking 
altogether: “to speak of the ‘creation’ of space is a bad way of speaking….The right way of 
speaking is to speak of a dynamic geometry” (Misner et al. 1973, p. 740).  Despite criticisms 
that such questions are the wrong ones to ask, it isn’t clear that one is maintaining a cohesive 
substantivalist ontology if the trickier areas must resort to a different explanatory paradigm 
(e.g. dynamic geometry).   
That is, if we are to take spacetime points (or regions) as real and if we take the 
expansion of spacetime as real, it is a perfectly reasonable question to ask what these two 
assumptions imply; are the distances between spacetime points/ regions expanding, and if 
they are is that new ‘distance’ spacetime as well?  Or are there more points coming into 
existence to account for the increasing volume of the universe?  Substantivalists (and 
supersubstantivalists) should take these questions seriously and offer an account of whether 
space is something that can be created or modified in this way.  As mentioned earlier, one 
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approach is to deny the assumptions that lead to us thinking that space is expanding, and so 
reject that ‘retreating’ galaxies imply anything about space, or that what we call the universe 
is a boundary to space, or yet some other divergence.  But if the substantivalist proceeds 
down these paths, we will need a more sophisticated understanding of the galactic redshifts 
and what other aspects can account for observed phenomena.  Here, then, the substantivalist 
owes us an explanation despite its prima facie advantage of offering a medium (space) by 
which to drag galaxies.  If it cannot given an explanation, then more work is needed on 
fleshing out the content and structure of the theory, and we have reason to look elsewhere for 
explanatory models. 
6.4 Spatial Emergence 
 
Another reason we are lead to address the creation of space comes from the suggestion that 
space (and spacetime) might be an emergent phenomenon, created through certain minute 
interactions such that it depends for its existence on matter, and is thus arguably not a distinct 
substance at all.  This view is, of course, quite opposed to both substantivalism and SS, and 
perhaps most closely aligns with relationalism and dense relationalism: matter is 
fundamental, ubiquitous and space depends upon it.  For several decades there has been a 
suspicion that space and time may be our macroscopic approximations of a very different 
looking theory
56
.   
 The creation of space in this way would take on a different meaning than the 
‘property pin cushion’ of substantivalism, since space would be re-imagined as a fluctuating 
entity that could at most be ‘pinned’ with less fundamental material properties and larger 
objects.  And in this, it could lose any sort of fundamental metaphysical role even if physical 
significance remained.  Here, as with other theories, it is the viability of the model rather than 
the proof that commends our attention, and it is something that physicists like Lisa Randall 
take seriously.  She suggests that “one of the most important lessons of the perplexing 
discoveries of the last decade is likely to be that space and time have more fundamental 
descriptions…David Gross imagines that ‘Very likely, space and perhaps even time have 
constituents; space and time could turn out to be emergent properties of a very different-
looking theory’” (Randall, p.454, with quotes from K.C. Cole’s article ‘Time, space obsolete 
in new view of universe’ Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1999).   
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 This suspicion is somewhat brought to light by Barbour in The End of Time, 2001. 
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 Nathan Seiberg also endorses such a view, suggesting that space and time “will not be 
present in the fundamental formulation of the theory and will appear as approximate 
semiclassical notions in the macroscopic world” (Seiberg, p.1).  Indeed, theories from 
twistors
57
 to strings are considering the possibility that spacetime is emergent, that it is not a 
fundamental component of our world but a phenomenon that appears at a higher level.  In 
examining the implications of string theory, Greene argues that in “the raw state before the 
strings that makeup the cosmic fabric engage in the orderly, coherent, vibrational dance we 
are discussing, there is no realization of space or time…. In a sense, it’s as if individual 
strings are ‘shards’ of space and time, and only when they appropriately undergo sympathetic 
vibrations do the conventional notions of space and time emerge” (Greene, 1999, p.378).  
Questions of emergence arise not only from string theory, but also from the lack of 
spatiotemporal variables in fundamental formulae used in attempts to combine relativity 
theory with quantum theory and even in the more radical approaches to higher dimensional 
algebra, where “the concepts of ‘space’ and ‘state’ are completely merged in the notion of 
‘spin network’, and similarly the concepts of ‘spacetime’ and ‘process’ are merged in the 
notion of ‘spin foam’, eliminating the scaffolding of a spacetime manifold entirely” (Baez, 
p.194).  Admittedly, this is only so much speculation, but there are problems that such a 
move might solve and reasons for taking it seriously. 
For instance, Olaf Dreyer argues that the difficulties posed by the cosmological 
constant and time in modern physics can be eliminated if, rather than treating spacetime as a 
separate object from matter, space and time are treated as emergent concepts.  That is, a 
spacetime appears only through the excitations of the quantum fields (Dreyer, p.11-12).  
Dreyer’s account relies upon, what he calls ‘coherent degrees of freedom’, which 
controversially “play the role of matter… [and] are also used to define notions of space and 
time.  It is because they play this dual role that the equivalence principle and also the Einstein 
equations are true” (Dreyer, p.13).  Dreyer may be seen to uphold a relationalist or even a 
supersubstantivalist perspective by rejecting any notion of spacetime without matter and 
instead favouring the parsimonious unification of spacetime and matter in the actualisations 
of degrees of freedom.  Again, there is little positive theory to interpret here, but the direction 
of the speculation is not without a long-standing engagement with the ideas, including the 
‘halfway-house’ of a holographic model.  
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 “On a sufficiently small scale the concept of a space-time point evaporates…Instead you have the 
intersections of twistors that model light rays” (Gardner, p.253). 
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Taking its cue from the astrophysical formulae describing a black hole’s mass, 
holographic theory supposes that if the maximum information (and thus entropy) in “any 
given region of space is proportional to the region’s surface area and not its volume, then 
perhaps the true, fundamental degrees of freedom – the attributes that have the potential to 
give rise to that disorder – actually reside on the region’s surface and not within its 
volume…Maybe, that is, the universe is rather like a hologram” (Greene, p.481).  The first 
part of this argument is less controversial than the conclusion, as there is a common belief 
that there is a limit to the amount of information and energy that can be contained in a region 
of space, our understanding of black holes says as much.   
This lurking suspicion of spacetime has been on the go for awhile and has many 
contributors, but it is quite a leap to suppose from this suspicion and the surface density of 
black holes that information is thus “stored on surfaces, or screens.  Screens separate points, 
and in this way are the natural place to store information about particles that move from one 
side to the other” (Verlinde, p.6).  It is hypothesised that particles approaching these screens 
influence (perhaps true ‘spooky action at a distance’) the information stored there even before 
they combine with it.  The screens also determine a special direction to space in much the 
same way that time is directed.  Thus, there is one direction “in which space is emergent…the 
screens that store the information are stretched like horizons.  On one side there is space, on 
the other side nothing yet” (Verlinde, p.6).58  The possibility that there is a direction to space 
is intriguing, if underdeveloped, though that in itself need not be a problem for substantival 
theories (though of course a dependent emergence would be). 
 Whether holographic in this way or not, spatial emergence may prompt 
substantivalists to disassociate such ‘emergent space’ from their philosophical conception of 
the philosophical underpinning of matter and thus chalk up the mismatch to linguistic faults 
(e.g. that sort of space is not what we really mean in the metaphysically grounding sense).  
This sort of response looks to the practically relevant rather than the theoretical principle, 
however, and would need to be acknowledged as an approximation, which is not unlike one 
of the options discussed in terms of intrinsic properties; colloquially we might still point to 
mass and shape as intrinsic, but for academic accuracy we can no longer be so sloppy.  
Similarly, substantivalists might also argue that such space is so minute that it can still act as 
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 One might stave off this problem, however, by interpreting the screens as just one large dimensional boundary 
to a higher dimensional universe, and because we (along with all the forces but gravity) are confined to this 
boundary/ screen, we only see the ‘shadows’ of interactions in the larger ‘bulk’ universe.  
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a grounding for all the sorts of properties we talk about.  This might lead them to shift to an 
‘almost fundamental’ ontology whereby space depends on material substance at a 
fundamental level, but above that there is utility in separating the two substances.  
Supersubstantivalists will face the same options, which would make some other theory of 
monistic ontology with a single master substance that accounts for space and matter more 
appealing. 
 In summary, there are areas of physics that are at odds with the notion of dual 
fundamental substances—an important element of traditional substantivalism in both its 
points-based and regions-based formulations.  The interchangeability of fields and ‘empty’ 
space to comply with both material and spatial needs indicates an underlying unity that makes 
dualistic theories unwarranted, while expansion presents substantivalists with challenges that 
need addressing in any case.  Emergence is only a possibility at this point, but it is a 
suggestion that opponents of substantivalism will find encouraging, and certainly if it is 
proven accurate then there will be no keeping up appearances for the theory.  As it stands, the 
weight of ontological commitment that attends embracing substance dualism is too heavy 
given the ontological unity of physical phenomena and so I advocate departing from current 
substantivalism to develop singular ontological models. 
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CHAPTER 7: Location and Points 
 
Beyond physical rationale, I think there are philosophical reasons for finding substantivalism 
troubling, namely in the way space (and spacetime) locates objects, since the material 
substance somehow ‘occupies’ the spatial substance.  That is, I take issue with 
substantivalism’s interaction between two distinct substances; while some auxiliary good 
may come from considering new object types, but such consideration is dependent on 
subtantivalism and the interaction with space remains mysterious.  For the substantivalist, 
space is generally perceived as something of an unprejudiced landlord that allows all manner 
of occupation by all manner of objects: a horse may be located in region r at time t, while a 
car may be located at the same region r at time t1.  Further, the horse or car may be located in 
a variety of ways, from only partly to wholly to exactly located.  Despite the fundamental 
difficulty in conceiving how two distinct substances interact, there are benefits to exploring 
new models for objecthood that attend this area of enquiry, particularly as concerns the 
science of the last century.  Reconceptualising objects in this way sustains the theme from 
Part I as well as raising concerns for reconceptualising space and pursuing singular 
ontological models.  
 Although limited by empirical demands, we can hope to get a better idea of some of 
the benefits of and challenges to substantivalism in regards to the occupation relation.  First, I 
will explore the ways an object might be located at or occupy spacetime in substantival 
models, examining the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, including the difficulty of 
making sense of substance dualism.  Second, I will look at a case study created by Josh 
Parsons that pulls these elements together and gives an idea of the metaphysical intersection 
with modern physics.  Finally, I look at the substantivalist’s use of points and the conceptual 
challenges that attend them, particularly as something interacting with material substance.  
7.1 Location 
Theories of location rely on a particular blending of a theory of spacetime structure, and a 
theory of what sorts of things count as an object.  The majority of discussions on location 
assume—following traditional physics—a substantivalist framework59.  This substantivalist 
bias may seem appropriate for the idea of location—and has its benefits—but it is not without 
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 Location for relationalism involves relevant relations to other bodies while SS can either rely on relations to 
other points/ regions or to the individuality of them (e.g. point 132). 
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its problems and, as with most locational theories, is underdetermined by the data.  Moreover, 
the benefits it provides can be achieved in other ways; i.e. by exploring different models for 
objecthood without assuming that they need to interact with a separate underpinning 
substance.  I see the benefits of such exploration to reside in the receptivity to new models for 
the configuration of objects; not only can these models be adopted by any of the object-
spacetime theories discussed in chapter 5, but they have the potential to better fit with 
discoveries in physics than classical object models do.  One might also claim that such 
explorations are beneficial because they offer a way to maintain locality and familiar causal 
stories that seem unavoidable in physical experiment.  I think there is thus some merit in this 
and am happy enough to compare the terminological uses and general differences among 
location relations in hopes that the above elements do prove fruitful. 
 However, in regards to the particularly substantival aspect of ‘occupation’, I find 
these explorations perplexing, particularly because it is meant to somehow importantly bring 
two distinct substances together and have them interact (e.g. if not simply through the 
‘occupation relation’ itself, then through spatial warping in response to matter).  The 
occupation relation is a weakness in the same way that the Cartesian pineal gland was: it is 
mysterious.  I admit that I have no idea what talk of occupation relations mean, as it seems 
suspiciously caught up in our everyday experience of material objects.  If spatial points are 
real, how exactly are such points occupied?  Could the point ever lose its property of 
‘containing’?  Do objects really need space to exist, and if so, does that not mean that they are 
not of an independent substance, and thus that we should pursue relationalist or 
supersubstantivalist approaches?  I do not even have an idea how I would answer these 
questions, and expect a much clearer account from the substantivalist on this score.  If she is 
as baffled as I am, then I think there is good cause to step back from the model and explore 
others.  Despite my strong misgivings in this respect, I think the previously mentioned 
benefits merit a review of the ways an object might be located. 
7.1.1 Ways to be located 
Most discussions of location adopt (understandably) a substantivalist view of space, which 
uses an occupation relation that has been spun out into a host of bizarre permutations, though 
one does not need this framework to consider exotic objects, so we need focus on the object 
models only without assuming spatial references to be a unique substance.  There are those, 
like Hudson, who advocate a particular terminology for both the relation between space and 
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objects as well as for describing various objects themselves.  Although I am happy to use 
‘occupies’ and ‘located at’ interchangeably, Hudson thinks there is good reason to distinguish 
them and to prefer the former along substantivalist lines.  He prefers to characterise the 
relationship between objects and spacetime in terms of occupancy rather than either ‘is 
extended in’ (because it suggests point-sized objects are nonmaterial) or ‘is located in’ 
(because it suggests spacetime regions are material) (Hudson, p.2-3).  In contrast, while such 
distinctions have potential merit, there does not seem to be enough evidence to motivate such 
terminological specificity, and so ‘located’ and ‘occupies’ will be equivalently used to 
reference where an object is.   
Parsons gives a considered account of particularly troubling quantum behaviour in 
terms of ‘entension’.  This form of the location relation is given to “the phenomenon of a 
material object being wholly located in multiple places” (Parsons, 2006, p.1).  When 
something is only partly located at multiple spatial places, it pertends.  Both of these terms 
have a temporal equivalent: “an enduring object is located wholly at each of the times at 
which it exists; a perduring object is located partly at each of the times at which it exists” 
(Parsons, 2006, p.1).  Parsons outlines a narrow lexicon of location, drawing a distinction 
between an object that is entirely located and one that is wholly located.  I am happy to make 
use of this vocabulary, not so much because it better elucidates our understanding of location, 
but rather because it draws out our idea of an object and its relation to space (or spacetime).  
Borrowing Parsons’ terms, we can say that 
X is entirely located at r iff x is located at r and there is no region of space-time 
disjoint (i.e. not sharing a subregion) from r at which x is located. 
X is wholly located at r iff x is located at r and there is no proper part of x (i.e. a part 
of x not identical to x) not located at r (Parsons, 2006, p.4). 
So long as an object has no proper parts, that is, is an extended simple, it may be wholly 
located at a variety of spacetime regions without being entirely located at any of them 
(entended).  And according to Parsons, entended objects need not be homogenous, rather they 
may have what he calls intrinsic distributional properties (the property being polka-dotted for 
example, rather then, say, having parts that are intrinsically dots and parts that are 
intrinsically not-dots).  In this way, differences in an object may be glossed as constituent of 
the overall distributional property and more ably cover quantum particles.   
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 Although using slightly different terminology, Ned Markosian encourages us to 
contemplate the similar notion of a scattered object (whose parts are spatially separated from 
each other), which is seemingly accessible from several angles.  We learn fairly early on that 
objects like hammers and dogs are composed of molecules with ‘space’ in between them; 
further, the notion of molecules and atoms come with the idea of lots of space between any 
matter as well.  Markosian extends this familiarity to a mereological classification of objects 
such that all composite objects are scattered, since, he argues, their proper parts are spatially 
separated (Markosian, p.405).  Under this view, only simples (that lack proper parts) are 
wholly unscattered.  Even if one is not ready to define all composite objects as scattered, the 
viability of scattered location has given rise to several attempts at classification.   
 Hudson entertains a far more ‘scattered’ object in the form of a multiply located 
object; a multiply located object, x, is (i) “located at more than one region, and (ii) x is not 
located at the fusion of the regions at which x is located” (Hudson, p.103).  That such an 
object need not be located at the fusion of its parts is perhaps most easily understood through 
a temporal analogy: if you exist here at time t1 with mass M, and you subsequently exist there 
at time t2 with mass M, you would not be the fusion of the properties of t1 and t2 (such that 
you had mass 2M).  Similarly, Hudson’s multiply located object is such that it is simply 
located in that way and is not the fusion of all those parts.   
 Such objects need not be entirely located at any one region (though, this may depend 
on how one defines ‘region’, for presumably a sufficiently spatially gappy region could 
encompass a disjoint object that we would consider multiply located).  Such an object may 
have proper parts or be an extended simple.  In (Saucedo 2006), Raul Saucedo explores at 
length possible permutations of simple and complex objects located at simple and complex 
spacetime regions, teasing out the permissibility of gunk and simples.  All of these exotic 
ways an object can be located reflect both our imaginations and the quantum weirdness seen 
through experiments.  Although none of them address the basic mystery of material stuff 
interacting with spatial stuff (no clearer than Cartesian pineal gland interactions), they have 
the potential to become a complex canon of reference separate from substantivalism. 
7.2 A case study in quantum location 
To get a clearer idea of how thinking on how such object types might be explanatorily 
beneficial to physics, I will use an example that does not rely on a substantival framework.  I 
focus on Parsons’ discussion of entensional objects through quantum superpositions and 
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entangled particle experiments (Parsons, 2003)
60
.  The set up is familiar, if slightly more 
complicated than usual; it involves a particle travelling from a source to a deflecting box (in 
the case of photons, we may suppose the box is a half-silvered mirror), from which point the 
particle will be deflected, one of two ways, toward detector 1 or detector 2 (appearing at 
either 50% of the time).   
 The complexity arises from the different additions one may make by incorporating 
more deflecting boxes or manipulating the interference (which can arise from a single particle 
interacting with itself or from impediments placed along the particle path).  The orthodox 
explanation for the particle’s strange behaviour is that the particle leaves the box in a 
superposition of states, that is, the particle is in a sense multiply located along every pathway.  
Even though it is seemingly detected only at one detector in the apparatus—and thus, seems 
not to have travelled along the other paths that would have led to the other detector(s)—with 
repetition, the particle’s location of detection nonetheless demonstrates a pattern of behaviour 
most readily explicable by having taken the statistical average of all paths.   
 Again adopting the orthodox interpretation, we can assume that this paradox of 
observations not aligning with the supposed process can be explained using the ‘Von 
Neumann strategy’, which includes an evolutionary wave ‘collapse’ that avoids including the 
entire experiment, observer or the rest of the universe from also entering a superposition of 
states in regards to where the particle is detected.  During the time when the particle is in a 
superposition, it may be thought to entend or pertend, that is, either the particle will be 
wholly located at multiple spacetimes, or parts of the particle will spread out and each 
traverse a path.  Parsons argues that the latter account is less appealing for two reasons.   
 First, it is not at all apparent how the properties are to be distributed across the two 
half particles as each behaves as if it has “the whole mass of the particle” (Parsons, 2003, 
p.12).  This first criticism could use more support, however, because on the one hand the 
various properties of the superstates are not well documented nor to my knowledge have they 
been independently observed, and on the other hand, our lack of a satisfying arrangement of 
property distribution may be a difficulty for us rather than for the theory.  Second, and more 
importantly, pertension when combined with the favoured Von Neumann strategy makes the 
“half-particles coordinate themselves instantaneously at the moment of collapse” (Parsons, 
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Also, see chapter 8 for a more detailed account of entanglement. 
113 
 
2003, p.13).  That is, pertension gives way to the very unsatisfying spooky action at a 
distance.  This latter concern highlights the loss of our explanatory framework should we 
accept pertension in this case, which might be clarified by a new understanding of spatial 
structure or object-spacetime interface, though is currently mysterious. 
 Parsons claims to lessen the mystery by adopting entension as an explanation, with 
the whole particle located at both detectors but affecting only one of them.  If he is correct, 
then superpositions may be perceived as non-homogenous wholly located objects at multiple 
spacetimes: an electron that undergoes the same deflecting box experiment can be spinning 
up along one path and spinning down along the other path.  Indeed, in experiments involving 
entangled particles we might see entension as prompting a re-categorisation of the twin 
particles as “a single entended object, a two-particle, which behaves almost exactly like the 
mereological fusion of two particles” (Parsons, 2003, p.16). The holistic view of this ‘non-
separable’ quantum state provides an alternative to the ‘non-locality’ problem; that is, there is 
no action at a distance or non-local effects because the entended particle is not distant from 
either detector (and thus, the one it affects). 
 Parsons is not alone in advocating such occupation relations; for instance, Peter 
Simons advocates a similar (perhaps coincident) view, if from a different motivation.  Simons 
seeks to reject what he calls the geometric correspondence principle, whereby an object’s 
parts correspond to the parts of the region it occupies, and instead embrace a view of 
extended simples
61
.  When such extended simples occupy a region of spacetime, they occupy 
all of it, but they need not do so homogenously.  That is, an extended simple may have a 
distributional property (again, e.g. being polka-dotted) that is the case all over, even if the 
intensity of the property (e.g. the polka dot as opposed to the ‘background’ colour) varies 
across the subregions of the spacetime region.  This idea fits nicely with the theories of 
location advocated by Parsons and seems to accommodate physical theory well.  
 Simons argues (though not in great detail) that the non-uniform nature of such simples 
allows them to overlap, presumably giving rise to forms of co-location.  It also allows us to 
accommodate the empirical interference patterns in describing the ‘split’ of a beam of 
photons by a half-silvered mirror and say that the ‘beam simple’ has gone both ways and 
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 His extended simples principle says that “every physically basic item (simple) occupies at any time an 
extended region, called its locus, but it has no physical proper parts.  In particular it has no parts corresponding 
to subregions of its locus” (Simons, p.376). 
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redistributed its energy over the new locus.  If this seems like a bizarre way to think of one 
object, it appears neither logically nor metaphysically impossible.  Indeed, as noted, our 
identity ascriptions include spatially separated parts all the time (e.g. ‘school’, ‘family’).  
What is different here is the potential to have that same spatial discontinuity applied to 
simples, or having it apply to a spatially separated object that is not spatially separated into 
parts (i.e. it could have parts of any of the spatial instantiations but each instantiation is not a 
different part). 
 The substantivalist’s occupation relation has spawned (though I don’t think was 
needed to) a rich metaphysical discussion for imaginative ways an object might manifest, 
some of which may be useful tools for physical explanation.  It gives us a lexicon and map of 
ways that relation might be, even if we cannot say much about the relation itself; by analogy, 
we might not be able to talk about the precise inner workings of a dog though we could say a 
lot about different breeds.  Still, I do not think this overview of locating objects in space has 
clarified the fundamental relation, something that still needs to be addressed by 
substantivalists.  Although I think substantivalism is not the best model, this creative 
approach to options once rejected off-hand by the scientific establishment is an important 
exercise.  We need to be cautious of our prejudices toward exotic object manifestations, not 
only because of the alien quantum world we are now exploring, but because our old models 
have been shown wanting and embarrassingly anachronistic.  Becoming more open and 
aware of the implications and permutations for objects and their environment in this way has 
the potential to be of service to modern physics.  This, however, is something of a by-the-by 
for substantivalism, which retains a confusing occupation relation and whose main asset is 
continuity with physical, i.e. mathematical, models that are not free of mystery either. 
7.3 Points, Continua and mathematical interpretation 
 
In addition to the mystery of the occupation relation, points-based substantivalism has the 
mystery of spatial points and their relation to physical objects.  It too comes with benefits—
mathematical and explanatory ones—that make the theory so appealing.  However, they also 
make it, for me at least, confusing.  Points-based SS inherits these pointy benefits and 
challenges, though relationalism, dense relationalism or yet some other permutation of a 
unitary ontology from which both spatial and material substance issue, may be able to avoid 
these conceptual challenges by turning the geometric talk into a merely instrumental model.   
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 That physics treats spacetime in a predominantly mathematical way, with 
extensionless points, means we are left to devise how our extended material world fits ‘onto’ 
this infinite array of unextended points.  The substantival merging of mathematical concepts 
with physical reality raises a concern about how infinite points of space(time) with zero 
volume could ever compose or interact with anything of volume or create distance.  With no 
physical limit set by the size of the spacetime points (because they have none), there is 
nothing to prevent any two points one may choose from having an infinite number of further 
points between them—but even accepting mathematical covering limits, does that create 
physical distance and/or spatial separation?  Indeed, does that create anything at all?   
 It may be palatable to think of an infinity of conceptual points, but more confusing to 
think of an infinity of physical minima that offer no measure.  For instance, it is not obvious 
how varying distances are created between objects when both “denumerable and 
nondenumerable point sets may have measure zero” (Fine, 1973, p.245).  Perhaps because 
our mathematical models enjoy such predictive success, many overlook the strangeness of an 
abstract but real spatial substance interacting with concrete, physically real material 
substance, but successful or not, it is a strange marriage and one about which we should be 
wary.  Since relativity theory supposes spatial substance to respond and interact with material 
substance, we are left giving an account of how seemingly abstract points interact with 
matter. 
 Indeed, the substantivalist faces something of the Cartesian dualist’s problem of 
accounting for the connection between different substances, particularly as concerns the 
mathematical model used to describe space.  If, on the one hand, spatial substance is to be 
likened to the concrete physical stuff of matter, it seems inconsistent to call it a separate 
substance; to make it a fundamentally distinct substance is unwarranted if it is the same stuff 
as matter.  On the other hand, if the spatial substance is to be likened to the abstract existence 
of coordinate axes, we should be clear how it then can be (if it can) warped by matter when, 
for instance, the abstract number line is not.   
 I find this profound physical use of points makes the problem of mathematical 
interpretation acute; if we take space as real and, say, dimensions as a fundamental structure, 
are points that which delineate one dimension from another?  That is, is it a point here with 4 
degrees of freedom and a point there with 7 degrees of freedom that makes this region 4-
dimensional and that region 7-dimensional?  The role of spacetime points to dimensional 
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structures is certainly important, though I will explore the reification of points more 
generally, reviewing some of the issues with integrating the notion of extensionless points 
with the ‘occupation relation’; that is, I will look at how we are to understand the interaction 
between the points (or regions) of one substance and the familiar materiality of the other.  
 The spacetime points of the substantivalist and supersubstantivalist appear to have the 
volumeless characteristics of mathematical points.  If such points are so insubstantial, i) what 
is the role they play, ii) what makes them real and more than instrumental scaffolding, and 
iii) what is it that provides the specific distances between objects?  It is not obvious that 
points can somehow collectively yield lengths, nor is it clear how these points relate to 
objects (e.g. what properties, if any, do they possess?  Do they bear properties, say, degrees 
of freedom?  Do they give rise to the appearance of objects as in the case of SS, and if so, 
how?).  It does not seem that point-based substantivalists have adequately addressed these 
questions, and what follows will be a brief overview of the problems and alternatives that she 
should take into account.  With such concerns in mind I will review some of the problems 
with points, taking a brief look at the traditional distinction and argue that substantivalists and 
supersubstantivalists should be concerned with giving an account of them.  I will also explore 
the possibility of a discrete, interval-based alternative, which helps such point-based (or 
‘pointillisme’, discussed later) worries, but leaves the question open as to what space is, 
exactly, since abstract intervals hardly seem much of an improvement on abstract points.  I 
conclude that point-based theories need to take these concerns seriously.  
7.3.1 Traditional Account 
The substantivalist appealingly suggests we treat space as a real substance on par with 
material bodies.  But where that space is also said to consist of an array of points, we 
encounter a confusion of categories that dates back to Zeno.  Despite substantivalism’s 
success in aligning with modern physics, I think its general
62
 commitment to the reality of 
points (rather than, say, regarding them as a mere model) means it owes us an account of how 
its two fundamental ontologies interact.   
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 Not all substantival approaches need embrace this.  For instance, William Edgar argues that one can allow 
space to contain locations without reducing it to a composite of locations or points.  He takes such an approach 
to be overtly substantivalist and casts locations as a privileged class of universals which are eternally 
instantiated and used to individuate instantiations of other universals (Edgar, p.330-3).  While an interesting 
approach, I will assume the standard interpretation of substantivalism here. 
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 For instance, if spacetime is composed of a continuum of points, the substantivalist 
should be able to tell us how they relate to objects and provide distance length, as well as 
telling us whether and in what way an entity that occupies these unextended points can have 
normal properties (or for supersubstantivalists, how they give rise to the concrete world).  To 
that end, I wish to question whether our mathematical account of reality is to be taken at face 
value (as the substantivalist seems to suggest), or whether it should be viewed as a model 
only (and perhaps an unhelpful one).  If the former, I am particularly concerned with how we 
are to make sense of extension composed of unextended elements, and in either case I want to 
know how we are to understand the interactions between extended bodies and 
spatial/spacetime points.  Zeno’s metrical paradox and responses to it provide a good 
example of the conceptual difficulties associated with such interactions, and merits a brief 
review. 
The argument takes four appealing premises drawn from arithmetic and geometry to 
form an uneasy collaboration that implies that the length of a line segment is 0.  I take the 
construction from David Sherry’s account: 
 
1. Composition. A line segment is an aggregate of points. 
2. Point-length. Each point has length 0. 
3. Summation.  The sum of a (possibly infinite) collection of 0’s is necessarily 0. 
4. General Additivity.  The length of a line segment is equal to the sum of the length 
of its parts (Sherry, p.59). 
 
Modern mathematics avoids Zeno’s conclusion by creating the concept of limits, 
distinguishing between countable and uncountable sets, and rejecting general additivity in 
favour of allowing the summation of an interval’s parts to be greater than the whole (that is, 
the union of the point sets is not a mere arithmetic sum).  Adolf Grünbaum explains the 
seeming paradox in terms of Zeno’s metrical ignorance that the cardinality of a set is 
independent of its dimensional length; the summation properties of topological sets do not 
require that the sum of zero-dimensional sets also be zero-dimensional (Grünbaum, p.294).   
 Moreover, interpreting length as a Cantorean point set, we find that it need not be “the 
case that the longer of two positive intervals has ‘more’ points” (Grünbaum, p.297), and 
indeed, one may make a continuous mapping of all the points in an interval onto all the points 
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of a square
63
.  Thus in mathematics at least, points can achieve things in sets that they could 
never do on their own.  Such developments seem to have left mathematics well clear of 
Zeno’s early concerns, but it is not solely the mathematics with which we are concerned.  For 
the substantivalist, the issue is not so much that mathematics can give an account of the 
confusion and dispense with it in its own domain, but how and to what extent the 
mathematical model is applied to physical reality.  
 David Sherry finds Grünbaum’s interpretation inadequate and sees Zeno’s confusion 
lying with this conjunction of geometry and arithmetic, rather than lying with a deficient 
understanding of mathematics.  Contra Grünbaum, then, “an uncountable summation of 
numbers is not inherently problematic, but an uncountable summation of numbers that have 
been identified with length is” (Sherry, p.62).  This kind of arithmetical application to 
geometry and their conjoined application to reality should give us pause, because it is 
arguably the real source of the paradox.  The restrictions and tools employed by the modern 
mathematician do not refute this paradox so much as delimit her possible aims.  How we 
should interpret this limitation is not clear, however: whether we are to take unextended 
points as the literal, physical components of line segments, extension and the stuff of 
spacetime, or to take them as a useful model only.   
 Or again as Sherry casts it, it is unclear whether we are to follow Zeno’s lead and 
think of the relation between lines and points in terms of parts and wholes, or whether we 
follow mathematical set theory and view it as the set-membership relation (Sherry, p.71-2).   
Indeed, we might reconsider our set-theoretic model and explore, as John Baez suggests, 
category-based models instead, which “can be thought of as an attempt to treat processes (or 
‘morphisms’) on an equal footing with things (or ‘objects’)” (Baez, p.178).64  The blending of 
mathematical and physical paradigms has certainly proven fruitful, but it is partly in virtue of 
this success that it is so difficult to separate the model from genuine reality.  We may find 
that “although, as mathematics and physics have shown, the grammar of atomism and the 
grammar of lines and points can be profitably joined, the latter can never by fully subsumed 
under the former” (Sherry, p.71).   
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 More generally, through his work with infinite sets Cantor proved (mathematically) that “n-dimensional space 
has exactly the same number of points as a 1-dimensional space” (Shapiro, p.66).  
64
 “A category consists of a collection of ‘objects’, and for each pair of objects x and y, a collection of 
‘morphisms’ from x to y…in category theory, an object need not have ‘elements’ or any sort of internal 
structure…What really matters about an object is its morphisms to and from other objects. Thus, category theory 
encourages a relational worldview” (Baez, p190). 
119 
 
This type of distinction can be found in Aristotle as well as Zeno, where the former 
suggests that “there is actually an infinite number of divisions in an interval, but that these 
divisions are not to be understood as parts of the interval” (Edgar, p.329, emphasis added).  
Similarly, Nerlich argues that clarity can be found in mereological terminology: “the only parts 
of continuous or merely dense space are its (proper) intervals; it is a sum only of these.  Points 
are not parts of space nor is a space a sum of points.  Points are members of intervals, not parts of 
them…points are in spaces as members are in sets, not as parts in wholes” (Nerlich, p.175). 
Nerlich thus appears to reject spatial points as constituents in favour of spatial intervals, along 
which one can locate an infinite number of points—as we would expect to find along any 
interval—that are nonetheless not parts of that length.  Points can be ‘found’ anywhere, much 
like the number seven, but when constructing chairs or puzzles or spacetime distance, they are 
not any part.   
Further, while we can conceivably carve up a line an infinite number of ways, we can 
only actually divide it a finite number of ways.  This is very much a difference between points 
and physical bodies, and the logical operations we can apply to each kind of entity.  For instance, 
we might assume that a dense continuum has axioms that can be satisfied in a domain of points 
while physical bodies require a different sort of logic altogether.  José Benardete follows 
Aristotelian lines when he argues that “the categorical distinction between points and bodies is so 
ontologically profound that it explains why it is that the axioms of absolute continuity may be 
satisfied in a domain of the one but not the other” (Benardete, p.425).  For Benardete, the points 
of conceptual or mathematical space are mere possibilities, many (even an infinite number) of 
which can be actualised, but not all of them; the actual world of bodies is discrete and does not 
follow the axioms of absolute continuity.  He concludes that there is no one-to-one mapping of 
actual bodies to points in the continuum, and we should not be surprised at this restriction: 
The distinction between the discrete and the continuous proves to be derivative from 
the deeper distinction between the actual and the potential. To be actually continuous 
is to be capable of being divided in more ways than can ever be realized.  Thanks to 
the fact that potentiality is necessarily richer than actuality, we can understand why it 
is that the axioms of continuity cannot be satisfied in any domain of bodies 
(Benardete, p.426). 
Thus, while we may reap the organisational benefits of the number line we are 
nonetheless left with the curious task of trying to pin extended actual objects ‘onto’ an 
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infinite range of unextended points (potential objects?) that somehow constitute the various 
spatial separations we perceive.  What, then, could ‘being located at’ or ‘occupying’ mean 
when we try to situate an object in space?  Such an unintuitive marriage should have very 
good support for its acceptance, and one that could usefully distinguish that sort of abstract 
from other, ‘less real’ sorts of abstract.  If spatial substance is made of points at which we are 
located, then what is to stop us from being located along abstract number lines at point 2.36 
or point 4388?  It is not clear that there is anything more than our arbitrarily determined 
coordinates, or a relational matrix of other objects that determines exactly where (in some 
absolute sense) an object is.  Points-based substantivalism needs to explain this interaction, 
and with something more than claims for primitiveness; such attempts did little to make 
Cartesian dualism palatable and I see no reason for being less lax in this case. 
7.3.2 Modern Concerns 
 
Modern engagement with mathematical axioms and points-based ontologies (from 
philosophers like David Sherry and Jeremy Butterfield) has given rise to similar paradoxes 
contrasting the available intuitive operations on space against the available operations within 
mathematical systems.  For instance, locating properties like mass and charge to point-sized 
particles leads to problems like infinite density (Simons, p.373).  The apparent absurdity of 
applying such theorems to the physical realm leads the like of Peter Forrest to reject the 
standard view of a points-based substantivalism and side with Jeffrey Russell who suggests 
that points my simply be temporary scaffolding to be jettisoned in latter theories (Russell, 
p.249). 
 Both general relativity and quantum theory agree in their use of points in 
mathematical models, but as Jeremy Butterfield and Christopher Isham note, “one needs to 
respect the distinction between a (putative) physical spacetime point, and an (undeniably 
postulated!) point in a mathematical model of spacetime based on standard set theory” 
(Butterfield and Isham, p.52).  That is, mathematical models may only be taken so far and 
require clear rationale for doing so in each case.  They cite a reason for our readiness to reify 
through our tendency to formulate theories where points are postulated “at the beginning of 
their formalism; the rest of physical reality being represented by mathematical structures 
(vector, tensor, and operator fields etc.) defined over the set of points” (Butterfield and 
Isham, p.52).  However, they argue, the theories need not assume such mathematical objects 
as representing spatial points, rather the theories may take those mathematical objects to 
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represent, say, fields.  Indeed, we might formulate the theories  “in such a way that the 
fundamental mathematical entity is not the set X of spatial points – on which fields are then 
defined – but rather a commutative ring, on which spatial points are then defined: viz. as 
maximal ideas” (Butterfield and Isham, p.52).  The range of alternatives to reified points 
afford substantivalists plenty of options, and given the unclear theoretical interface between 
material and spatial substances, it appears that they would do well to explore the options. 
 An additional problem lies with the Leibnizian concern for distinctions without a 
difference (or ‘symmetry transformations’), as was seen in the ‘Hole argument’.  Butterfield 
and Isham argue that this problem arises with any theory of general covariance and spacetime 
points as objects, as the combination implies a radical indeterminism that should prompt us to 
reject the physical reality of spatial/ spacetime points (Butterfield and Isham, p.54).  This 
ontological interpretation of spacetime points can certainly complicate matters, but adopting a 
more structural definition may ease the issues; to keep philosophical claims subservient to 
empirical ones, we are compelled to think of spacetime points as indiscernible, such that they 
could exchange properties so long as the overall structure is preserved.  Even if one argues 
for the discernibility of such points through a sophisticated substantivalism, one may need to 
appeal to the relational structure of the metric as a means of individuation rather than a 
primitive haecceity. 
Arguably, “the use of real numbers (and similarly complex numbers) in quantum 
theory in effect involves a prior assumption that space should be modelled as a continuum” 
(Butterfield and Isham, p.85).  Further, it may be that this bias slows our construction of a 
discrete structure at the Planck scale that would more aptly capture reality.  Indeed, the 
inability to completely unify general relativity with quantum theory has prompted some to 
suggest altering the mathematics we use to better incorporate discrete models.  For instance, 
“standard mathematics is based on set theory, and certain aspects of the latter (for example, 
the notion of the continuum) are grounded ultimately in our spatial perceptions.  However, 
our perceptions probe only the world of classical physics – and hence we feed into the 
mathematical structures currently used in all domains of physics, ideas that are essentially 
classical in nature” (Butterfield and Isham, p.85).  This is not to say we should dismiss 
classical models, but only that our biases may be more prevalent in this area than realised.  
Moreover, there are classical reasons that we might reject a point-based model. 
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 The notable limits of the partnership between mathematics and physical interpretation 
have been discussed by Butterfield in his several papers against pointillisme, wherein he 
argues against the “doctrine that a physical theory’s fundamental quantities are defined at 
points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-
sized objects located there” (Butterfield, p.2).  Butterfield’s account follows the conclusions 
of Part I in embracing a more extrinsic view of spacetime points whereby they cannot support 
the property attributions of many physical qualities, specifically those of classical mechanics.  
It is worth noting the four main concerns he raises in this respect, both as a way to highlight 
the drawbacks of such point-based models (some of which I discussed) and to add his 
particular concerns to the general complaint.   
 Firstly, Butterfield argues that pointillisme violates, or at least must concede to 
classical mechanics in regards to the binary relation of ‘occupies’, which “presumably brings 
with it extrinsic properties of its relata: it seems an extrinsic property of a point-particle (or a 
continuum, i.e. a continuous body) that it occupy a certain spatial or spacetime point or 
region; and conversely” (Butterfield, p.11).  For instance, the need to go beyond the 
summation of points in a line to get the property of ‘length’, which is extrinsic to the points, 
is at odds with pointillisme’s claim that the fundamental qualities are intrinsic to points. 
 Secondly, the spatial structure of classical mechanics “involves a complex network of 
geometric relations between, and so extrinsic properties of, points” (Butterfield, p.11). 
Specifically, Butterfield argues that the geometrical demands of attributing vector properties 
(a tangent vector with its attendant space and a metric tensor) to points in order to define 
curvature cannot reasonably be intrinsic since they are directional and relational.  Citing both 
Denis Robinson and pre-1993 David Lewis, Butterfield argues that, though uncomfortable, 
the conclusion results from the intuition that a zero-dimensional point could not instantiate a 
vectorial property (Butterfield, p.22).  If true, then it is yet another way that pointillisme 
contradicts—the very useful—classical mechanics.  Thirdly, Butterfield argues that reference 
to “instantaneous velocity or momentum of a body...is temporally extrinsic to the instant in 
question, since for example it implies the body’s existence at other times” (Butterfield, p.12). 
Given the union of space and time into spacetime, this further element of extrinsicality poses 
a problem for pointillisme and removes part of the appeal for a point-based substantivalism, 
as does Butterfield’s final point.  Fourthly—and briefly, he argues that classical mechanics is 
not, in fact, formulated in terms of points, but rather in terms of regions (Butterfield, p.12), 
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and thus is notably divorced from the more acute problems of abstraction that come with 
pointillisme. 
 Butterfield’s complaints echo some of the issues mentioned earlier, all of which make 
the adoption of a point-based substantivalism unattractive.  First, we looked at some of the 
larger structural concerns dictating how an abstract geometry of points interacts with the 
concrete physicality of material substance, which offered no clear answer.  In this we 
explored some of the traditional debates dating back to Zeno and including the ‘solution’ of 
modern mathematical ‘covering laws’, which nonetheless seemed to miss the crux of the 
paradox.  The promising alternative of a discrete approach was also briefly reviewed, 
followed by a litany of challenges and/or failings of the point-based model.   
 The above discussion suggests a substantivalism that is region-based as a more 
promising alternative to pointillisme, but it also suggests that there remains a pronounced 
disconnect in the substantivalist’s model between the non-physical substance of space and the 
physical substance of matter and energy.  If each substance deserves such a classification, it 
is frustratingly unintuitive to explain how they interact and what we are to make of the reality 
of the former.  If, on the other hand we discover that by space we actually do mean something 
like ‘energy field’, then space and matter are not obviously two distinct substances since 
intuitions go both ways about which ontological category they belong to.  Admittedly, this 
depends on how one conceives of spatial substance, but I wonder whether—if we are honest 
with ourselves—we might be driven to a more unified (perhaps supersubstantivalist) picture.   
7.4 Conclusion  
 
The traditional substantivalist approach has proven fruitful in conceiving and developing 
modern physics, not least because it maintains the geometrisation so common in that 
discipline.  Substantivalism also leads us, if serendipitously, to consider an explosive range of 
ways to scatter or centralise bits or all of an object through an array of spatial partitions, 
which may prove useful models for physics.  I think there are real problems with the standard 
account, however, including the basic doubling of substances, the phenomena that it fails to 
help explain, the mysterious ‘occupation relation’ and its traditional use of points.  There is 
room within the theory to accommodate point-based concerns (adopt regions instead) and 
perhaps approaches to various physical phenomena, though more work needs to be done in 
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support of these, and a good deal more to address the interaction of independent fundamental 
substances. 
 Substantivalism is not the only option of course, and its offspring theory, SS, avoids 
some of the conceptual confusions while maintaining the mathematical tractability.  Like 
relationalism, it gives a parsimonious ontology that does not need to incorporate the 
mysterious occupation relation.  Like substantivalism, it can adopt the working terminology 
and models of modern physics in describing distances, fields and spatial orientation.  The 
conceptual challenges attendant to adopting a point-based spatiotemporal structure are, I 
think, significant however, and give good reason to pursue more discrete relationalist models.  
Similarly, it appears compelling to explore other formulations of a single ontology theory that 
does not prioritise either space or objects.   
 That is, physical phenomena are suggestive of a single stuff, but give us no reason to 
assume that substance is either of the ones we traditionally delineate in substantival theories.  
Indeed, dense relationalism, which adopts fields and all energetic minima, may be as well off 
as SS in explaining the data and satisfying theory desiderata.  To this end, I conclude that 
current substantivalism, both regions or points-based, should be put aside in favour of 
developing monistic ontologies, particularly ones that can clearly articulate the physical 
interpretation of mathematical theory.  Dense relationalism and relationalism are both up for 
ongoing review to make them sufficiently compatible with modern physics to be dominant 
models.  SS, both regions and points-based, has more work to do with interpreting the theory 
and mathematical formulism (particularly with the latter version).  It is thus relationalist and 
supersubstantivalist theories that appear most compelling in regards to the discussed 
phenomena and philosophical concerns.  In trying to address such issues with standard 
substantivalism, we continually return to the problem of space itself, of its characteristics and 
structure—and of our expectations failing spectacularly in the face of experimental results—
and this issue will be the focus of Part III. 
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PART III: Space in Itself 
 
We typically use the term ‘space’ in a dizzying number of senses that encompasses 
everything from a conceptual tool (e.g. for separating objects), to the expanse between 
planets, to an array of unextended points on which all matter is pinned.  In the sciences some 
“find it useful to keep the concept of space rather fuzzy because it can imply many things for 
which we have no other terms” (Yau, p.18).  In each respect, space and its modern marriage 
with time as spacetime is viewed as a fundamental aspect of the universe, and although its 
attributed properties have altered over the last century, space just seems to have room to 
accommodate them.  As a conceptual tool space is used as a realm for manipulating objects 
or mapping the possible histories of states and values in Euclidean and Phase space, 
respectively.  In most everyday discourse, space remains a vacuum, a void surrounding 
distinct objects, while to modern physics ‘spacetime’ is a dynamic, engaging entity, which 
may even be an emergent property of some grainy, mysterious quantum contortions.  I am 
interested in ‘space’ per se, though its century-long association with ‘time’ has made talk of 
‘spacetime’ often commensurate with ‘space’, and I will use the terms ‘space’ and 
‘spacetime’ interchangeably unless otherwise noted.   
 Space is generally associated with distance—we expect that more space between 
objects amounts to more distance between them—and is thus used to separate and locate 
objects, logically and physically (while time is used for analogous measurements of 
duration).  Separation is what we commonly use to distinguish one billiard ball from 
another—if the two balls were in the same place at the same time, we would suspect there to 
be just one ball.  However, in the quantum world, separation does not appear to be 
determined (solely, if at all) by spatial distance.  Determining the fundamental constituents of 
either matter or space has proven difficult, and part of our response has been to give 
explanations that rely on nonseparability, that is, to move away from classical conceptions of 
space’s role.  In addition to spatial separation, physical space is characterised as notably 
different than abstract spaces and as something with structure, though what these aspects 
amount to is far more vague.  In this, I am particularly interested in the much neglected topic 
of dimensionality.  Higher dimensions run riot through many of our best theories, but  
philosophers and physicists remain unsure of what dimension is or how we are to treat it. 
 Thus, in trying to better understand aspects of space not captured in the space-object 
framework discussion of Part II, I first question whether we can assume that space separates 
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objects—looking at instances of nonseparation and what we have to give up in adopting that 
framework.  Second, I look at some options for what we think makes a space real, in the 
physically concrete way.  Third, I look at the confusion surrounding dimensionality and its 
possible formulations.  Fourth, I explore the uses of dimensionality, including profound roles 
in shaping our best physical theories, and finally, I look at realist and non-realist 
interpretations of dimensions.  In pursuing dimensions—often seen as spatial structure—it 
seems a more tractable approach to better understanding space than diving in for its essence 
(lesson learned from Part I), though it too raises fundamental questions (e.g. about what sort 
of ontology is adopted).  I offer more questions than answers in the latter section, but in this 
case it is important work too.  
CHAPTER 8: Physics and Non-separability 
 
Incorporating the broad conclusions of earlier chapters (e.g. that the distinction between 
object and environment is unclear and perhaps fundamentally so) I want to examine the 
interplay of physical theories with our expectations of space in a bit more detail, questioning 
our belief in clearly defined physical space.  I will explore several suggestive physical 
examples of a unified fundamental ontology in a continuing bid to refine and update 
metaphysical ontology and to emphasise how suspiciously elusive ‘space’, as separate from 
objects, really is.  This examination is meant to build on Part II’s concern that substance 
dualism is problematically mysterious, and to reveal how little purchase we have on ‘space-
in-itself’.  First, the concept of locality, through ‘entanglement’ will be taken up to examine 
objects in space and whether physical space always provides the separation we assume it 
does.  Second, the permeability and homogeneity of space will be reviewed in terms of 
quantum tunnelling.  Third, I will look at the blurring of material and spatial substance 
through the double-slit experiment and, finally, I will review the implications of this physics 
for separability.    
8.1 Objects in Space: Entanglement  
 
Classically, object properties are thought to be local, but modern physics makes it hard to say 
which properties an object has when we cannot pin it down and find a lack of definite 
observables.  One of the best examples of this break with the behaviour of classical objects—
and perhaps another reason to suppose spatial and material substances to share a deeper 
connection—is entanglement, whereby our spatial expectations seem confusingly opposed to 
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experiment, suggesting that spatial separation does not have to mean causal separation.  
Indeed, a great deal of attention has been directed to this quantum phenomena of 
entanglement, particularly because it appears to violate causal locality; that is, “we get a 
counterfactual0supporting causal connection between the…[particles] which cannot be 
explained by a common cause” (Maudlin 2002, p.147)65. 
 Entangled particles manifest correlated behaviours at the same time despite being 
spatially separated, suggesting that “intervening space, regardless of how much there is, does 
not ensure that two objects are separate” (Greene, p.80).  And unless we are willing to 
embrace a theory of hidden variables that programme or connect the pair, we are left with the 
orthodox interpretation of nonlocality.  As Peter Gibbins notes, being nonlocal “can be a 
matter of nonlocal forces, of nonlocal correlations, or of physical holism…[at least] in the 
second and third senses of nonlocality (insofar as they are really separable)…quantum 
mechanics is a nonlocal theory” (Gibbins, p.116).  I will briefly review the experiments in 
question to better understand the metaphysical implications and see whether we should accept 
such standardly perceived instances of nonlocality as exceptions to an otherwise robust 
theory of objects and space, or whether we should be compelled to re-evaluate our 
assumptions and entertain a holistic theory.  I encourage the latter. 
Briefly, entanglement describes a type of relation between particles or molecules that 
holds after they have interacted and separated, whereby the pair creates a quantum 
superposition with each member described by the same quantum mechanical state until a 
measurement is made.  So when a pair of photons are produced (see Figure 2), the 
measurement of one member communicates the measurement of the other member, and 
moreover is thought to determine the state of the unmeasured member (Maudlin 2002, p.22-
4).  Several versions of the entangled pair experiment can be performed, involving photons or 
electrons, that generally test the spin polarisation.   
The experiment as so conceived was explained by Einstein and his graduate students 
Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen as simply indicating our ignorance of further (hidden) 
variables that do connect cause and effect; in other words, quantum mechanics is incomplete.  
In a paper to this end (EPR), Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen had argued that even though we 
may not be able to measure it, the electron does have a definite spin around each of its axes.  
                                                          
65
 Some authors (e.g. Redhead 1987) doubt the connection should be causal, but (Maudlin 2002) effectively 
argues for understanding it causally, which need not permit superluminal signaling (Maudlin 2002, p.154). 
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Little progress was made in dismissing this concern until several decades later when John 
Bell analysed the probabilistic outcomes of correlations assuming hidden variables.  He 
concluded that, whatever the hidden variables were, the particle pair would have to display a 
certain probabilistic agreement in measured spins to support EPR’s hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  General diagram of the EPR set-up 
Bell’s analysis of the EPR dilemma was tested over a number of years, but likely the 
most famous experiment was performed by Alain Aspect and his team in the 1980’s.  In it, a 
calcium vapour is made to fluoresce, causing electrons to fall to their ground state and emit a 
pair of photons in opposite directions.  The photons are then measured for their spin (though 
the same principle would hold for other entangled properties like velocity and position) along 
a certain axis by two detectors set 13 metres apart (and thus at such a distance that light 
cannot travel between them to relay any ‘messages’ about the other particle in time)66.  
Therein, 
the polarization of the photons individually shows no preferred direction: for any 
randomly chosen direction θ the photons will pass a polarizer oriented in that 
direction half the time.  But although the photons individually show no particular 
polarization, the pairs exhibit some striking correlations.  Roughly, each member of a 
pair always acts as if it has the same polarization of its partner (Maudlin, p.12).  
Theory predicts and experiments confirm that whatever value one detector measures, the 
other will detect the corresponding opposite, such that we may know the value of one upon 
measuring the other particle at space-like separation.  The detectors may be further 
manipulated to randomly vary the measured spin axis.  According to Bell’s calculations, for 
EPR to be right, the detectors would have to agree more than 50 percent of the time. 
                                                          
66
 The experiment was undertaken again in 1997 by Daniel Salart and collaborators with the detectors placed 11 
kilometres apart (see Salart et al.).  With the results unchanged, physicists confidently expect such entanglement 
to prevail across the length of the universe (Greene, p.115). 
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However, they do not agree more than 50% of the time, thus indicating the violation of Bell’s 
inequalities and a flaw in the traditional reasoning employed by EPR, which is generally 
agreed to be the assumptions of locality and separability
67
.  Orthodox quantum theory further 
explains this process by arguing that until the time of measurement, the particles were in an 
indeterminate state; their wave functions only ‘collapsed’ (across the universe)68 to a 
determinate value with the experimenter’s interactions.   
 So not only do the particles display inexplicable correlations, but up until the time of 
measurement there are no determinate properties to measure.  Although the Bohmian
69
 and 
orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretations diverge on this point, they both agree that locality is 
violated—that the effects of the measurement on one particle “creates a state of affairs” 
(Maudlin 2002, p.87) at the other particle faster than any known causal process.  Standard 
quantum theory has been at pains to describe what exactly occurs in this situation, but the 
general understanding is that the universe is not local, and that “entangled particles, even 
though spatially separate, do not operate autonomously” (Greene, p.114). That is, spatial 
separation need not mean causal separation. This has significant implications for any revised 
theory of the relations between objects and space, particularly as the extent of entanglement 
can blur distinctions between the two.  For, in some sense even “the vacuum state of a 
quantum field is entangled…with certain spacelike separated regions of Minkowski 
spacetime” (Healey 2009).   
This nonseparability has also strongly motivated various theories of ontological 
holism that recast the emitted pair as a single effect occurring at the left and right wing of the 
experiment; “in other words, the effect is the ‘disentangling’ of the particle pair; that object is 
becoming two particles” (Lange, p.292).  Like Parson’s conception of an entended particle, 
under this approach, measurement did not bring about two wave-collapses, but a single wave 
collapse into two particles.  Lange notes that this approach has important connotations for 
how we divide up the universe into objects, which may be radically refitted to include space-
                                                          
67
 Mark Silverman usefully distils their assumption by noting that, while “admittedly arbitrary, EPR adopted as 
a reasonable definition of reality the criterion that: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict 
with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element 
of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity” (Silverman, p.46). 
68
 Wave collapse as an interpretation of events remains controversial as it “does not emerge from the 
mathematics of quantum theory; it has to be put in by hand, and there is no agreed-upon or experimentally 
justified way to do this” (Greene, p.119). 
69
 Alternative theories such as the Bohmian view of quantum mechanics have offered alternative accounts (that 
both claim that Schrödinger’s wave function fails to represent all physical facts and employ hidden variables) 
that nonetheless adopt some form of nonlocality (e.g. see Goldstein and Teufel 2001). 
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like separation (Lange, p.297).  In practice, it is only the pair of particles (rather than either 
particle individually) that has “sharp properties: zero total linear momentum, zero total 
angular momentum…Experimentally, there is no way to probe the pair of correlated photons 
to determine the properties of its constituents without destroying the correlations” 
(Silverman, p.52). 
However, even if we treat the entangled pair holistically, the opposing traditional 
conception of individuation as well as the seemingly separable and individual nature of the 
particles when not entangled, both encourage a traditional ontology that rejects such holism 
(or at least its wider application).  Michael Dickson, among others, rejects in (Dickson 1998) 
the holistic approach that the two particles are really one object, as “it is not clear how one is 
to keep the disease from spreading.  Why are our apparatuses not also ‘parts of’ holistic 
objects?” (Dickson, p.156).  In response, some holists are happy to accept the extension of 
holistic objects to include cosmological scales (which, much like the notion of a field, have a 
sharp decrease in efficacy away from the relevant ‘centre’).  And in a less overt holism, 
some, like Neils Bohr, argue that speaking of quantum phenomena without the apparatus 
framework is nonsensical.   
Where physical holism is rejected, one is generally left without satisfactory 
explanations and with suspicions that the particles somehow remain in communication.  
Rejecting causation is understandably anathema to science, which has created itself on causal 
foundations and proven it a wildly successful and intuitive paradigm, and further it is unclear 
what could take its place.  So rather than giving up our model for causation we might press 
on with such beliefs of hidden contact, or we might see our models as inadequate; “quantum 
correlations violating Bell inequalities simply happen, somehow from outside space-time, in 
the sense that there is no space-time explanation for their occurrence: there is no event here 
that somehow influences another distant event there” (Salart et al., p.861).   
This observed departure from classical strategies at explanation reflects the very 
unclassical behaviour of the quantum correlation (or ‘interactive force’) itself, in that 1) it 
does not diminish with distance, 2) it discriminates with the particles it affects, and 3) it 
operates faster than light (apparently instantaneously).  This behaviour is not a product of the 
laboratory, and “non-locality is very likely the rule rather than the exception for quantum 
mechanical systems.  Entanglement of systems occurs…in the course of quite typical 
interactions among quantum mechanical systems” (Dickson, p.129).  While this raises the 
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spectre of universal entanglement (as the set of all interacting quantum systems), it is 
commonly dispatched by noting that it is likewise interactions that disentangle particles and 
give them determinate values.  The tremendous number of interactions occurring every 
instant in the universe may thus create and destroy many pairings, preserving determinate 
values in some sense if not locality. 
Entanglement thus presents a view of objects that disregards the standard limiting role 
of space; despite kilometres of spatial separation, two seemingly discrete particles display 
correlated behaviour, and it is not clear that the paradox lies with the quantum phenomena or 
with our understanding of space and its relation to objects.  Mark Silverman has located the 
fault with the human approach, arguing that 
The ‘paradox’ is primarily one of unfulfilled expectations of philosophical 
preferences (‘objective reality’, ‘locality’) and deceptive physical images evoked by 
semantically poor labels (‘state-vector collapse’, ‘instantaneous action at a distance’). 
In its present form – and most likely for any future incarnation – quantum theory does 
not describe single events, but only the statistical properties (count rates, correlations, 
cross-sections, etc.) of numerous events (Silverman, p.53). 
If what is required is merely a shift in perception and expectation, then there may be ways to 
salvage locality or at least address this measurement issue.  Arthur Fine even argues that 
simply assigning values in a different way can render quantum mechanics local.  He thinks 
we should note that Bell’s inequalities and variants of it are “not a ‘proof of nonlocality’.  It 
is a proof that locality cannot be married to the assignment of determinate values in the 
recommended way” (Fine, 1999, p.10).  However, such assignments are not so easily 
accounted for, and turning to non-standard quantum theories is no guarantee of locality, 
though they may solve other problems.  For instance, adopting a Bohmian mechanics 
arguably avoids the measurement problem while offering “progress toward a coherent 
treatment of the classical limit…and the meaning of the numerical output of a tunnelling-time 
experiment…The price tag for all of this is non-locality.  But such non-locality is arguably 
unavoidable in any empirically adequate quantum theory” (Cushing and Bowman, p.92).  So 
while there are other options that merit investigation, the orthodox interpretation of quantum 
mechanics and indeed the observed behaviour of particles compel a deeper analysis of our 
assumptions about what space is and how it relates to objects, since its status as a standard 
means of separation is challenged. 
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8.2 Quantum Tunnelling 
 
While entanglement has received much attention as evidence of quantum nonlocality, it is not 
the only phenomenon that transgresses our assumptions about the relationship between space 
and objects.  Quantum tunnelling also appears to violate our causal sense and challenge the 
traditional ‘density’ of spatial distance.  Broadly defined, quantum tunnelling occurs when a 
particle crosses a region of space that it should not have the energy to cross, often at 
apparently superluminal speeds.  That tunnelling occurs is widely agreed, but the claims for 
time taken are contentious, leaving many to respond that superluminal tunnelling claims are 
only a confusion of interpretation.  Physicist Günter Nimtz is among the strongest proponents 
of superluminal interpretations of quantum tunnelling, arguing that his experiments 
demonstrate “that there are spaces which could be crossed in an imaginary time, i.e. a time 
that cannot be measured by electrons, photons, atoms or even molecules” (Nimtz and Haibel, 
p.79).  It is this seemingly instantaneous jump of the particle—or rather wave packet—that 
violates spatiotemporal (and spatial) locality—yet another relic of classical models.  
 I will briefly review the predictions and experimental results of this phenomenon as 
an example of the unexpected interactions between space and objects.  Following the 
discussions in chapter 7, tunnelling offers a valuable model for substantival theories of 
objecthood and location.  For supersubstantivalists and relationalists, it may encourage the 
‘object as property bundle’ view (which may not always instantiate with spatiotemporal or 
temporal contiguity, respectively).  Focusing on substantivalism, however, there is a real 
possibility that the object/ space relationship is flexible in this way because they are 
interchangeable and of the same substance; we might not have lost the object, but only 
transformed it into spatial stuff and back to material stuff.  In this, I think the phenomena 
encourages us to consider space in non-substantival terms with tunnelling suggesting a 
breakdown of the classical roles of object and space (particularly the idea of spatial 
separation and causation being spatiotemporally contiguous).   
Experiments involving tunnelling employ a variety of devices to produce ‘forbidden 
energy gaps’ through which the incoming particle/wave packet should not have the energy to 
traverse.  Such devices include double prisms, photonic lattices or undersized wave guides 
(that bottleneck to discriminate certain frequencies), and each may produce barriers of 
varying lengths.  In a double prism scenario for example, although the incoming beam to the 
first prism should be totally reflected, the placement of a proximate prism (some centimetre 
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away, say) creates a ‘frustrated total reflection’, where a small part of the beam “tunnels as 
evanescent modes through the air gap from the first into the second prism” (Nimtz and 
Haibel, p.86).  Although we are unable to observe the process within the barrier, it is assumed 
to take the form of such evanescent modes that can be thought of as virtual particles or field 
modes with no real wavelength and negative energy (Nimtz and Haibel, p.103).  The signals 
used in most tunnelling experiments are photons for greater precision, which allows that “the 
results could then, through mathematical equivalence, be transformed to electrons and 
generally to all particles” (Nimtz and Haibel, p.85).   
 
 
  
Figure 3. A model of an energy barrier, where the long thin rectangle 
presents a smaller area than the frequency should be able to enter. 
 
Particularly problematic in the scenario is the temporal duration of transmission, 
which can be measured by the difference between the time when the peak of the transmitted 
wave packet leaves the barrier and when the peak of the incident wave packet arrives at the 
end of the barrier.  Surprisingly, the tunnelling time of these modes can become independent 
of the barrier length (Nimtz and Haibel, p.112) in a process known as the Hartman effect, 
which has been found in multi-dimensional barriers (Bandopadhyay, p.267).  As the energy 
of the evanescent mode, or field, exponentially decays within partially opaque “barriers, the 
tunneling time evaluated either as a simple ‘phase time’…or calculated through the analysis 
of the wave packet behavior…becomes independent of the barrier width...This implies that 
for sufficiently large barriers the effective velocity of the particle can become arbitrarily 
large, even larger than the light speed in the vacuum” (Bandopadhyay, p.267).  Such speeds 
are reached because the travelling wave-packet appears to require only one oscillation period 
to traverse gaps—any gaps.  All this amounts to the possibility that there is a flexible relation 
between objects and space, perhaps allowing a borrowing of energy from the latter in certain 
situations. 
The signal strength (if not the time duration) is thus affected by the traversed barrier 
length, but it can also be influenced by surrounding barriers and the differences in potential of 
passing through any one of them.  One can construct a branching network of barriers that 
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alters the signal in unintuitive ways, including what appears to be time advancement (with the 
peak pulse arriving at the start after passing through the barrier).  In a response characteristic 
of the ‘sum of all histories approach’70, whereby the particle’s path is viewed in phase space 
as taking all possible routes, the ‘phase time’ and its saturated value at any side branch feels 
the presence of barriers in other spatially separated branches (Bandopadhyay, p.272).  This 
effect is perhaps not so surprising given observed quantum behaviour in other situations; 
indeed it is a, by now, familiar indication of quantum nonlocality.  But familiarity in this case 
gives us no special purchase on understanding the object-space relation, and it is not just this 
relation at stake, but issues of causation, relativity theory and information transmission.   
For instance, repeat experiments from multiple labs have demonstrated apparently 
superluminal tunnelling using dielectric mirrors (Chaio et al. 1995 and Spielmann et al. 
1994).  As if zero time were not problematic enough, concerns of backwards causation have 
been raised following experiments where “the peak of a pulse arrived at the exit of a medium 
before it had reached the entrance.  Consequently the spread of the peak traveled in the 
opposite direction” (Nimtz and Haibel, p.15).  Most scientists argue that this data does not 
violate primitive causality in relativity theory (Nimtz and Haibel, p.105), but whether it 
violates special relativity in general is less clear—largely because it depends on one’s 
interpretation of just what the theory prohibits
71
.  Philosophers like Maudlin, who have 
already conceded superluminal causal connections and information transmission through the 
violation of Bell’s inequalities concerning entangled particles, may be more inclined to find 
compromises between the phenomenon and theory.   
Although Nimtz does not appear to follow Maudlin’s rigorous definitional standards 
for ‘signal’, he notes that “experiments have shown that superluminal velocities are indeed 
possible and can transmit signals and thus information” (Nimtz and Haibel, p.117).  For 
instance, an experiment tunnelled an extended pulse of information—a piece of Mozart’s 
music—on a microwave carrier at a recorded 4.7 times light speed (Nimtz and Haibel, p.104-
5).  While there was no recorded signal in the strict sense that might enable backwards 
causation, Nimtz claims that there was superluminal information transfer, which Maudlin 
argued is implied via quantum entanglement.  In this, one sees that it is not just the 
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 Aptly described by Lisa Randall, after Feynman: “in quantum field theory, everything that is not forbidden 
will occur” (Randall, p.228). 
71
 Maudlin argues that the fundamental feature of special relativity is the invariance of the speed of light, which 
does not explicitly prohibit superluminal velocities, indeed, depending on the structure we attribute to 
spacetime, all manner of superluminal transmissions may be allowed (Maudlin, p.112-6). 
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spontaneous permeation of quantum wave packets through a forbidden space in zero time, but 
the controlled transmission of information.  Our current theories of space, causation, matter 
(or energy) propagation and objects shed little light on this phenomenon, which might be 
better analysed under alternative frameworks.  
Nimtz’s conclusions are by no means universally accepted, however, with opponents 
like Herbert Winful arguing for a less exotic interpretation.  In particular, he takes issue with 
Nimtz’s definition of ‘transit time’ and with his assumption that the incident particles are the 
same particles that exit the barrier.  Aided by mathematical simulations, Winful argues that 
the experiments reveal something of a domino effect in that there is a trapped standing wave 
already extant in the barrier that is in some sense pushed by the incident wave front and made 
to dispel photons at the other end of the barrier: 
once the exponential standing wave (evanescent mode) has been established within 
the barrier, the newly arriving light modulates this stored energy and thus the amount 
of ﬂux that escapes through the boundaries…Because of the multiple reflections, once 
any light enters, it gets all mixed up, scrambled, so that we cannot look at the 
transmitted pulse and say, aha this portion of the transmitted pulse entered the barrier 
at such and such a time (Winful, p.66). 
If the light gets as unrecognisably scrambled as Winful suggests, then it seems overly 
presumptive to call the process ‘tunnelling’ at all (perhaps the quantum ‘knock-on effect’ is 
more apt), but it also does not seem to account for the transmission of the sent information as 
easily.  Making a conservative compromise between Nimtz’s and Winful’s views that accepts 
subluminal tunnelling, we might still inquire about the nature of the object’s spacetime 
traversal.   
 Here, one of the central issues is what makes some property ‘spatial’ or ‘material’ is 
unclear.  The distinction does not appear as obvious or intuitive as it does from an armchair, 
and if we find the properties of each ‘substance’ to be indistinguishable then we have very 
little cause for supposing they really are distinct substances.   This concern closely allies to 
the disparity between our expectations of both a homogenous space that proportionately 
separates distant objects, as well as particle-waves being restricted to proportionate and 
homogenous negotiation of spatial extent.  That is, we do not expect objects to be able to leap 
from one region of space to another without paying their dues and passing through the 
intervening space.  There may be familiar explanations for this phenomenon, but it is possible 
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that there may be something else at work like a much more fluid relation between particle and 
space derived from a singular substance, or a different permissibility of interactions at the 
quantum level.   
8.3 Double Slit Experiment  
 
We first met wave-particle duality when exploring some of the difficulties presented by 
indistinct object boundaries.  For many of the same reasons that it was problematic for 
attributions of intrinsicality, wave-particle duality is interesting for addressing the 
relationship between objects and space, both in revealing apparent non-locality for the objects 
and in the permissibility of space in ‘locating’ objects.  One of the most iconic ways of 
perceiving this dual nature is achieved through the double slit experiment, wherein a single 
particle or a beam of them (photons or electrons) is directed toward a barrier with two slits 
and onto a detector screen.  The particles display an interference pattern (vertical bands of 
absorption) indicative of colliding waves, and they manifest this pattern whether emitted as a 
beam en masse or as individual particles over time.  While most of the specifics do not 
concern us here, the relevant issues to which we should be attentive are 1) the way space 
‘hosts’ objects, and 2) the way objects appear to negotiate a ‘phase space’ of all possible 
routes in their actual behaviour. 
Part of the difficulty in determining how quantum objects interact with space is that 
we seem to destroy that relationship in our act of observation.  The coarseness of our 
measurements means we can only test (and roughly at that) the beginning and end of a 
trajectory and never the process as it is in itself.  In the double slit experiment we do not 
know exactly how and in what way the electron negotiates the intervening space, only 
something of how it negotiates our measuring apparatus.  Nonetheless, the results suggest 
nonlocal interactions and an engagement with space that seems to happen only at microscopic 
levels: “according to quantum mechanics, each electron’s probability wave does pass through 
both slits, and because the parts of the wave emerging from each slit commingle, the resulting 
probability profile manifests an interference pattern, and hence the electron landing positions 
do, too” (Greene, p.179).  These probability waves are unusual in two ways; one, they are 
(generally) not meant to be material, that is, to consist of matter, and two, they seem to range 
over all possible histories of the particles coming from the source.   
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In the double slit experiment, “each detected photon could have gotten to the detector 
by the left route or by going via the right route.  Thus we are obliged to combine these two 
possible histories in determining the probability that a photon will hit the screen at one 
particular point” (Greene, p.181).  Thus, the particles behave either as if the possible paths 
(and their different potentials) all mattered and influenced the chosen path or as if they 
travelled as a wave but interacted as a particle (Lange, p.286).  This averaging of history, 
while present even in everyday macroscopic objects, is most obvious in the quantum realm 
and can contribute to a reinterpretation of classical presumptions like stability in time, object 
identity, locality and property possession in quantum mechanical terms.  We do not know 
exactly how the particle-wave behaves beyond our invasive measurements, but its concluding 
interaction (absorption on the screen) indicates a much more complex relationship with space 
then was traditionally conceived.   
For instance, in the double slit experiment we note that “the results of the experiment 
depend on the nature of the whole experimental setup, apparatus plus light (or electrons), and 
not just on the nature of light itself” (Davies and Gribbin, p.212).  Our intuition is not 
equipped to make these sorts of predictions for the macroscopic world—for instance, no one 
supposes that whether we look or not means an animal will be a fish or a zebra—and the 
intuition is no clearer when considering the ‘delayed-choice’ experiments advanced by John 
Wheeler.  He argued, and subsequent experiments demonstrated, that whether a photon (or 
electron) manifests the property of behaving as a wave or the property behaving as a particle 
can be determined after the experiment is complete.  That is, if one decides not to look from 
the absorbing screen, one will allow the interference pattern to accumulate as in normal 
experiments where there is no detector positioned at the slit.  But if one were to look at the 
experiment from the image screen, one could see which slit the particle passed through.  
Thus, it seems that whether or not the experimenter looks “back at the time the particles 
arrive at the screen determines whether or not the light was behaving in the manner of 
particles or waves at an earlier moment” (Davies and Gribbin, p.213).  This is not just 
nonlocality in space, but in spacetime as well.  
 These three iconic experiments reveal some of the most challenging aspects of 
quantum theory in regards to the interaction of object and space, discouraging assumptions 
that space uniformly separates or that causation is local.  Peering into the nature of space as a 
‘real, physical entity’ as well as its potentially more dynamic moments (as vacuum 
fluctuations or expansion etc.) has left the possibility open for a more interactive monistic 
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view of objects and space to develop.  However, the construction of such a view should really 
come only after establishing a clearer conception of what space amounts to—and of how our 
expectations of separability are to be understood in light of modern physics. 
8.4 Separability and Non-separability 
These experiments suggest a blurring between space and object, which threatens our 
traditional assumptions about the role of space and the expectation that spatial distance 
separates objects.  This concern is perhaps most pressing for the substantivalist since she 
deals with material and spatial substance, although related questions of object identity and 
distance relations will need to be addressed in some form by rival theories.  Relationalists can 
choose to reject traditional notions of space, and either populate the universe with minute 
objects composing ever larger composites, or they may choose to find some other account of 
distance relations.  Supersubstantivalists already identify material objects with their 
spacetime points/regions (so space is no special separating entity) and so may, say, attribute 
seemingly ‘scattered’ objects to law-bound property instantiations or some other constraint.   
 Nonseparability challenges one of the fundamental roles we invest space with—along 
with dimensional structure—and I want to put that role, and its competition, into context.  
With the physics of entanglement and quantum tunnelling (etc.) in mind, I will first review 
what we mean by ‘separability’, looking at some of the mereological options for separation 
and non-separability; second, I will re-evaluate our expectation for the uniform permeability 
of spacetime to objects including our rejection of co-location. 
8.4.1 What Separability means 
Separability is closely connected to locality, and both were assumed in classical physics such 
that phenomena were thought to be “completely described by local assignments of 
magnitudes” (Healey 2009).  Historically, nonseparability has had a long-standing currency 
in the quantum community, and experienced something of a renewal with Schaffer’s 
engagement with monism (Schaffer 2008).  Niels Bohr’s well known approach to quantum 
‘phenomena’ encouraged an account in which observers (and perhaps a good deal else) were 
part of the quantum system.  For Bohr, it is “a mistake to consider a quantum object to be an 
independently existing component part of the apparatus-object” (Healey 2009).  Current 
physics’ approaches to understanding phenomena favour a less-local range of assignments 
that include everything from nearby areas of spacetime points, to relatively distant physical 
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processes.  Separation thus implies, among other things, that if there are two distant objects 
(i.e. that have a measurable amount of space, occupied or not, between them in all directions), 
then an influence on one object will have no immediate effect on the other.  That is: spatially 
separated states have independent real states.   
Generally, nonseparbility is motivated by otherwise inexplicable statistical correlation 
patterns.  There are arguments for it deriving from probabilities in quantum field theory and 
quantum mechanics in general, such that individual probability sets need to be integrated to 
obtain meaningful results (Placek 2004).  In such cases it is the system that is taken as basic 
and primary for probabilistic calculations.  Echoing the physics of Part I, we find that “the 
main new quantum properties of matter follow not from the use of the probability theory, but 
rather from the qualitatively new features of the quantum potential which, for example, imply 
a novel quantum wholeness such that the behavior of a particle may depend crucially on 
distant features of the environment” (Bohm and Hiley, p.42).  Part of the reason for treating 
the quantum phenomenon as a system is its explanatory cohesion.  For instance, if we took a 
“two billiard ball system as a single object, there would appear to be a mysterious constraint 
on the evolution over time of that object’s energy distribution.  That constraint can be made 
less mysterious by postulating the existence of billiard balls…There is no analogous 
explanation to be given of what happens in collapse in terms of finer parts of the superposed 
particle” (Parsons, 2003, p.13). 
System ‘states’ rather than objects are the more common description of the quantum 
world, but even state
72
 separability is insecure.  Roughly, such separability assumes that “the 
state assigned to a compound physical system at any time is supervenient on the states then 
assigned to its component subsystems” (Healey 2009).  All that is required for such 
separability to fail is for the subsystems to be either without assigned states or with states that 
do not fully determine the compound system’s state.  Given strict definitions of subsystems, 
modern physics’ use of algebraic limits makes the failure of state separability (and the 
presence of nonseparability) surprisingly easy to achieve.  For instance, even familiar 
phenomena like the electromagnetic field need not be separable as its value is determined by 
taking the limits over successively smaller neighbourhoods of points that spatially extend 
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 In quantum theory, the state of a system “gives a specification of its probabilistic dispositions to display 
various properties on measurement” and may play a role in specifying the state’s categorical properties (Healey 
2009). 
140 
 
further and further away rather than over the subsystems themselves.  That is, values for the 
subsystem can be integrated with regions beyond the compound system’s parameters.   
 Part of the problem may be the ontological interpretation attached to the mathematics 
in cases of separability.  For instance, Belousek argues that an instrumental approach 
removes the strangeness associated with nonseparable states, which arises only if “the 
quantum state be interpreted ontologically, as opposed to instrumentally, that is, as 
representing in some (perhaps incomplete) way the physical reality of quantum-mechanical 
systems and not merely as a mathematical tool for statistical prediction” (Belousek, 2003, 
p.794-5).  There is also concern from (Dickson 1998) and others that ontological holism is 
indicative of our ignorance of quantum phenomena rather than posing a viable scientific 
theory, and certainly it would require an overhaul of our working definition of events
73
.  The 
interpretive caveat and concerns over ignorance are well-placed, but it is hard to see how we 
are to avoid ontological interpretations entirely, and both Bohmian and orthodox approaches 
thus far agree on non-separability and non-locality.    
 Locality, relatedly, assumes that the effects of an interaction are confined to the 
immediate spatiotemporal surroundings, and then causally transferred in a continuous way.  
Locality seems to encourage separation—by restricting effects in space—while separability 
seems to encourage local causal connections.  At base, belief in separation means a belief that 
space separates objects; it is a belief that objects can be distinct from their surroundings and 
treated as separate in experiments isolating a particular quality.  Locality focuses on action 
rather than objects, and belief in locality means a belief in local causal chains of action—in 
spatiotemporally physical laws having local causes.  In Peter Gibbins’ words, “locality 
means, among other things, ‘no-action-at-a-distance’.  It means that the properties of a 
physical system are affected only by events in the immediate vicinity.  It also means that 
complex systems may be described as collections of interacting, but otherwise independent, 
components” (Gibbins, p.116).  Separation and locality are thus intimately related, but it may 
be that conceding the loss of the latter makes us more open to exploring the former. 
Although there are difficulties with both nonseparability and non-locality, it seems 
that physicists are embracing nonseparability.  It represents a smaller modification to their 
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 Indeed, there have been suggestions (Vijay et al. 2012) that various quantum mysteries can be overcome 
through ingenious new experiments that somehow sidestep measurement barriers, but even if that is the case the 
nonseparable option deserves to be explored. 
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explanatory system given that non-locality already accompanies their theories.  For if we lose 
locality, we seem at a loss for figuring causality and prediction in general; we could lose the 
heart of scientific practice.  Finding some way to keep it, on the other hand, may open our 
ontology to strange objects, but we are getting rather used to that by now.  Nonseparability—
if it is to be distinguished from non-locality at all—may represent nothing more than a new 
type of object—a multiply located body or force that is not isolated by intervening spacetime 
regions.  Non-locality, on the other hand, looks as if there are new or different laws, which 
poses a far larger revisionary problem for the explanatory system, and must be modified in 
such a way as to preserve the successful local accounts given to the majority of other 
scientific disciplines.  Furthermore, non-locality drags—at least a type of—nonseparability 
with it, in that instantaneous spooky action at a distance would erode our belief in separate 
objects that can be experimented upon in some form of isolation.   
For instance, under such an interpretation, the modification of behaviour witnessed in 
interactions like the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect which appears distinctly nonlocal (where 
electrons behave as if they were experiencing a magnetic field with which they are never in 
contact), may be recast in a holistic framework as the local action of nonseparable 
electromagnetism.  The most common way of representing this is by taking the 
electromagnetic field as a “set of intrinsic properties of loops in…space-time…[which] do 
not supervene on any assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical properties at spacetime 
points in the region concerned, nor even in arbitrarily small neighbourhoods of those points” 
(Healey 2009).  Nonseparability compellingly accounts for the AB effect, as the interference 
pattern produced by the particles indicates the spatially absent electromagnetic field.   
 If nonseparability is indeed more appealing to physics, then the philosophical 
accounts of more exotic objects may have a very functional role in distancing science from 
non-locality.  Currently, however, and since Bell’s inequalities were published, much of the 
discussion has centred around non-locality (e.g. Maudlin 2002), with some vague hope that a 
unification between relativity and quantum theory will explain away the issue.  Non-locality, 
at least given our general physical account of the world, leaves a particularly large set of 
unanswered questions that have the structural significance (in our explanatory system) of 
accounting for a set of interactions between fundamental particles.  That is, non-locality 
requires an important addition and/or modification to the fundamental laws (or dimensional 
structure of space); nonseparability could mean a change to physical laws, or it might just 
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mean a new type of object—and this latter interpretation may be easier to account for given 
the rest of the explanatory system. 
For metaphysicians, nonseparability still produces problems for accounts of objects 
(as we have seen), properties and causation, even if these problems are often ignored.  If 
descriptions of an object or process need to extend beyond the traditionally assigned prima 
facie boundaries, then we ought to explore in what way they extend—for instance, is it 
continuously or discretely?  Is it across gunky regions or atomic bits?  In what way are 
objects separated from each other and how are they separated from spacetime?  A piece of the 
conceptual answer should include an account of how objects (in whatever form they are 
conceived) negotiate their surroundings, and whether space uniformly interacts with objects 
as classically conceived.   
8.4.2 Spacetime Permeability  
 
Given that one of the things we expect spacetime to do is to separate objects, we may wonder 
whether this separation is or ought to be uniform; that is, whether sets of particular masses or 
other properties traverse spacetime for the same duration per distance travelled.  Do we have 
good reasons for rejecting the heterogeneous permeability of spacetime?  Might some objects 
traverse it, penetrate it or otherwise interact with it in a non-uniform manner such that it 
could explain observed phenomena?  One could argue that through certain quantum 
phenomena (such as quantum tunnelling), physics has encountered reasons to make us 
entertain this possibility and to offer an account of how this might happen.  So, perhaps 
instead of searching for some hidden variables to explain quantum nonlocal correspondences 
we might contemplate a new class of nonlocal causes through a new appreciation for how 
space behaves.  For example, space may be selectively permeable where once we thought it 
presented a uniform path for all objects.  That is, we could swap new laws of spatial 
heterogeneity for the unsettling quantum nonlocality.   
One way we might account for perceived non-uniform permeability may be through a 
dimensional perspective by the routes traversed through spacetime.  It is conceptually 
possible for different objects to interact with spacetime in different ways, following snaking 
line paths at some times and bridging paths at other times, and I can see no reason why all 
objects must interact in a uniform and consistent manner with spacetime.  Metaphysicians 
such as Hudson, seem happy to consider a variety of more exotic objects that might address 
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this since there seems to be no proof of their impossibility; some objects may have a relation 
of ‘multiple location’ to a plurality of spacetime regions while other objects have only a 
relation of ‘single location’ to one spacetime region.  Perhaps these different sorts of objects 
and/or interactions are just what we need to explain some of the more bizarre physics. 
 Part of the tacit assumption in our search for determining the means of separation and 
distance, is that it contributes to distinct objects—objects that are isolated from other objects 
in the region they exactly occupy.  That is, the separation of objects is important to prevent 
co-location, something commonly avoided—as we saw with (Schaffer 2009) in chapter 5.  
But what is it that motivates this view that objects are separate in this way or immune to co-
location, and is it necessary for our metaphysics?  It is hard to see how we could accept co-
location, but even if we maintain the ban on it we should be very clear why it is there, 
especially when so many of our intuitions about objects become problematic.  It may be that 
we are over-eager to follow our intuitions and traditional beliefs about what it is to be an 
object, such that we give objects more structure than that for which physics accounts.  That 
is, spatial points may not be ‘monogamous’ with one material occupant, able to interact with 
more than one object simultaneously.  The reasons we have for rejecting this view seem to 
stem from its unintelligibility given our experience; for example, it seems impossible for 
something to be two different colours all over; it does not seem possible that an object is 
spatiotemporally all blue and all red.   
 But we are generally happy to concede that objects and events can co-locate, or 
objects and property instantiations, but perhaps we are overly biased against other 
phenomena co-locating.  There are already unintuitive processes that can be seen to 
encourage a more inclusive approach; for instance, in some sense waves and particles are co-
located, and the elusive nature of mass-energy equivalence in general.  At the very least it is 
something to bear in mind: when we are presented with seeming co-location we should not 
reject it offhand, but seek a different perspective, and perhaps a more holistic one.  If spatial 
interaction is not homogenous and spatial separation does not guarantee causal separation as 
classically conceived, then we should wonder what it does guarantee, and whether space is 
anything more than a conceptual but unreal tool.  The remaining chapters examine such 
additional characterisations of space with a focus on its supposed dimensional structure. 
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CHAPTER 9: Space; the Convention of Fact or Fiction? 
 
There are some that think space to be a real something, agreeing with Nerlich that “space is a 
particular with a definite structure, a topological one, just any other particular thing…it is a 
real live thing” (Nerlich, p.194).  And others who argue that such structure is derived from 
the matter ‘within’ it, that “space is in the first place a device introduced to describe the 
positions and movements of particles.  Space is therefore literally just a storage space for 
information.  This information is naturally associated with matter” (Verlinde, p.6).  Of 
course, space may be the information, or at least a vital part of it, and we may perhaps be 
wary of concluding that it is space rather than some other property that separates objects.  
Space can certainly keep bodies apart, but arguably “by way of giving a logical condition, not 
a causal one: space is needed if we are to be able to speak of objects as being apart, but it is 
not the instrument of their separation” (Rundle, p.219).  This last stipulation is of course 
controversial, but relationalists and those that entertain multiply-located objects may embrace 
it (and given the physics related in Part I).  This important logical role for physical space has 
encouraged us to develop other coherent and complex abstract spaces, which reflect selective 
perceived relations between objects or pieces of information.   
This distinction between physical space and abstract space is interesting, not least 
because of which qualities it reveals as the grounds for our metaphysics.  We find things like 
momentum and geometric position on an extended coordinate system to be valuable for 
explanation, prediction and organisation in a way that we do not find sensory qualities like 
colour, smell or mood
74
.  But we can talk of abstract momentum or position in abstract 
spaces in mathematical texts or when making weather charts or financial analysis reports.  In 
this we can separate the concept of space from physical space, though the details and 
rationale for this separation may be somewhat lacking.  As noted above, space is 
instrumentally useful for revealing objects, but it also actively participates in the behaviour 
and characteristics of those objects and is interesting in its on right.   
For these reasons, it matters whether we are realist about space or not.  So beyond 
looking at problematic issue of spatial separation, I here explore if we can distil what 
‘physical space’ is in a realist sense, and to help motivate the analysis by looking at some of 
the physics that challenges traditional conceptions of space.  I conclude that, among other 
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attributes, physical space is characterised by its epistemic value to us and by its sensitivity to 
all measurable change that bears the possibility of interaction with the material of our world.   
9.1 Abstract Spaces 
 
When we refer to ‘space’ it is not always clear what we mean; there are many kinds of 
spaces, from the space between my hands, to outer space, to economic space and measured 
space.  We invest our time and formalism in these spaces because they all serve an 
explanatory role; they explain future behaviour, how certain properties relate, or why things 
are separate.  However, I am interested in what properties can be attributed to our physical 
space—the space that we all move through/in/by—and part of figuring that out involves 
separating it from other spaces.  What is it about certain spaces that makes them abstract
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and non-physical?  Given the prevalence of space in our discourse and theories, we should 
expect a ready arsenal of properties we can use to flesh out the concept of space; but, as we 
saw in chapter 8, such stalwarts as ‘definite place holder’ and ‘means of causal separation’ 
are challenged by phenomena that blur the boundaries of object and space, and that appear to 
permeate or transcend spatial distance.  Physicists routinely deal with super, configuration, 
phase, spin, superposition and isospin space, all of which examine relations between objects 
and their properties—especially via mathematical symmetry operations—but as usual there is 
some uncertainty about whether or why such spaces are abstract.  I will very briefly survey 
each of these in an attempt to review some of the criteria for physical space and reveal the 
uncertainty surrounding it. 
[1] Superspace 
Superspace is a space in which impressive unification seems possible—again, much like the 
electric and magnetic forces were recast into the one electromagnetic force—taking certain 
types of mathematical operations to reveal important differences in the manifestation of 
something that in some way is fundamentally preserved.  In this, it is founded on 
mathematical symmetry, which is among the most central principles in physics, guiding 
mathematical exploration, theory formation and prediction.  Symmetry also has the benefit of 
simplifying calculations and reducing several degrees of freedom to a single element (Siegel, 
p.38).  Not only does symmetry feature in our best theories of everything, it also appears in 
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 Although certain quotes may appear to pit 'abstract' against 'real', I mean to contrast the former only with 
'physical' and leave the dispute about the reality of abstract entities to others. 
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all interactions between fundamental particles in the form of gauge symmetry for local 
transformations.  Roughly, 
A symmetry is a transformation (a change of variables) under which the laws of 
nature do not change. It places strong restrictions on what kinds of objects can exist, 
and how they can interact. When dynamics are described by an action principle 
(Lagrangian, Hamiltonian, etc.)…continuous symmetries are equivalent to 
conservation laws, which are the sole content of Newton’s laws (Siegel, p.38). 
The similarities in behaviour or properties between fundamental particles has led the physics 
community to regard many such particles as possessing a unifying symmetry, which both 
dictates the types of interactions and particles available, and explains the observed ‘families’ 
of particles and interactions.  More ambitious unifying theories have developed a (yet 
unproven) supersymmetric theory that links quite disparate members of the particle family in 
complex ways that may or may not be a reflection of a physical unification. 
For instance, supersymmetry theory assumes that the masses of fermionic and bosonic 
particles are intimately related to each other, with particles from each group partnered with 
opposing superpartner fields (which are thought to have gone unobserved because they only 
appear at abnormally high energies).  That is, bosons of spin 1 (e.g. gluon) are paired with 
lepton and quark superfields of spin 1/2; and the boson of spin 2 (graviton) is paired with a 
superfield of spin 3/2.  But “supersymmetry doesn’t just pair up bosons and fermions, it also 
enlarges the notion of space-time to pair up ordinary coordinates with fermionic coordinates” 
(McMahon, p.169).  This creates a superspace of superfields that incorporates both the 
normal 4 bosonic dimensional coordinates and additional four fermionic dimensional 
components.  These coordinates form the dimensional parameters of an abstract ‘superspace’ 
that nonetheless strongly resembles physical space in its content and description. 
Relating observed particles in this way not only simplifies and smoothes the 
mathematics by removing infinities, it also provides a more fundamental explanation for the 
structure and type of particles in our best account of particle physics.  The diversity of 
particle types is explained by the movement of one basic object, the string, just as the 
diversity of musical notes can issue from a single plucked string.  To capture this intimate 
and reductive connection between particles, several spaces are conjectured: “In the 
superspace, we can think of bosons and fermions as two different projections of a single 
object, much as an electron and its neutrino can be thought of as two different projections of 
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an object in an internal space” (Kane, p.67).  If we can think of two seemingly different 
objects as one in the superspace, can we also think of them as one object in real physical 
space?  That is, “does the fact that (before symmetry breaking) a boson can be transformed 
into a fermion by the supersymmetry transformations mean that the two are, at a deeper level, 
a single particle…Or does it just mean that physically the two can change into each 
other?...The answer appears to hinge on how realistically we can (or should) interpret 
superspace” (Weingard, p.147).   
The total lack of empirical verification of this hypothesis generally keeps physicists 
guarded about the reality of superspace.  So although this sort of interpretation is tempting, 
the additional coordinates are not thought to be dimensions of real physical space, rather, 
they are a “purely theoretical device” (Randall, p.262).  But what is it about them that is not 
(physically) real?  We might suggest that there are three main reasons for calling it a non-
physical space, that is, 1) the directions are ones we do not observe, i.e. there might be 
nothing beyond mathematical formulae—and nothing we could in principle construct—to 
access them, 2) the properties are ones with which we are unfamiliar, e.g. not having a 
determinate value, and 3) it looks suspiciously like mathematical gymnastics in that we may 
not be able to match the mathematical terms to known phenomena.  We still call it a space 
because we find it useful to posit it anyway.  Superspace, then, like many other abstract 
spaces, gives a place for certain properties to be related, often benefiting from geometrical 
relations, functions or spatial structure.  
[2] Configuration and Phase Space 
Configuration and phase space also follow this model by offering a place to compare all the 
physically possible states of a system and what that would mean over time.  Such an 
expansive space is useful given the general assumption in quantum mechanics that whatever 
can happen will happen, barring certain brute constraints, such that mapping out statistical 
averages over such a space can give better behavioural predictions.  Part of the rationale for 
this doctrine is the observation of certain phenomena (e.g. the firing of electrons through slits 
at screens) that behave as if they had taken all possible routes or ‘histories’ from one place to 
another.  Such behaviour has led to the creation of a ‘configuration’ space “which is taken to 
be the space of possible configurations of some set of particles or fields relative to physical 
space” (Belot and Earman, p.216).  In this case, and in such areas as statistical mechanics, 
such a system’s microstate can be specified by a scalar number that is considered a degree of 
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freedom.  The collection of possible states for one or many particles or fields are calculated in 
terms of a manifold (hence the configuration manifold) and offers a useful tool for calculating 
probabilities.   
Expanding upon this, mechanical systems take the cotangent bundle
76
 of the 
configuration manifold to account for both position and momentum; that is, the specification 
of all microstates of a system can be a point in a larger manifold called the ‘phase space’ of 
the system.  Phase space takes every parameter of the system to be a degree of freedom with 
its own dimension (and thus axis), such that a particle’s position coordinates and momenta 
among other properties would each require separate dimensions.  Phase space can thus be a 
useful means of charting the evolution of possible and probable states over time by relating 
the possible relevant variables in a timeless way (e.g. on a graph).  Reducing a variable’s 
possible states to one element is something that does not seem possible in our real space, 
importantly because time appears to us as such a dynamic unfolding dimension that the 
thought of collapsing it into other values for a single ‘location’ in phase space is 
counterintuitive.  However, given the scepticism with which many scientists view pre-
theoretical intuitions, this hesitation may not mean much—in fact, such spaces may highlight 
a more fundamental explanation of the nature of space. 
[3] Superposition 
Another abstract space that mathematically reduces important physical variables is associated 
with superpositions, where ‘position’ here is much more about the probabilistic position 
potential for a particle or qubit (smallest non-trivial quantum system) rather than a multiply-
located or higher-dimensional position.  A qubit is the superposition of probability 
amplitudes, or states, and its “0 and 1 values are represented by quantum states that can be 
reliably distinguished – for example, horizontal and vertical polarizations – but coexisting 
with these are the whole continuum of intermediate states such as diagonal polarisations that 
lean toward 0 or 1 with different probabilities” (Gleick, 2011, p.365).  That is, the value is 
physically indeterminate for a given observable.  One way to make sense of this is by 
supposing that either real space somehow allows all these positions to actually be held, or 
there is a function that ranges over different universes where all the position values are 
actualised until an interaction collapses it. 
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 One might establish a superposition of a lump of material “where each individual 
state has a well-defined static mass distribution, but where the mass distributions differ from 
one state to the other…In the absence of any spatial inhomogeneity in the background 
potentials…there is nothing in the intrinsic nature of one lump location that allows us to 
distinguish it from any other lump location” (Penrose, p.293).  Quantum general relativity, 
such as it is, follows Leibniz in assuming that the lack of physical difference implies that all 
lump states are the same.  In quantum mechanics, however, the differences are preserved in 
order to assign all the calculated wave functions for the lump (particle) in the form of 
superpositions.  Such a way of being ‘located’ is something we never experience in the 
macroscopic world, and struggle to makes sense of in physical space. 
 It is unclear whether we ought to interpret this as fundamental indeterminacy 
(resulting from ‘a lack’ of interaction), or as an indication of the Many Worlds approach to 
quantum mechanics that allows for each of the possible values to be observed in different 
universes.  That is, in measuring the polarisation of an electron, say, there is a space where 
each possible value from 0 to 1 is recorded (just not all in the same space).  Many are reticent 
to interpret this in the realist tradition and instead view the account in purely instrumentalist 
terms, whereby our ontological theorising is limited to making predictions.  Being very clear 
on why superposition cannot or should not conceptually be part of physical space will be 
important in articulating what physical space is, even if we cannot yet empirically verify the 
physics involved. 
[4] Spin space 
In addition to superpositions and the abstract space they invoke, elementary particles can 
have both orbital and intrinsic spin (or ‘intrinsic angular momentum’), which is thought to be 
somewhat analogous to the earth spinning around the sun and around its own axis, 
respectively.  This latter type of spin is not strictly analogous however, as the space in which 
many particles with spin turn requires more than one 360
0
 rotation to return it to the original 
state.  For instance, fermions seem to require two full turns to return to an original state, 
which perhaps reveals some unseen topology, where “one full turn produces a state 
topologically distinct from the original state but two full turns produce a state topologically 
equivalent to the initial one” (Gardner, p.331).   
 This exotic property may derive from a yet unknown property of the particles (e.g. 
twisting as it ‘turns’ such that two 3600 revolutions are needed to restore the original 
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symmetries) rather than from the demands of a higher dimensional space, or perhaps some 
other restricting feature of our universe.  But beyond this curious spin, such particles are also 
credited with another, more abstract, spin called quantum isobaric spin, or isospin (Schumm, 
p.187), whereby different particles that engage with the strong interaction (say a neutron and 
a proton) can be considered the same particle through the invocation of an “abstract inner 
space called isospace” (Gardner, p.327).  In this space a neutron can be ‘rotated’ into a proton 
by altering or rotating one of the constituent down quarks into an up quark. 
Particles like the neutron and proton are composed of certain types of quarks (up and 
down) that produce such similar strong force interactions that they are thought by some to be 
different states of the same particle, perhaps not unlike the two sides of the same coin.  It 
seems that either they are the same particle in our physical space, or that they share an 
important underlying property.  It may be a matter of deciding what characteristics need to be 
preserved for identity ascriptions in order to better gauge whether the two particles should be 
thought of as the same particle or in what way we can claim that they are the same particle.  
For instance, a 2 year-old me and an 80 year-old me are in some ways fundamentally the 
same being, even though the behaviour, mass and perhaps every single atom are different.  It 
may be that utility will drive whether we view neutrons and protons as essentially the same, 
although for now the abstractness of the space dominates.  Many physicists like Barry 
Schumm think isospin rotations “are mathematical edifices, spaces with no more physical 
content than the space in which I plot my checking account balance against the unyielding 
advance of time” (Schumm, p.204).   
This space is useful for manipulating values and charting the evolution of relevant 
variables over time or in relation to other like elements, but there remains something 
decidedly unphysical about such a space, with physicists interpreting “isospin-space as an 
internal symmetry space, while asking ‘but what is that, really?’” (Schumm, p.194).  As with 
the other spaces, should such ‘flavour’ symmetry operations unify the particles, then I suspect 
we would interpret physical space as we know it to expand in complexity to encompass such 
relations largely because it is in physical space that we ground—and keep a record of—
concrete entities.  That is, I do not think there is anything preventing space from permitting 
such operations, especially if the operation amounts to no more than a shift in perspective 
akin to describing phenomena on the one hand as a gas with temperature, or as a number of 
molecules in motion on the other.  The other spaces mentioned, on the other hand, seem to 
offer only a certain reductive way to perceive the features of reality (e.g. particles, speed, 
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position), and thus a narrowing of the totality of information offered by physical space (even 
phase space is a reduction of the information available to chart certain information over 
time).  Thus, they are more akin to places for comparing ideas and, like geometry, create a 
representation of physical reality in human-friendly measuring spaces (e.g. representing the 
earth on a rectangular map).   
We might claim, then, that we call a space ‘physical’ for both epistemological and 
constitutive reasons.  Epistemological because of the fundamental structuring (one of the 
Kantian conditions of physical experience) and explanatory role space serves, and 
constitutive because certain concrete elements exist and together occupy, or create, a physical 
space.  As noted in the introduction to this chapter, we rely on space to explain various 
aspects of our experience, providing an important conceptual framework for many of our 
ordering and predicting endeavours.  Traditionally, as is likely still the case, we call things 
physically real because we can or could interact with them.   
Abstract spaces, on the other hand, give us ways to mathematically represent and 
geometrically plot relations and predictions for aspects of entities in telling ways that move 
beyond their limitations in physical space.  For instance, we can formulate a space where all 
the objects in a room are situated by their position on the colour wheel rather than their 
physical position.  While important in their own right, such abstract spaces do not give us a 
clear definition of space in itself, though they may highlight some of the characteristics we 
attribute to physical space, which can be described in terms of a) ‘states’ where each change 
in information value (e.g. each qubit of information) and all manifestations of matter and 
energy are registered, and b) as existing along a continuous coordinate system of material 
units in which we are located (giving us the possibility, in some sense, of interacting with 
it
77
).   
While these characteristics may not definitively and exclusively describe physical 
space, they do seem important characteristics and the ways we define abstract spaces have 
raised the importance of both information and fundamental units that can be geometrically 
expressed to a conception of space.  Choosing which fundamental units determine the space, 
however, is unclear, although in regards to abstract space, it is not obvious that one can go 
from an abstract space to our physical space without the addition of more information; that is, 
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though we seem comfortable isolating elements from physical space in order to formulate 
abstract ones it appears easier to move from physical space to abstract ones rather than trying 
to reconstruct all the information in physical space from an abstract space.  In general, I think 
that the distinction between physical, in some sense concrete, and abstract space needs to be 
clarified, particularly as there are so many unclear examples in physics that need stronger 
guidelines for their classification in this regard.  Nonetheless, these characteristics do not 
demand that physical space be either a unique substance or even a physical entity.  That is, 
physical space need not be a substance to be distinguished from abstract space.  Space may 
be nothing more than our term for the collective organisation of matter, and nothing at all like 
the robust creature of substantival models.   
While physical space need not be so very fundamental, it does need to have some sort 
of structure to characterise it, and ideally to afford the kinds of distinctions we expect (e.g. 
determining whether an object can be enantiomorphic).  This belief, along with the 
mathematical demands of the energy values for such fundamental units as charge, 
momentum, spin etc., naturally leads to talk of dimensions—the seemingly immaterial 
structuring of all interactions that determines whether, say, a ‘left-facing right triangle’ can be 
manipulated into a ‘right-facing right triangle’.  Dimensionality can certainly populate 
abstract spaces—indeed, it was variously manipulated in all the above cases—but it is a 
characteristic that has long been thought to belong to our physical space.  Our three-
dimensional construction of space and then four-dimensional construction of spacetime has 
proven wonderfully fruitful for engineering and mathematics, and traditionally constitutes an 
important part of our understanding of space.  Having struggled to ‘discover’ the nature of 
space in the substantivalist’s point-based manifold and in comparisons with dubiously 
abstract spaces, it is tempting to suppose greater insight will accompany the supposed spatial 
structure of dimensions—which will occupy the remainder of this work—if, that is, we can 
figure out what they are. 
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CHAPTER 10: What are Dimensions? 
 
Rather than promote a given philosophical position at the expense of another, as I do in other 
chapters, in these three chapters I want to raise a subject for debate, namely, the concept of a 
dimension which, despite its common and broad usage, is not clearly defined and more 
alarmingly, the philosophical community does not seem to recognise this as a problem.  I 
think this does a disservice to both philosophers and scientists, and produces a confused and 
fractured account of some of our best theories of the world.  My aim here, therefore, is 
principally to illustrate both the importance of the term and the need for much more work on 
it to be done.  In this, I will be highlighting areas I find particularly fruitful and asking more 
questions than giving answers, with modest hopes of a spring cleaning for the concept rather 
than a rigorous and complete account of dimensionality.   
Whether attributed to spacetime or to objects, the property of ‘dimension’ has played 
an increasingly significant scientific role over the last century, leading to its current usage as 
a crucial contributor to our fundamental theories (whether superstring, supergravity etc.), and 
thus as much as the notion of a ‘field’ or a ‘number’, it deserves our attention.  This 
prominence of spatial dimensionality as a physical tool began with mathematicians in the 
19th century
78
 and then in earnest in the wake of Einstein’s special theory of relativity.  From 
there, a series of developments in dimensional discourse—from the four dimensions of 
Minkowski spacetime and the suggestions of Kaluza-Klein theory, to the mathematical 
cohesion of superstring theory—expanded the range and kind of theories considered by 
physicists.  The first waves of inquiry into extended dimensions have given way to the 
mainstream, and there now seem to be very few physicists who do not seriously consider 4+ 
dimensions constituting our reality.   
 However, this ontological proliferation has received scant attention from philosophers 
and only cursory attempts at elaboration by scientists that often mention it in terms of degrees 
of freedom.  Dimensions are nearly always defined via simplistic examples that focus on 
lower spatial analogues and often frustratingly end in ‘etc.’ as if the unobserved were 
obvious.  For instance, a point is zero-dimensional because it allows no movement along any 
direction and there is no uncertainty about the location of anything ‘on’ that point (because 
there is only the point).  A line is one-dimensional because it allows movement along one 
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direction (say, left/right), and spatially locating anything on it only requires one piece of 
information.  A Euclidean plane is two-dimensional because it allows movement along two 
directions which are orthogonal to each other (say, left/right and forward/backward), and 
because two pieces of information are needed to spatially locate an object on the plane.  The 
rationale for incorporating orthogonality into the definition of dimension follows from our 
use of independent variables along standard 90
0
 coordinate axes, as in Leibniz’s definition of 
dimension: “the maximum number of mutually perpendicular lines that can be drawn through 
a point” (Dipert, p.63).  
 Polar coordinates also require two pieces of information, though one is an angle and 
one a length from the origin.  Our visible world is three-dimensional because it allows 
movement along three orthogonal directions (say, left/right, forward/backward and up/down), 
and requires three pieces of information to spatially locate an object.  Following this, we are 
generally informed that 4, 5, 6 etc. dimensions follow this pattern, with a temporal dimension 
tacked on for good measure.  In all of these discussions of dimensions as determined by the 
number of information pieces used to locate an object, there is the rather large additional and 
uncounted inclusion of a coordinate system with a proscribed centre, as well as the 
understanding that this whole contraption models some aspect(s) of the universe (e.g. 
classical observables, mass etc.).  That is, there is a fair bit of framework that supports the 
dimensional house of cards, which may be influencing more than we realise and certainly 
could lay claim to being an additional piece of information, though I am not sure what 
exactly to make of this. 
 The familiar three spatial dimensions above have been the endorsed number for 
hundreds of years, with philosophers like Aristotle and Kant
79
 offering brief discussions on 
the topic that invariably amounted to little more than a by-the-by statement of fact
80
.  Their 
views are no longer taken for granted, however, and philosophers who continue in that line of 
argument need to give more compelling arguments than, say, Richard Swinburne’s push for 
tri-dimensionality, whereby he seems to equate ‘logical’ with ‘readily sensible’, appealing to 
one’s intuition (through several examples) to show the difficulty in conceiving of our world 
being greater than three-dimensional (Swinburne, p.152-4).  This of course hardly amounts to 
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80 Although philosophers may attempt to corroborate or explain our world’s tri-dimensional appearance, they 
cannot go beyond the evidence, and “all our empirical arguments for the dimensionality of spacetime prove only 
the importance of 3 + 1 space-time throughout its intimate interconnection with our most general physical laws.  
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any kind of a substantial proof for the impossibility of our world being so constituted.  The 
difficulty one has in conceiving of infinite expanses or of an electron cannot be taken to 
refute the existence of either.  More recently, time has been cast as an additional dimension, 
an add-on to whatever number of spatial dimensions one likes, though it has hardly escaped 
anyone’s notice that a temporal dimension is not the same species as a spatial one.   
 While this particular difference has received more philosophical notice, the dialogue 
has not, by and large, focused on dimensionality per se, but rather on concepts like the nature 
of temporal existence, mereology or change.  One might think that at least with the 
proliferation of spatial dimensions there would arise a more rigorous analysis of what we 
expect of a dimension, how we use it, and what, exactly, a dimension is.  But the physical 
analysis has not kept pace with the mathematical, and it is easy to stumble upon confused or 
unsure physicists or even mathematicians that only discuss the differences between 
dimensions (e.g. in topology or shape), and wonder what exactly they are referencing, as the 
next section notes.  Our failure to flesh out the definition may rely to some extent on 
empirical data, but there is certainly ample room for a more profound and elucidating account 
of dimensionality as it is currently used and understood in physics
81
.  I will first review some 
of the explicit confusion concerning dimensions, and then explore the central topics such an 
account should include. 
10.1 Underdetermination, Confusion and Equivalences 
 
Dimensions, like fields, or particles, or space, are important because they are thought to 
underpin and inform our understanding of the universe.  Whether dimensions (or any of the 
other listed concepts) are physically real or merely instrumentally useful matters; it makes all 
the difference whether, say, one’s mother or car or imaginary friend is physically real or only 
an instrumentally useful abstraction, like the ‘average family’.  Is a dimension the sort of 
thing that affects physical processes with different numbers of dimensions giving rise to the 
same physical phenomena?  Is dimensionality even a property of space or is it wholly or 
partly a property of objects?  We appeal to dimensions as fundamental structures of space and 
even as the shapers of properties themselves, but without a clear account of what we mean by 
the term, significant empirical data will have no framework to fall into, neither confirming 
nor disconfirming the vague definition of dimension some of us at times hold.   
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 It is not simply a question of asking the physicists what they use dimensions for, 
because there is no unified or thorough response to be had.  Mathematicians can be even 
worse, since they seem to happily proliferate dimensions as their calculations require, leading 
to the comforting thought about the quantum field that “the multidimensional nature of this 
field need not then be so mysterious since information can be organised into as many sets of 
dimensions as may be needed” (Bohm and Hiley, p.61).  Because of its slippery, even 
purposefully vague definition, ‘dimension’ is used to sort and describe a range of information 
and phenomena.  To put this information to the best use, there needs to be an effort to 
consolidate and clarify, and at least question, the conceptually possible and practical roles of 
dimensionality. 
The endeavour of analysis is a process begun by the physicists themselves.  Harvard 
physicist Lisa Randall devotes a book—and much of her career—to an analysis of physical 
dimensions, but she closes the text questioning what she means by the term, particularly in 
regards to equivalent theories with disparate numbers of dimensions: “what does the number 
of dimensions really mean? We know that the number of dimensions is defined as the number 
of quantities that you need to locate a point in space.  But…there’s a plasticity in the 
definition that eludes the conventional terminology....Because no single theory is always the 
best description, the question of the number of dimensions doesn’t always have a simple 
answer” (Randall, p.449).   
In particular, we find theories exchanging seemingly quite disparate properties like 
momentum and charge, each meriting its own dimension: “the number of directions is the 
number of independent directions of momentum—that is, the number of different directions 
in which an object can travel.  But if momentum along one of the dimensions can be replaced 
by a charge [and some theories claim it can], the number of dimensions isn’t really well 
defined” (Randall, p.320).  This concern should be twofold, as there is uncertainty regarding 
both the number of dimensions science ought to embrace (perhaps based on evidence or 
utility or coherence with other models), and uncertainty regarding the nature of dimensions 
(are they physically real? Mathematically real? Instrumental?), which then affects what and 
how we count.  It is this latter uncertainty in particular that makes discussing the number of 
dimensions such a non-starter; there is no piece of evidence that can settle the matter since 
scientists like Randall are not yet in agreement as to what they are looking for and what sort 
of evidence would confirm whatever that is. 
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She is not alone in her concern, Brian Greene echoes her uncertainty: “what can we 
mean by dimension when our mathematical theories that demand a number of dimensions of 
movement, are equivalent to other theories where the size, shape and number of dimensions 
can change?” (Greene, p.477).  This uneasiness is largely brushed aside in the day to day 
work of physicists and mathematicians, but the growing reliance upon dimensions in their 
theories makes it increasingly difficult to ignore.  Indeed, such distinguished physicists as the 
Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg have noted (if half-heartedly) that “we could use help from 
professional philosophers in understanding what it is that we are doing” (Weinberg, p.24).  It 
is the greater wonder that philosophers have been so slow to respond to the invitation.  
Perhaps the most important source of concern for physicists about dimensionality is 
the above referenced equivalence between theories.  Our simplistic account of dimensions 
assures us that, if nothing else, different dimensions produce very different worlds; a 2-
dimensional house is fundamentally different than a 3-dimensional house.  It should be 
unsurprising, then, that physicists are unsettled to find that their theories of the world with 
different tallies of dimensional numbers appear equivalent in their description of physical 
phenomena.  For instance, “there seems to be an equivalence between ten-dimensional 
superstring theory and eleven-dimensional supergravity” (Randall, p.304), as well as an 
equivalence between infinite (or approximating infinite) dimensions and very minute rolled-
up dimensions (known as T-duality)
 82
.   
This equivalence has the potential to unite what were once seen as two competing 
‘theories of everything’.  In addition to such flexibility, dimensions have the power to unify 
or separate objects and phenomena in profound ways, not only making seemingly 
incongruous counterparts congruous counterparts via a higher dimensional flip, but unifying 
the force carriers (bosons) with the matter particles (fermions) and joining all the 
fundamental forces.  For instance, although our visible spacetime presents electric and 
magnetic fields as similar, in other dimensional models they lose that symmetry and appear 
quite disparate
  
(Yau, p.68).   
This also applies to seemingly interchangeable theories that posit different numbers of 
dimensions but require the same number of values to uniquely identify a particle.  Because 
this interchangeability has proven such a catalyst for questions about dimensionality, it 
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 The circle radius of a rolled up infinitely large dimension would yield no number, no circle at all, and a zero-
size circle does not count as a dimension so it may be taken as equivalent with a theory of one dimension fewer 
(Randall, p.451). 
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behoves us to spend a moment on what sorts of equivalences physicists have in mind.  The 
different versions of string theory display a topological T-duality symmetry that relates the 
large coupling strength (energy of the interactions) or small distance of one theory to the 
weak coupling strength and large distance of another theory to show “that the two theories 
are in fact the same theory expressed from different viewpoints” (McMahon, p.159).  Thus, 
type IIA theory with its small compactified dimension with radius r and tightly wound strings 
is dual to type IIB theory with its huge dimension of radius r* and directed momentum; “each 
time the string in type IIA theory winds around the compact dimension, this corresponds to 
increasing the momentum in type IIB theory by one unit” (McMahon, p.160).   
There are further equivalences with this element of ‘sameness’ derives from the 
persistence of mathematical variables in the descriptive formulae, which is interpreted 
according to observable phenomena like momentum and charge.  Mass can also be in some 
sense created through dimensional analysis “by ‘dimensional reduction’, identifying mass 
with the component of momentum in an extra dimension.  As with the extra dimensions used 
for describing conformal symmetry, this extra dimension is just a mathematical construct 
used to give a simple derivation” (Siegel, p.141).  Positing an additional spatial direction 
extends the range of available indices and allows the corresponding momentum to equal the 
mass, given renormalizing transformations (Siegel, p.142).  The different perspectives 
achieved through various radii (in this case) are thought to describe the same objects; 
similarly, a description of motorway traffic could include the bundles of pistons, engine, 
wheels, shafts, seats etc. and how they interact with the road in complex high-energy ways 
across 4 dimensions, or it could include ‘cars’ and traffic flow patterns from a slightly 
different, simpler perspective.   
There are additional mathematical approaches that study the evolution of dynamic 
systems and seem to give some sense of the interconnectivity associated with higher 
dimensions.  This sense appears in more exotic models for phenomena, say, the description of 
a dynamical system’s evolution wherein the points of the evolution curve remain close to an 
original ‘attractor’, which itself could be a point, manifold or a fractal structure.  Here the 
evolving system is always closely connected with its origin and to other points; “this concept 
of dimension gives a measure of the amount of information necessary to specify the structure 
of the attractor” (Barrow, p.343).  The interconnectivity of such structures may merit a multi-
dimensional analysis of their information in a similar way to the highly complex behaviour of 
other objects and systems.   
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Although it provides no physical interpretation, this mathematical approach of 
shifting the ‘view’ to different dimensions is common.  For instance, “using the tools of 
renormalisation and perturbation theory, rescaling phenomena to different spatial dimensions 
can shed more light on the behaviours involved; for instance… we can gain a better 
understanding of matter in 4D by looking at the field equations in 5D” (Wesson, p.21).  
Again, the rationale appears utility-based; we find it helpful and informative to explain events 
and properties under the assumption of different boundary constraints.  Dimensions, however 
they are perceived, fulfil this role and offer an explanatory framework to make sense of 
information.   
Dimensions can have more subtle interactions than unifying all particles by 
determining (or being determined by) the energetic strength of the entities involved.  Strongly 
interacting theories seem to give rise to additional dimensions while the ‘same’ world at a 
lower energy might then be interpreted through a lower dimensional model (Randall, p.448).  
The technical difficulties of working with more energetic models have lead researchers to use 
a renormalisation process called perturbation theory to make the calculations tractable; that 
is, one can alter the perspective by describing a higher dimensional model in lower 
dimensional terms and choosing a different level of precision and scale (e.g. describing the 
motion of 3-D cars using only a 2-dimensional plane).  Our move from speaking of ‘a gas’ 
and speaking of its constituent molecules is also similar, and although we may lose 
descriptive power at one level we may gain it in another through simplicity and applicability.   
Dimensions can also link seemingly disparate theories; for example, in ten-
dimensional superstring theory one needs to specify nine values of momentum and a value of 
charge (thus 10 values plus time), whereas in eleven-dimensional supergravity one needs 
only specify ten values of momentum (plus time).  That dimensionality appears to embrace a 
range of phenomena (such as a dimension of charge) by reducing properties to a number of 
mathematical terms seems reminiscent of Descartes’ approach to treat dimension as simply a 
‘measure of something’, a way of organising information (see 10.2).  The interchangeability 
of higher dimensions with lower dimensional values may suggest an instrumental 
interpretation or it may suggest an ancient confusion between one and many (e.g. a gas vs. 
many molecules).  Or again, it may mean that, though there are real structures in place or 
facts of the matter about the number of dimensions, our interests and abilities prompt a 
fluidity of reference.  Dimensions certainly have the potential for wide-ranging unification 
that could challenge a number of philosophical assumptions in the areas of ontology (e.g. are 
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bosons and fermions really just one complex particle?), of universals (introducing a universal 
of boson-fermioness or perhaps altering the list of first and second-order universals) and our 
assumptions about property possession (whether objects or spacetime possesses 
dimensionality will affect their intrinsic and extrinsic properties). 
  Beyond the open bewilderment about the meaning of dimension, is the further 
concern that, because of this, we have no real idea how it impacts other elements of our 
theories, specifically we have no assurances of priority.  The evidential underdetermination of 
theory is a problem for science in general, but it is arguably particularly acute for 
dimensionality because of both its vague definition and its pervasive and fundamental use (if 
often tacit) in many theories.  If dimensions are only bookkeeping devices then we may have 
good reasons to think that some laws will hold rather than others and what their effects might 
look like, but if dimensions are physically real and constitutive of the structure of 
fundamental substances, then it is not clear how we are to construct higher dimensional 
models on our current definition.  As Craig Callender argues, 
Absent a developed physical theory that takes dimensionality as contingent and offers 
principled physical constraints on what can happen in different dimensions, there 
seem to be no standards for knowing which laws hold in what dimension.  Which is 
more fundamental, a r
-1
 potential in higher dimensions (and thus stable orbits there) or 
Gauss’ law in higher dimensions (and thus no stable orbits there)?  There is no 
scientific theory of this, and only vague intuitions fill the vacuum (Callender, p.132). 
Callender criticises the claims of theorists who take laws or dimensions or matter to be the 
most fundamental theoretical components and control the variables of the other concepts, 
arguing that the rationale is only the theorist’s belief.  In order “to get their conclusion, some 
physics is of course used, some assumptions are made, and these assumptions may not be 
legitimate in higher dimensions, e.g., Burgbacher’s assumption that in every dimension the 
lowest series contains only transitions with l=k=0 or Caruso and Xavier’s assumption that 
classical thermodynamics is valid in all n” (Callender, p.133).  This caution of Callender’s is 
particularly salient in the wake of rampant and confident speculation on the nature and 
characteristics of higher dimensional worlds.  There is little or no thought given to what 
limits or enables the degrees of freedom in one region or by one object compared with 
another region or object, or to rationales for causal priority, or for a grounding account of 
what a dimension is physically.  While the majority of our attempts to pin down a definition 
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have been broad and brief, it seems as good a place as any to start teasing apart the confusion 
and see if we can formulate a clearer expression of what we mean by ‘dimension’ (regardless 
of whether any real thing corresponds to that expression, which may also be a matter of 
underdetermination). 
10.2 Traditional and Working definitions of ‘Dimension’ 
 
A ‘dimension’ is commonly geometrically described as a direction or axis along which 
something can move, or equivalently, a dimension offers a piece of information to specify a 
location.  It is in this latter sense that ‘time’ is also viewed as a dimension, since it is such a 
fundamental component of locating something that it have a temporal component.  
Geometrically this is typically portrayed by using an additional axis to whatever spatial 
number is in use (to capture changes in position along a linear temporal ‘direction’).  
Following these notions, we can look to the literature for particulars; for instance, Swinburne 
distinguishes between the definitions in geometry and topology, where the former posits that 
“a space is n-dimensional if and only if n real coordinates are necessary and sufficient for 
unique identification of points” (Swinburne, p.137).  He gives the topological definition of a 
dimension as “defined by the dimension of the neighbourhood of a point of the space, and it 
by the dimension of its boundary” (Swinburne, p.137), but this only postpones any real 
definition.   
 To get a better sense of what our first passes at dimensionality mean, one might try 
unpacking the terms ‘direction’, ‘motion’ and ‘location’.  Thus, we might define ‘direction’ 
as the straight or curved continuous extent of length (merely a measurement of extent) 
without breadth along which something moves or faces (e.g. North-Northeast); motion can be 
defined as a change in position, and location can be defined as the place where something is 
situated, the assigned particular position—generally relative to other things.  If we adopt 
these terms, then we get a definition comfortably situated in traditional language:  
[1] Dimension= a continuous extent of length along which something may occupy 
different positions relative to something else.   
The key definitions are loaded with co-dependent terms which offer a ‘meaning constellation’ 
rather than a reductive foundation, but that may at least serve to place ‘dimensionality’ close 
to other terms we take as fairly primitive.  This rather simplistic account of a dimension can 
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be seen as only one particular element of earlier approaches that gave dimensionality a wide 
scope. 
Among the first early modern discourses on dimension is Descartes’ broad categorisation, 
which stems from his aim to give some kind of mathematical formalism to the haphazard 
world of bodies in motion.  By analysing their fundamental characteristics, chief of which is 
dimension, Descartes argues that the geometrical elements of length, depth and width are 
arbitrarily distinguished and only one of many ways that something might be measurable.  
Geometry may not be the best or most accurate way to carve up reality of course, but 
certainly “physicists have chosen geometry as the currently best way to deal with 
macroscopic and microscopic mechanics” (Wesson, p.11-12).  Whether that sort of division 
makes the most sense in higher energy physics, or at higher dimensions (if such things would 
exist in a non-geometrical model) may be disputable.   
In parsing away the unimportant features for mathematical reduction, Descartes 
allows for many aspects of motion and extension to act as a dimension, in much the same 
way that modern theorists use any piece of information to coordinate the relation of some 
element among others in abstract spaces.  Construed in this way, dimension is a feature 
applicable to more than just spatial extension; “thus it is not merely the case that length, 
breadth and depth are dimensions; but weight is also a dimension…So, too, speed is a 
dimension of motion…it clearly follows that there may be an infinite number of dimensions” 
(Rules for Direction, XIV, Philosophical Works, I, 6I (AT X, 44-48)).  This early definition 
has persisted both in the common usage of dimension as an aspect of something and in 
physics as ‘dimensional analysis’ where useful physical quantities are calculated using what 
are called basic physical dimensions (including determinations of time, mass, length or even 
temperature and charge) that speak in very different terms than geometrical orthogonality.   
Nonetheless, dimensional analysis does preserve both the idea that a dimension 
involves a piece of information and a means of ‘locating’ an object in a space (even if it is not 
always clear if the space is physically real) by means of independent variables.  For instance, 
to locate a particle one may need a value for its mass as well as its charge, either of which 
may change without affecting the other, such that each value can be seen as a separate 
dimension.  The Oxford Dictionary of English notes all three meanings in its ‘dimension’ 
citation, providing a first pass at our working understanding of the term: 
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dimension noun  
… (usu. Dimensions) a measurable extent of a particular kind, such as length, breadth, 
depth, or height: the final dimensions of the pond were 14 ft x 8 ft | [mass noun] … ■ 
a mode of linear extension of which there are three in space and two on a flat surface, 
which corresponds to one of a set of coordinates specifying the position of a point. 
■ (Physics) an expression for a derived physical quantity in terms of fundamental 
quantities such as mass, length, or time, raised to the appropriate power (acceleration, 
for example, having the dimension of length × time
-2
) (Oxford Dictionary of English 
‘dimension noun’) 
Although the latter sense of dimensionality is commonly attributed to physics, the discipline 
also heavily relies on the more standardly geometric account, particularly as concerns the 
spatial structure of reality: 
A mode of linear measurement, magnitude, or extension, in a particular direction; 
usually as co-existing with similar measurements or extensions in other directions.  
The three dimensions of a body, or of ordinary space, are length, breadth, and 
thickness (or depth); a surface has only two dimensions (length and breadth); a line 
only one (length).  Here the notion of measurement or magnitude is commonly lost, 
and the word denotes merely a particular mode of spatial extension.  Modern 
mathematicians have speculated as to the possibility of more than three dimensions of 
space (OED online ‘dimension n’). 
The depth of the above OED definition is largely comparable to the non-mathematical ones 
given by scientists and theorists, and gives us little insight into the constituents or criteria for 
a physical dimension.  It is not only through physics directly, however, that we need 
investigate what we mean by the term, indeed  more of the meaning might be teased out by 
focused analyses from surrounding fields that treat dimensionality in the same spirit as the 
above definition. 
An early non-scientific approach at constructing a definition of dimension comes 
from Benjamin Gilman (Gilman 1928), who attempts to set out a definition for a one-
dimensional manifold, where a ‘manifold’ can be any plurality of things, and whereby it will 
be the particular relations that these things, or ‘elements’ bear to each other that will 
determine their dimensionality.  For Gilman, “a manifold may be such that every pair of its 
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elements subsists in one certain relation.  The relation may then be termed ‘characteristic’ of 
the manifold.  When a characteristic relation is both heterogeneous and transitive, it is called 
a ‘dimension’ of the manifold it characterizes.  Let such a manifold be called a one-
dimensional manifold” (Gilman, p.562-3).  By ‘heterogeneous’, Gilman means that the 
relation each term of a 2-part relation bears to the other is different, that is, what we might 
now call asymmetrical; for instance, the relation X is ‘larger than’ Y gives X a different 
relation to Y than Y bears toward X.  If the relation were the same, as with the relation of 
‘equivalence’, then Gilman would characterise the relationship as homogenous 
(symmetrical).    
By ‘transitive’, Gilman more straightforwardly means that if X bears a relation r to Y, 
and Y bears relation r to Z, then X bears relation r to Z.  More generally, then, a dimension is 
defined through the particular transitive and heterogeneous characteristic that is “necessary 
and sufficient to describe the relation in which every element of a given manifold subsists 
with every other” (Gilman, p.574).  He intends this definition to apply to the number line, to 
time, physical space, or indeed to the lineage of English kings.   Thus, English royalty is a 
one-dimensional manifold, where every “predecessor differs from successor, and the 
predecessor of a predecessor is also a predecessor” (Gilman, p.568).  From Gilman we gain 
the idea of sequence and a primitive sense of connectivity that does not obviously transfer to 
higher dimensional manifolds.  Indeed although the idea of sequence is more easily adopted 
into later set-theoretic accounts that underlie modern conceptions of sequences like the 
number line, spatial connectivity has been largely glossed over.  Nonetheless, let us take his 
account as a cursory operating definition of dimension: 
[2]   Dimension = a certain relation that is both heterogeneous and transitive which is 
possessed of all the elements of a manifold. 
 Clearly [2] gives no particular emphasis to a physically real spatial account, but 
beyond that it does little to elaborate on the relevant kind of relation, connection, or the relata 
(which might be, say, spacetime points or material entities).  To make it applicable to more 
complex spaces than a one-dimensional manifold, we might add to the number of relata (e.g. 
further specifying the dimensionality through the 2- or 3- or 4- etc. part relations—n-tuples— 
of the manifold).  
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[3]   Dimension = a certain n-tuple relation that is both heterogeneous and transitive 
which is possessed of all the elements of a manifold
83
.  
This n-tuple relation gives us the flexibility of increasing the data points (the coordinates, or 
independent pieces of information) to accommodate higher dimensions, but it does not 
convey any notion of how that relation impacts the dimensionality or in what it consists.  The 
nature of the relation would itself be an interesting idea to pursue, perhaps giving physicists a 
clearer set of criteria for distinguishing and explaining dimensions.  For instance, the n-tuple 
relation between elements might be purely distributive with one element bearing the same 
relationship to several other elements (as a mother would to all her children); or purely 
collective with one element bearing a relation to a collection of elements (as the ‘centre of a 
circle’ bears to all the points that make up the circle, or when Tom, Dick and Harry surround 
a house which they could not do individually); or a variety of relations
84
.  Our simplistic 
account of dimensions (invoking the examples of a line, square and cube) seem to favour the 
distributive approach at first blush, but that may change on closer inspection or upon 
reflection of the higher-dimensional characterisations.  Beyond the kind of relation, one 
might also incorporate how we think interconnectivity impacts the dimensionality.   
10.2.1 Connectivity 
 
A more recent take on dimensions that focuses much more explicitly on information theory 
and the study of networks, gives particular attention to the connectivity aspect of 
dimensionality.  Although it is not clear whether the adopted notion of dimension is 
elaborating on the physicist’s definition or importantly diverging, it is of central importance 
to ‘systems’, as Daqing et al. note: “the dimension of a system is one of the most fundamental 
quantities to characterize its structure and basic physical properties.  Diffusion and 
vibrational excitations, for example, as well as the universal features of a system near a 
critical point depend crucially on its dimension” (Daqing et al., p.1).  In their study of 
networks of embedded dimensionality, they argue that networks of widely distributed, long 
range connectivity between nodes are of a higher dimension (and even arguably infinite) than 
networks of short range linkages connecting only nearby nodes.  The networks are able to 
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 Spacetime manifolds and metrics are features, or structures, of spacetime such that “a space which carries 
consistent continuous coordinates is called a manifold.  In addition to being a manifold, real space has 
geometrical structure…Furthermore, distances and angles may be defined.  Spaces with these features are called 
metric spaces” (P.C.W. Davies, p.11). 
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 Particular thanks to Katherine Hawley for raising these suggestions [and throughout!]. 
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transcend the surrounding spatial dimension through such long range inter-connectivity, 
whereas in networks connecting “only neighbouring nodes (in space)…the dimension of the 
network is trivially identical to the dimension of the embedding space” (Daqing et al., p.1).   
 The above account makes connectivity the hallmark of dimensionality, with spaces 
(networks) of dense interconnectivity acquiring a higher dimension than spaces of marginal 
connectivity.  The account also employs formulae that take both the number of nodes and the 
probability of ‘encountering’ one at a certain distance to scale with the dimensionality.  
Phillip Bricker, too, raises concerns about connectivity, wondering if there are “direct ties 
only between ‘neighbouring’ points, so that points at a distance are connected only indirectly 
through a series of such direct ties?  Or are there also direct ties between distant points, so 
that the fabric is reinforced, as it were, by irreducibly global spatial relations?” (Bricker, 
p.271).   
 This ‘reinforcing’ could certainly contribute to the density of spatial pathways, and 
presumably increase the dimensionality of the space.   Although undertaking a different 
project, Nerlich suggests an intrinsic account of directions and non-overlapping paths that 
also seems well formulated to capture some of this path-wise connectivity of dimensions.  He 
argues that “the set of directions round any point in physical space is intrinsic to it…the 
directions are not tangent vectors…A direction at a point is shared by paths which touch at 
the point without crossing” (Nerlich, p.105).  This notion of non-intersecting paths (where 
traversal along every path could be undergone simultaneously) offers another component to 
our understanding of dimensionality and highlights the importance of the relations between 
pathways.   
This interest can also be seen in modern and rather exotic variations of loop quantum 
gravity, which includes a discrete spin network composed of evolving intersections of 
looping flux-lines that models spacetime at its smallest level; “the area of a given surface is 
determined by the number of ‘edges’ of the network it crosses (not the expanse of interior 
void), and the volume it encloses is given by the number of nodes (or intersections) it 
contains” (Dainton, p.333).  This importantly incorporates interconnectivity into a conception 
of physical density, perhaps providing another clue as to the nature of dimensionality.  Such 
network edges appear to be the pathways that ‘channel’ energy and objects, effectively giving 
boundaries to space, while the nodal density (and presumably the nodal orientation) 
establishes spatial volumes and the structure for higher dimensions in this model.  One of the 
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most important aspects of dimensionality is to characterise the ways objects can (or cannot) 
interact, and in loop quantum gravity we find this modelled in “the way these loops and lines 
intersect and knot together [which] determines the geometry of space at the Planck-scale” 
(Dainton, p.333).  Another important characteristic that this theory raises is that of the 
fundamental divisibility of spacetime; that is, whether spacetime is discrete—offering a 
maximum density for a region or even giving rise to space itself through certain ‘looping’ 
structures—or whether spacetime is continuous and follows classical mathematics. 
 
Figure 4. Although the thick circle is larger it covers a smaller area and volume 
in the spin network than the thin circle (which encompasses more edges and nodes). 
 
This concern over the basic model for spacetime units, may have pressing implications 
for dimensionality.  When it comes to our conception of dimensions, more often than not 
continuity is assumed rather than questioned.  Mathematicians like Poincaré only give 
recursive definitions of ‘dimension’ that “deal explicitly with continuum…and assigning 
three dimensions to space on the basis of these definitions means adoption of the continuous 
structure of space from the outset” (Abramenko, p.91).  But the strength of the quantum 
model over the last century has slowly worn away the confidence in continuity as discrete 
models (from energy and motion) seem better equipped to explain phenomena.   
Which model we adopt certainly can affect our theories, and some theorists, like 
Abramenko argue that continuity is critical to our common notions of dimensionality, even 
though continuity in space and time remains an unverified (and dubious) postulate.  If space 
or time adopted a discrete structure, he argues that “the usual meaning of dimensionality will 
be lost, and physical discontinuous time [or space] will be represented by a zero-dimensional 
complex of cells” (Abramenko, p.104).  It may also be the case that a firm understanding of 
dimensionality is ineliminably bound up with a clear understanding of the basic model of 
divisibility (whether discrete or continuous). 
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Taking such models on board, we might try to insert our concern for connectivity and 
the pathways available, particularly as concerns the number of relata.  Thus we might expand 
[3] with: 
[4]   Dimension = a certain n-tuple relation that is both heterogeneous and transitive 
which is possessed of all the elements of a manifold, and is distinguished by the 
number of independent paths (degrees of freedom) available to those elements. 
While incorporating the degrees of freedom may reflect general attitudes to dimensionality, 
degrees of freedom need not be limited to the orthogonal specifications of earlier accounts.  
For instance, physics often takes a degree of freedom to be any independent physical 
parameter (often geometrically represented as an orthogonal axis) in the formal description of 
the state of a physical system.  A system of N independent particles in 3-dimensions, 
therefore, has the total of 3N degrees of freedom
85.  If we were to simply equate ‘dimension’ 
with ‘degree of freedom’ along these lines then the dimensionality of any space would 
directly depend on the number of unique entities moving in distinct directions (independent 
pathways).   
 This focus on connectivity can be found in other notions of dimension, where it is 
described by the degrees of freedom for a point or object that are not dependent on other 
variables.  The degree of freedom—which the mathematician Shin-Tung Yau defines as a 
dimension, “an independent way of moving in space” (Yau, p.3)—represents a path in a 
network, and in this respect bears a strong similarity to dimensional analysis carried out by 
Daqing et alia.   Might we then be able to determine the dimension of a spatial region simply 
be counting the possible degrees of freedom from any chosen node or average set of nodes?  
Although this seems to aim only at differentiating a hierarchy of dimensions, rather than 
defining them, it may provide a useful insight into the latter.  Were we to take this approach 
we would need to first decide 1) what counts as a node (or element) and 2) what counts as a 
path or degree of freedom (which will also include determining what sorts of things are to 
‘traverse’ these paths).  If we want to preserve the heterogeneous and transitivity 
requirements of Gilman, our method of determining spatial dimension might further specify 
that these paths are distinguished in at least their spatial positions as categorised in our 3-
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 Dimensions in Hilbert space, for instance, follow such a model, wherein the notion of dimension is built out 
of state-vectors which can be “linearly independent of the rest.  The size of the largest set of mutually linearly 
independent state-vectors is then the dimension of the Hilbert space…Hilbert spaces are vector spaces over the 
field of complex numbers and…their dimension may be any integer from 1 to a countable infinity” (Gibbins, 
p.90). 
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space (or by another means) and that this same relation is found between all points within the 
dimension.   
 So while something of this idea could be incorporated, it is unclear how exactly this 
should be applied and whether, for instance, we should take an average of the available 
independent paths if they differ for the elements in a given region, or simply take the highest 
dimension manifested (or physically possible) in that space.  However, it does seem that the 
interconnectivity of those independent pathways can be an important indicator of dimension 
even with our simplistic accounts.  Where two pathways intersect, the freedom of movement 
cannot be maintained unless that intersection becomes a higher-dimensional crossover, that 
is, at least a 3-dimensional space.  
   
Figure 5.  Crossing pathways in 2 and 3 dimensions 
 If this approach holds through higher dimensions then the more pathways to 
‘intersect’, the more dimensions are needed to account for the degrees of freedom.  Certainly 
our expectations for interconnectivity will be a concept to flesh out, but if it is to be an 
essential component, presumably it should at least capture the idea of dimensional 
accumulation, as each higher dimension partakes of all the connectivity of the lower ones as 
well as adding its own links to the ‘nodes’ of each lower dimension.  For instance, we can 
think of each point on a line mapping onto another set of points perpendicular to the original 
line to form a plane, as well as having each point on the mapped plane (including that one-
dimensional line) map onto another point-set perpendicular to the plane and forming a cube.  
The cube will thus allow for connections between the nodes of the line and plane and all its 
own additional nodes, exponentially increasing the connectivity of the space.  This approach 
does not seem contradictory to our other working definitions of dimension (e.g. as an 
extension in a certain direction), but it is still a long way from giving a precise account of its 
terms.  This attempt is necessarily cursory, however, and may improve upon a better 
understanding of how we use dimensions, which I will now survey. 
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CHAPTER 11: Ways we Use Dimensions  
 
Perhaps because of our fuzzy conception of ‘dimension’ we employ the term to do a lot of 
work, invoking dimensions to help explain separation, transmission, the general way our 
universe is, geometrical analysis, informational organisation and property attribution.  This is 
an impressive list that should catch any metaphysician’s eye, and although I will here only 
give an overview of some of the term’s uses, the richness should be clear.  First, 
dimensionality offers a means of keeping things separate or in contact; second, dimensions 
are crucial in attempted constructions of a unified fundamental physical theory whereby the 
forces and perhaps their particles are reduced to the same laws and substance; third, 
dimensions are common mathematical and geometrical devices; finally, dimensions are used 
to order and transmit information.  
11.1 Contact and Separation 
 
One of the more important motivations for discussing dimensionality has been to account for 
our own observed tri-dimensional world, although more recent decades have seen the 
motivation switch to account for the possibility of inhabiting higher-dimensional worlds.  
Regardless of the particular number one settles on, the dimensionality of a space is seen to 
offer an explanation for various observations, such as our conception of causation as 
spatiotemporally contiguous.  Nerlich supports this explanatory role, arguing that “we say 
that space has three dimensions because only that choice lets us describe the world so that the 
action is always by contact (or causal transmission)” (Nerlich, 1994, p.192).  There are other 
assumptions built into Nerlich’s claim, since presumably we could still describe the world so 
that action is through contact even in five dimensions—and he certainly offers no proof that 
this could not be the case.  Overlooking, for the moment, the rationale for this statement (part 
of the concern, of course, is that our understanding of dimensions is so poor we do not know 
which way the explanation goes), we do find ‘dimension’ accounting for physical 
phenomena, whether it is action-through-contact or the stability of planetary orbits
 
(Barrow, 
p.338).  In the same capacity that dimensions can account for contact, however, they can also 
be a means of separation, and in this respect seem intimately tied to a fundamental role of 
space in general. 
 Dimensions offer us a nearly magical means of controlling how and if entities 
interact, allowing us a plurality of closed-off or very close worlds in otherwise 
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undistinguished space.  In particular, “extra dimensions introduce a way to separate particles” 
(Randall, p.335).  Following this approach, Nerlich suggests that “just as orientability is 
displayed in a difference between left and right hands, dimensional features are displayed in 
action by contact – or better, by the kind of physical thing that can be a boundary” (Nerlich, 
p.152).  This last qualification is fairly mysterious, and Nerlich does not elaborate, but we 
might try to interpret it as noting the way dimensions ‘cut off’ certain interactions between 
certain objects and act as boundaries.  Suppose I put two 2D creatures 50 centimetres apart on 
a plane, and further that I hold another 2D creature 3 centimetres above one of the other 
creatures.   
 
   
Figure 6. 2D creatures ‘stuck’ to a plane and one held above. 
Although the distance between the held-creature and the one below it is much less than the 
distance between the creatures on the plane, there may be no means of leaving the plane for a 
higher dimension (perhaps a restrictive law of motion for 2D beings), which makes the more-
distant (all space considered) 2D creature closer in terms of accessibility to the other plane-
bound 2D creature than the one I hold.  Dimensional pathways create conduits as much as 
barriers.  This remarkable property of separation allows dimensions to shape the connective 
paths between the nodes, or elements, of a space, preventing some objects from having 
certain types of interactions and locations.  I say this with a seeming bias toward space 
bearing the property of dimensionality, but of course it may be the objects themselves that 
attain the dimensionality, and thus directly determine the type of interactions allowed 
amongst themselves (space may additionally be seen as either dimensionless or infinitely 
dimensional).  One can adopt either assumption about the source of dimensionality, and allow 
that the nodes of dimensional connectivity and separation may be objects as much as 
spacetime points/regions.  In either case, dimensionality can offer a further set of rules 
governing the interactions of objects. 
11.2 Unification and the Universe 
 
One of the most exciting uses of dimensions, and dimensional structure is the possibility of 
unifying seemingly disparate properties and fundamental forces, as well as offering more 
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exotic options for higher dimensional ‘directions’ that can more cohesively explain physical 
law.  The ideological benefits of such explanatory unification (and presumably predictive 
success) seem far more tantalizing to many than the acquiring of a greater dimensional 
ontology is burdensome.  For instance, in extending Kaluza’s theory, Oscar Klein suggested 
that “macroscopic objects are confined to four-dimensional space-time, but elementary 
particles have what physicists call a higher degree of freedom: we can think of particles as 
capable of moving around this fifth coordinate in either direction.  If they go around one way, 
they are positively charged; if they go the other way, they are negatively charged” (Gardner, 
p.236).  Of course, taking this analogy to a lower level is difficult because we do not appear 
to move in higher dimensions but remain always in ‘three-space’, and we can not know if our 
moving up or down would produce a charge-like property to a two-dimensional observer.   
 The supposition remains, however, that dimensions may reveal the array of 
fundamental properties to be much more limited and unified, manifesting in a diverse number 
of ways only when viewed from restricted dimensional perspectives.  This ought to raise 
further concerns for questions of intrinsicality in a variety of ways including whether we are 
justified—by our own analysis—in regarding three-dimensional ‘position’ as an extrinsic 
feature, when a ten or eleven-dimensional framework might recast that ‘position’ as some 
sort of, say, ‘intrinsic spin’.  Intrinsicality in a unified higher-dimensional account might then 
have to adopt relatively complex property descriptions that allow for such symmetry 
translations as fermions to bosons.  Alternatively, we may feel no more compelled to make 
our property ascriptions cover such a range and may choose instead to carve our reality up 
along a different set of objects, but in either case dimensions seem to figure in the analysis. 
11.3 Geometrical and physical tool 
 
The mathematical use and understanding of dimensions often drives the account given them 
by other disciplines, even when those representations are ill-fitted to the new material.  But it 
is partially this relative simplicity and abstraction in mathematics that makes dimensions so 
useful and encourages us to use them in innovative and fruitful ways.  For some, dimensions 
are something of a possible worlds testing ground for theories, a means of exploring 
‘intrinsic’ geometric or topological properties whereby “to truly understand a concept in 
geometry, such as curvature or distance, we need to understand it in all possible 
dimensions…the point being that if a rule or law of nature works in a space of any dimension, 
it’s more powerful, and seemingly more fundamental, than a statement that only applies in a 
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particular setting” (Yau, p.4).  Even though we cannot be sure how laws of nature behave in 
extended dimensions and are left with Callender’s concern about biased principles of 
primacy, the pairing of dimensionality with geometry is an important tool; geometry has long 
been privileged as the best way of understanding and representing the relations of objects and 
space, and as such provides the most pertinent accounts of dimensions for our purposes.   
The dimensional analysis of physics has adapted the geometrical concept to its more 
abstract spaces and new coordinates, which physicist Jonathan Graves sees as entirely 
separate from the geometric account.  He thus distinguishes two senses of dimension where 
“the first sense of dimension (dimension1) is a purely geometrical one…This is the sense used 
when we say that space has three dimensions, that space-time has four dimensions, or that a 
surface has two.  Here all the dimensions are assumed to be similar in kind, and perfectly 
commensurate with each other” (Graves, p.198).  The second sense of dimension 
(dimension2), such as the dimension of a physical magnitude, is more like a type “of 
dimension in the first sense…In distinguishing these dimensions2, we assume explicitly that 
they are qualitatively different and incommensurable.  We cannot add quantities with 
different dimensions and expect a meaningful result” (Graves, p.200).   
By dimensions2 Graves means the qualities used in physics’ dimensional analysis and 
which can be seen as the successors of Descartes’ account.  For instance, among the most 
common basic dimensions are properties like mass, length and time, each of which offers an 
independent variable used to fundamentally describe the most basic constituents of matter. 
The above dimensions2 may combine, say, in the form M
α
L
β
T
γ
 , which can then be used to 
define other measurements like momentum M
1
L
1
T
-1
 or the gravitational constant, M
-1
L
3
T
-2
.  
Dimensions2, then, refer to “the most general and irreducible distinctions in the descriptive 
framework provided by the model” (Graves, p.201), whatever model is employed.  This 
system of dimensions reflects the success of Newtonian mechanics that put such values at its 
core, but they need not be essential to the conceptual framework and can be replaced by more 
nuanced ‘dimensions’ (e.g. ‘spin’). 
From this much abbreviated overview of the traditional and working definitions of 
dimension, we not only find two different senses of the word—as a geometrical term or as 
that used in dimensional analysis—we also find a fairly superficial notion of how either sense 
applies to reality.  I will focus on the geometrical (dimension1) sense because it seems to best 
describe our apparent three-dimensional world and touch on something fundamental in our 
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metaphysical view.  But the lack of a formalised rigorous account of dimensionality means 
that there remains a large gap in understanding the concept in physically real terms.  Indeed, 
there are reasons to suppose dimensions to be merely bookkeeping devices, instruments to 
help our understanding of the universe.  Even those that see dimensions as more than 
organisational tools still speak of them in terms of pieces of information or mathematical 
models, rather than in terms of physical entities.  Classifying in terms of information is a 
popular approach, however, and importantly allies with dimensionality. 
11.4 Ordering information 
 
For instrumentalists and realists alike, one of the central functions (if not the function) of 
dimensionality is as an organiser of certain types of information, and in this “a dimension is 
more than a collection of points: it is a way of organizing things according to whether they 
are nearby or far apart” (Randall, p.315).  This distinction is important, since it is very much 
about how things are related rather than how many things there are
86
, and this association 
goes back to the 19
th
 century that saw a boom in the mathematical exploration of dimensions, 
which similarly became increasingly involved with the idea of information; “Cayley, 
Riemann and others developed the systematic study of N-dimensional geometry although the 
notion of dimension they employed was entirely intuitive. It sufficed for them to regard 
dimension as the number of independent pieces of information required for a unique 
specification of a point in some coordinate system” (Barrow, p.337).   
Such required information has come to include non-geometrical features, or rather, we 
have come to see the geometry of higher-dimensional space in terms of non-geometric 
features (at least in our observable world).  The quantum uncertainty of pinning down an 
object (or point of that object) in space has shown physicists that position can depend upon 
other values like momentum, encouraging a broader understanding of information than a 
Euclidean coordinate system implies.  This widening of the kind of information admissible 
for the specification of dimension might make the association of the two concepts seem like a 
platitude; the organisation of information could be said to account for most things.  
Information remains, however, the most common descriptor of dimensionality.  From 
Eddington we learn that “on any surface it requires two independent numbers or ‘coordinates’ 
                                                          
86
 As noted by Eddington: “An aggregate of a large number of things has in itself no particular number of 
dimensions.  In order to define the number of dimensions we have to postulate some ordering relation.  This 
relation appears to be the interval” (Eddington p.186). 
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to specify the position of a point.  For this reason a surface, whether flat or curved, is called a 
two dimensional space” (emphasis mine, Eddington, p.77).  This same principle extends to 
non-spatial dimensionality as well, such that we specify events with “four pieces of 
information: three in space and one in time…in this sense, time is another dimension” 
(Greene, 1999, p.49-50).  Although important to our working conception of dimensionality, 
the physical information required to locate an object is not intuitively obvious when we look 
at higher dimensional spaces, and this seems to encourage physicists to investigate more 
abstract mathematical information. 
Mathematicians have embraced the expanding notion of information not by 
examining physical phenomena but by giving every term in their calculations a dimension of 
its own.  Dispensing with the maximised geometrical efficiency of orthogonal coordinates, 
mathematicians commonly take each direction of movement by an object as its own abstract 
dimension.  Thus, “in describing all the ways that one thousand atoms can be arranged in a 
molecule …we need to give three thousand numbers, which we can think of as the 
coordinates of a three-thousand-dimensional landscape” (Susskind, p.275).  There are more 
abstract ‘symmetry dimensions’ that follow the same pattern, whereby the number of relevant 
particles (say, that communicate the studied force) corresponds to the number of (symmetry) 
dimensions.  For instance, “E8 is a 248-dimensional symmetry group that can be thought of, 
in turn, as a gauge field with 248 components (much as a vector pointing in some arbitrary 
direction in three dimensions has 3 components – described as the x, y and z components)” 
(Yau, p.206).  
The mathematical approach does seem to capture the idea of a degree of freedom, but 
it challenges our traditional conception of dimensions as pervasive spatial structures.  For 
mathematicians, a point in 4-dimensional space may simply be the set of data consisting of 
four variables: x, y, z, t.  In this abstract 4-space one can extend the properties of 
mathematical objects in lower dimensions and determine, say, which edges connect which 
vertices in 4-D regular polyhedra, even if one cannot be confident about the structure of 
physical objects undergoing analogous changes.  Indeed, the mathematical equivalence 
between a group of 248 objects and a 248-dimensional space does not seem to obviously 
carry over to the physical world, and while we may wonder which view is correct, if either, 
we may also wonder how some qualities are in any way commensurate—how dimensional 
coordinates in one framework are unique objects in another framework.   
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The preference extends beyond abstract Euclidean geometry, however, with physicists 
choosing to interpret ‘fundamental’ values and quantum states “in a geometrical way – the 
states of a system corresponding to directions in space (a space of many possible 
dimensions), and their distinguishability depending on whether those directions are 
perpendicular” (Gleick, 2011, p.365).  But is this interpretation misleading?  Consider James 
Bond.  Bond is an entity who has greater clearance than me; he is able to access areas I am 
forbidden from entering, and can travel from point A to point B (say, Rome to Rio) faster 
than I can travel it.  Does this mean Bond is a higher dimensional entity than me?  To give 
him this distinction is getting at some difference in the world, but what kind of difference?  
All objects like me may have to follow these restricted rules and behaviour, and all objects 
like James Bond may have to follow that behaviour, and is that all we mean by dimension?  It 
seems much more likely that we will give it more fundamental weight if there is either 1) a 
physical substance of space that is contoured to force these different behaviours or 2) enough 
elements to warrant dubbing this relation a ‘law’.  One might argue that the infamous agent 
James Bond operates on a sufficiently different level than I do—with higher clearance and 
permission to access typically forbidden ‘domains’—that he merits the introduction of a 
structural distinction—a dimension—to explain his behaviour.  Then again, this may be only 
a matter of intuitions in need of a much more stringent definition. 
Mathematicians certainly paved the way for dimensional acceptance, and such 
information on position in a geometric model perhaps once seemed among the more objective 
attributions an object could have—colour or sharpness or teleological worth all seem too 
anthropocentric and changeable to be considered.  But relative notions of position, 
uncertainty over the interpretation of values and concerns about what kind of coordinates in 
what kind of space can be used as objective data on geometric position have complicated 
matters.  Particularly, Riemann’s association of dimensionality with the number of 
coordinates needed to locate an object (or characterise a position) in space “was undermined 
by the nineteenth century discovery that a single continuous line could completely fill (and 
hence be used to coordinatize) a two-dimensional square” (Dainton, p.353).   
This demonstration by Georg Cantor that the line’s set of points and the plane’s set of 
points are equinumerous may have encouraged the subsequent description of a dimension in 
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terms of ‘degrees of freedom’,87 which happens to fit the ‘information paradigm’ quite well.  
The abstract flexibility of information (coupled with dimensionality’s vague definition) poses 
acute problems for physicists, however, who may find themselves agreeing with Randall’s 
sentiment that “duality still makes me wonder what the word ‘dimensions’ really means.  We 
know that the number of dimensions should be the number of quantities you need to specify 
the location of an object.  But are we always sure we know which quantities to count?” 
(Randall, p.450). 
Any number of mathematical dimensions can be entertained, but their relevance to 
physical reality typically rests on the fundamental constants of Planck, Gravity or the speed 
of light.  These parameters can be used in higher dimensional analysis “to change the 
physical units of material quantities to lengths, enabling them to be given a geometrical 
description” (Wesson, p.14).  For instance, one might interpret mass and charge as extra 
dimensions of space—as an ‘extension’ of the same sort as length and height.  But as Graves 
notes, this is problematic, since “bodies already have characteristic geometrical lengths, 
describing their size and shape…what then is the orientation (or direction) of these new 
dynamical lengths with respect to the old ones of width, depth, etc.?” (Graves, p.206).   
Such collusion would need a new system that can integrate the perceptual geometric 
structure with the dynamic parameters, which may be “trying to fit them into one space when 
there are really two” (Graves, p.206).  This uncertainty about what sort of things can count as 
dimensional variables is fairly acute, such that including the property of ‘momentum’ could 
be seen as trying to put too many parameters (mass and velocity) into one space.  It is also 
unclear what implications, if any, these extra dimensions would have for spacetime itself (e.g. 
does it offer a new degree of freedom at every point?).  Taking such talk to be only a 
convenience, however, an instrumental device for prediction, say, would remove the 
ontological concerns, giving us another framework to make sense of information, but even 
then we need some sort of direction to pick out the relevant variables.  
The values that appear to merit their own dimensions are fundamentals of physics like 
charge, momentum (which thereby takes mass and velocity into account), time and perhaps 
spin.  We seem to apply this approach to other cases where we invoke dimensions, accepting 
that the fundamental variables alter according to the desired scale and sphere of interest: 
                                                          
87
 For instance, taking ‘place’ to mean roughly a set of points, Benjamin Pierce is cited as offering several 
definitions including “the Freedom, or Number of degrees of freedom of a place, subject to certain conditions is 
the number of independent singly continuous motions of which it or its parts are susceptible” (Dipert, p.64). 
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Each point of our ordinary space can be topologically characterized by three, but not 
less than three, real numbers, e.g., its Cartesian or spherical coordinates….Similarly, 
each color sensation of a normal eye can be topologically characterized by three, but 
not less than three, real numbers, viz., the quantities of three standard colors whose 
mixture produces an identical sensation. Hence, the totality of color sensations of a 
normal eye is 3-dimensional while the corresponding totalities for a partially or totally 
color blind eye are but 2- and 1-dimensional, respectively. In the same way, a totality 
of all mixtures of four ingredients which cannot be obtained by mixing less than four 
of them is called four-dimensional.  In fact, in this direction lies our only elementary 
analytical approach to…higher-dimensional spaces (Menger, p.2-3).   
Part of the question, then, is deciding what information best uniquely describes an object.  By 
analogy, dimensions are characterized by the values sufficient to go from a book’s index to 
the desired quote.  Despite colloquialisms to the contrary, complex, dependent qualities like 
colour are not considered in physics, presumably because it applies to aggregates (and not, 
say, an electron) and is not as efficient at geometrically locating an object.  Even though the 
geometric approach fails to specify which values we need to take into account to locate an 
object in a higher-dimensional space—and this uncertainty should concern us—we are still 
committed to the idea that the organisation of information specifies and perhaps demands a 
certain dimensionality.   
11.4.1 Information transmission 
 
One of the most important interactions that dimensions play a role in governing is the 
transmission of information, both broadly construed in terms of matter and actions as pieces 
of data and narrowly construed in the sense of signalling and communication.  Under the 
broader conception, one of the chief uses for higher dimensions is as an information store, a 
place to hold data, such that very energetic particles with complex behaviours can be given 
enough ‘space’ to move about.  For example, it was argued early in the 20th century that 
Schrodinger’s theory required an additional band of frequency, “as phenomena of 
incoherence cannot occur in strictly monochromatic oscillatory phenomena.  We thus see a 
definite reason for introducing a fifth dimension, to give room for this band” (Weiner and 
Struik, p.264).  In this way, one can see the needs of independent information (space for a 
band of frequency) driving the more extensive dimensional ontology.  
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 The information content of a system is bound up with many other concepts, including 
dimensions and is another description for entropy, such that when the entropy content rises so 
too does the information required to describe the system.  Determining what type of 
information is relevant (momentum, geometry, size, charge?) and which types are 
independent spectra from the rest, then, importantly relates to the number of dimensions, and 
is very much a key issue.  Not only does the connective structure given by dimensions store 
information, but the limits on information transmission are thought to be set by dimensions as 
well.  In this respect dimensionality may allow or prohibit the development of many complex 
and precise constructions.  For instance, following others John Barrow argues that  
it is impossible to transmit sharply defined signals in two dimensions, for example, by 
waves on a liquid surface. Now it is known that the transmission of wave impulses in 
a reverberation-free fashion is impossible in spaces with an even number of 
dimensions (Hadamard 1923). The favourable odd dimensional cases are said to obey 
Huygen’s Principle (Courant & Hilbert 1962). This situation has led many to suppose 
that life could only exist in an odd dimensional world because living organisms 
require high fidelity information transmission at a neurological or mechanical level
 
(Barrow, p.341). 
The mathematical expectations and interpretations of dimensions weigh heavily in this 
analysis, nonetheless, it is another significant way in which dimensions are thought to shape 
our world by requiring certain connectivity structures for certain processes, particularly for 
the transmission of high definition information as we know it.   
 Perhaps a more immediate example can be seen in an attempt to describe our world 
from an ignorant 2-dimensional scientist’s perspective, using, say, the surface of the earth as 
the plane in question.  Like physicists working in higher dimensions such an endeavour may 
be able to arrive at a complex mathematical method for capturing most, if not all, of the 
information we find significant now, but it will necessarily involve unfamiliar 
characterisation. For instance, there will be times when foot-shaped movements are recorded 
with some disturbing the plane more than others, perhaps engendering a 2-dimensional 
concept of mass.  The information stored in our ‘footprints’ will thus be circumscribed and 
perhaps yield significantly different structures and causal accounts than in our 3-dimensional 
approach.  Rules that govern the movement or even type of energy—and thus information 
and signals—will have a drastic effect on the kinds and complexity of structures and 
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processes permitted in a given world.  But all of this, of course, rests on whether we adopt a 
realist or instrumentalist account of dimensions, as examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 12: The Status of Dimensions 
 
Despite claims that it is a bad question to ask, in my view, one of the most interesting 
questions attendant to the rise of dimensionality is one that revolves around whether we are to 
take a realist or instrumentalist approach.  This, along with a look at whether spatial structure 
is the bearer, or objects themselves are the bearers, of ‘dimensional properties’ will be raised, 
with modest aims of clearing the field to open discussion.   
12.1 Instrumental  
 
Dimensions may be, like the mathematical number line, simply an instrument, a way we 
make sense of the world, without having any physically real presence.  They may be just a 
useful name for a grouping of phenomena, much as our biological taxonomy designates a 
class of organisms as ‘oysters’ that nonetheless do not feature in our best physics.  This is in 
contrast to other theories that claim physical dimensions do feature in our best physics, 
perhaps even as a structural component, and that they help determine other basic properties.  
Part of the confusion is that our mathematical formalism does not guarantee or dictate 
ontology, and it is often its mathematical uses—and flexibility—that obscure a clear 
ontological interpretation, leading to underdetermination in our theories (as discussed).   
 Because so much hangs on which of these definitions we adopt, we should make an 
effort to choose, or at least to give an account of how we would choose.  Thus, part of our 
enquiry concerns the extent to which dimensions provide a model for reality or a basic 
structural component of that reality.  The reasons for endorsing only the former might include 
dimensionality’s vague definition discussed earlier, as well as the lack of empirical support, 
the suspicion that questions on the nature of dimensionality are misguided, and the often 
endorsed possibility that ‘dimension-talk’ only arose for general utility in scientific practice, 
particularly as concerns mathematical tractability. 
The vague definition of ‘dimension’ in some ways supports the instrumentalist stance 
as it can be taken as an indication that there is no physical entity there to guide the 
construction of a definition (it is much more difficult to confirm something exists if you do 
not know what exactly you are confirming), but it is not the only or even the strongest 
argument for such an approach.  It does not seem too outlandish to chalk up the customary 
division of our world into three spatial dimensions to a mere instrumentalist tool just as we 
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might divide the world into ‘animal’, ‘mineral’, ‘vegetable’, or the cardinal directions.  
Dispensing with any fundamental slicing of ‘directions’ couples nicely with the present lack 
of empirical verification of higher-dimensional structures to our space, while the challenge of 
even constructing experiments that might be able to confirm them leaves ample room for 
scepticism.   
For instance, one current model (and there are many) posits the existence of six 
rolled-up dimensions at every ‘point’ in our observable 4-dimensional spacetime, but “every 
attempt to move an object in the direction of one of the compactified dimensions will see it 
revert to its original position after about 10
-40
cm; and since this path is unimaginably short, 
we do not know whether our object has moved at all” (Genz, p.259).  That dimensions could 
be so elusive and exotic certainly raises questions about their nature, how they interact with 
matter, and what it is that is getting compactified, but it also gives us reasonable cause to 
suspect that we are using dimensionality to account for a variety of phenomena that rest on 
some other physical foundation. 
Many are quick to call the enterprise of determining the ontological significance of 
dimensions confused from the start—a bad question—and it is a criticism levied at more 
theoretical entities than just dimensions.  For instance, if asking about the physical reality of 
twistors in Roger Penrose’s twistor theory, one might be told that “this is a vague question, 
like asking whether a planet’s elliptical orbit is real…It is best not to worry about such 
metaphysical questions, but to think of twistor theory as a new mathematical technique…” 
(Gardner, p.255).  This seems a fine position to adopt if one is a mathematician, but 
altogether disingenuous if one is a physicist, and the analogy could certainly be drawn with 
queries on the ontological status of dimensions.   
Presumably such thinking is partly behind the relative lack of work done on 
dimensions, but even if one doubts that a comprehensive realist account can or should be 
given, they ought to be concerned, I argue, with whether they are treated consistently in 
scientific discourse, particularly because it has implications for the attribution of properties, 
ontological dependence and the way we construct our best physics.  Just as we have found it 
fruitful to determine whether the ether, the Higgs field, or Pluto is physically real, I think we 
have good cause to determine both what we mean by dimensions and, if it is then appropriate, 
whether they are physically real.  I thus wholly reject the idea that such pursuits are born of a 
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‘bad question’ and would expect those that argue dimensions to be bookkeeping devices to 
offer a better rationale. 
In one of the few focused accounts on this subject, Paul Wesson reviews ways in 
which dimensional treatment in the sciences favours an instrumental interpretation.  Noting 
the flexibility of the term, he argues that dimensions are “subjective but essential concepts 
which provide a kind of book-keeping device” (Wesson, p.2).  In observing the adaptability 
of the concept to fit uses from data organisation to object separation to providing new ways to 
move, Wesson argues that dimensionality gives a standardised mathematical (and particularly 
geometrical) way of sorting all the information and integrating it into the rest of the scientific 
enterprise in general, and into the interactions of basic properties in particular.  In this, 
dimensions have become crucial to the scientific paradigms of many physicists; even if they 
are fabricated, they are “inventions whose geometrical usefulness for physics involves a well-
judged use of the fundamental constants” (Wesson, p.4).   
Although most scientists do not seem to dwell on, in print at least, the ontological 
status of dimensions there are occasional admissions that dimensions are interpreted only 
instrumentally, following Wesson’s analysis.  For instance, Christopher Ray states that “when 
we think of multi-dimensional worlds, we regard dimension, not as a ‘physical property’, but 
as a ‘degree of freedom’, or as a ‘variable’ needed to describe a topological manifold” (Ray, 
p.82).  Interpreting ‘dimension’ in non-physical terms and as a variable may put one in mind 
of the variables used in calculating the many-dimensional spaces of ‘the economic market’ or 
‘the climate’, where the coordinates exist only in an abstract space and where the geometrical 
account of our three spatial dimensions no longer holds. 
What physicists wish to do with the data (i.e. which property values they wish to 
calculate for certain phenomena), say, if they want to compute the rest mass of a macroscopic 
object or the quantum rest mass of a microscopic object, determines the dimensional scale 
used, which can mean that non-geometrical properties in one model of dimensions can be 
viewed geometrically, and thus more tractably, in a higher dimensional model.  For instance, 
Wesson argues that non electro-magnetic “‘charges’ associated with particle physics…should 
be geometrized and then treated as coordinates in the matching N-dimensional manifold” 
(Wesson, p.11).  The same approach to mathematical simplification is found in Randall, 
particularly as concerns strongly-interacting theories, which “are almost always impossible to 
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interpret without an alternate, weakly interacting description…Only…[such a] theory has a 
simple enough formulation to use for computation” (Randall, p.450).   
As may apply to scientific realism in general, few would like ‘mathematical 
tractability to humans’ to count as a reason for the universe to possess the number of 
dimensions it does, and so one should be cautious in separating any obvious uses of 
dimensionality for instrumental reasons from its uses in physical description.  In the latter 
case, it makes sense to further specify what those higher-dimensional coordinates mean in 
physical terms.  Wesson endorses this approach, arguing, for instance, that “we should have a 
physical identification of the extra coordinates, in order to understand the implications of 
their associated dimensions.  In 5D, we have seen that the extra coordinate can profitably be 
related to rest mass” (Wesson, p.25).  Although some theories have singled out non-
geometrical (at least given our 3-dimensinoal conception) properties, much more analysis on 
why those properties have their own dimension and how exactly they work needs to be done. 
 The scientific focus on prediction also lends itself to instrumental interpretations of 
utility and convenience, and it can be very difficult to separate the instrumental components 
of a theory from the ontological claims when the subject matter is so far removed from 
observation and experience.  For example, Hans Reichenbach described the 
interchangeability of different dimensional descriptions, taking the state of a static gas as an 
example, which can be described as n molecules in three-dimensional space or as one point in 
‘parameter’ space with 3n dimensions.  Likewise a diatomic gas molecule has 6 degrees of 
freedom even though the centre of mass for the entire molecule accounts for 3 degrees of 
freedom.  Nerlich rejects  this purported equivalence, arguing that “it is only mathematically 
(in a rather abstract way too) that the pictures are alike…the example does not begin to get 
off the ground as providing two ‘competing’ descriptions with a common core of basic 
factual ideas” (Nerlich, p.152).   
 But this is not obvious and physicists themselves may suffer from this confusion, 
easily altering their talk on dimensions for convenience or in the pursuit of some larger 
unifying scheme.  Concepts are easily rearranged, and dimensions as “degrees of freedom 
may be removed by imposing initial conditions on the geometry, physical conditions on the 
matter, or conditions on a boundary” (Wesson, p.23).  From geometrodynamics to more 
recent suggestions for simplifying descriptions, there have been suggestions supporting the 
merging of qualities used in dimensional analysis with the geometric qualities of traditional 
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spatial language that might dictate an instrumental approach, but this move should not go 
unanalysed.  There is room for both agnostics who do not think it matters whether dimensions 
are real (undoubtedly some mathematicians and physicists fall into this group), and those who 
think it does matter.  For those that favour dimensional realism, there are additional theories 
to choose from concerning the possession of dimensional properties. 
12.2 Dimensionality as a property of spacetime 
 
Dimensionality is largely seen not as a property of objects but as a property of space, which is 
perhaps unsurprising given a scientific tradition dominated by implicit substantivalism.  In 
this light, most seem to take dimensions as a discoverable property of space rather than as 
simply an instrument to reveal interesting relations between objects.  At least in lower 
dimensions, many of the mathematical properties of particular dimensional spaces allow one 
to determine the nature of that space entirely from within its confines (assuming one can 
carry out the necessary measurements).  Such geometrical properties “are not simply features 
of the way we have chosen to embed the surface in the surrounding space; they are intrinsic 
to the surface itself” (Davies p.102).  For example, on the 2D surface of a sphere, the angles 
of a large triangle do not equal 180
0
; and in a spherical 3D space, the surface area is found to 
be, in general, smaller than the Euclidean requirement of a 4πr2 proportionality to its radius 
(Davies p.102).  Taking dimensions as real also certainly fits nicely into our descriptive story 
of causality and the more familiar space we inhabit, and gives space a structural component 
with which to engage matter (as we describe it doing in general relativity for example). 
Under this assumption we find that the properties an object has can depend upon the 
space in which it is embedded, making such properties extrinsic according to traditional 
accounts.  For instance, whether an object can be enantiomorphic or homomorphic seems to 
depend on the structure of space, or at the very least on the relation of other objects
88
.  
Properties like being enantiomorphic
89
 lie toward the periphery of our significant 
metaphysical debates, however, prompting few to explore the impact of dimensionality.  But 
this complacency is shifting, partly because physicists have become much more eager to 
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 For instance, Nerlich argues that “whether a hand or a knee is enantiomorphic or homomorphic depends on 
the nature of the space it is in.  In particular, it depends on the dimensionality or the orientability, but in any case 
on some aspect of the overall connectedness or topology of the space” (Nerlich, p.37).  Sklar agrees, but does 
not think that anything “in the dependence of congruity and incongruity on global facts about space, refutes the 
relationist approach to the metaphysics of space” (Sklar, p.234).  Certainly the relationalist has recourse to laws 
as being a limiting element to permitted movements instead of dimensions (Dainton, p.230). 
89
 This may be generalized as: “an asymmetrical n-dimensional object is enantiomorphic in a space of n 
dimensions, but not in a space of n + 1 dimensions” (Dainton, p.229). 
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embrace higher-dimensional theories and partly because we are uncertain of the constraints 
and nomic interactions of dimensionality.  More physicists are exploring the possibility that 
very basic, even ‘intrinsic’ or essential object properties are a product of dimensional 
structure.  Under some current models, an object’s mass is determined by its dimensions 
while a highly energetic object’s momentum depends on the inhabited dimensions’ size and 
shape (Randall, p.354).  A by-product of theses approaches (it certainly was not the reason 
for forming them) is the new role they give space; beyond acting as a container for things to 
exist and constraining their motions and relations, space now “directly controls the properties 
that material things possess and can possess” (Dainton, p.330).  Even if these models turn out 
to be incorrect, they usefully bring to the fore the weaknesses and problems in our 
expectations and accounts of dimensionality. 
Part of the effort thus far has been to understand how the mathematic and geometric 
models physically manifest and what higher-dimensional geometries mean in lower-
dimensional spaces.  For instance, theorists in this field commonly think that “the relationship 
between mass and momentum imposed by special relativity tells us that extra-dimensional 
momentum would be seen in the four-dimensional world as mass” (Randall, p.353).  We are 
generally quite biased (and understandably so) toward a three-dimensional conception of 
position, which is a quality that is generally not considered intrinsic.  If we were to examine 
position at a higher dimension, however, we might discover that many of the characteristics 
we are traditionally inclined to view as intrinsic (mass, charge etc.) appear as no more than a 
coordinate of position in a more complex space.  According to one model, one of the 
“consequences of warped geometry is that size, mass and even time depend on position along 
the fifth dimension” (Randall, p.387).   
If position in two or three dimensions does not count as an intrinsic property, why 
should position along a fourth or fifth dimension count?  Seriously addressing the 
implications of our dimensional theories has the potential to radically alter many 
metaphysical debates, particularly but not only if higher-dimensional theories are 
experimentally verified.  If such higher-dimensional “geometry determines fundamental 
physical attributes like particle masses and charges that we observe in the usual three large 
space dimensions of common experience” (Greene, Elegant Universe, p.206), then there 
seems reason to believe that viewable 3-dimensional geometry would similarly determine 
lower-dimensional attributes and give us a better understanding of them. 
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We need not look only at higher dimensional models, however, as this concern for 
dimensionally-dependent properties can be seen in current dimensional morphing techniques 
as well.  In the thin epitaxial layers of semi-conducting films, electrons can be confined to a 
width of 50   from which “the world looks distinctly two-dimensional.  And indeed new 
properties emerge as a consequence.  If an electron finds itself…confined to the carbon chain 
of a polymer, the world is now one-dimensional, and even stranger properties, such as 
superconductivity may emerge” (Ridley, p.46).  Of course, such confinement is not strictly 
engaging two or one dimensions—the electron still inhabits a 3-dimensional world—but the 
approximation’s change in behaviour can be telling.  It is from such accounts that we make 
predictions of the way dimensionality alters properties.  For example, “if a wave or particle is 
confined to a tiny, tiny space, where its position is thus highly constrained, it will have 
tremendous momentum and a correspondingly high mass.  Conversely, if the extra 
dimensions are large, the wave or particle will have more room to move in and 
correspondingly less momentum, and will therefore be lighter” (Yau, p.284).   
It seems reasonable to suppose that the behavioural effects of any objects traversing 
independent pathways (different dimensions) will become altered relative to lower or higher 
spatial regions and could give rise to seemingly disparate perceived phenomena that manifest 
according to, say, our rules for ‘momentum’, even if they follows our rules for ‘position’ in 
higher dimensional terms.  These sorts of analogies do not produce uniform confidence, let 
alone guidance, however, and Callender’s caution about assuming the priority of constraints 
is well taken, particularly if we consider space to be topologically inhomogeneous.  It is not 
too difficult to suppose that the universe might have inhomogeneous dimensionality, for 
instance, with at least apparent differences in the numbers of dimensions for different regions 
of space (Randall, p.444).  Further, there may be singular regions of varying dimensionality 
that “appear as the limit of regions of increasingly sharp curvatures, like horns or cusps, or as 
sudden ‘holes’ in an otherwise relatively flat manifold; they may affect all geometrical 
quantities, or only some of them’ and they may have devastating effects on some physical 
process, but none at all on others” (Graves, p.228).  Some balance of caution and 
hypothesising (particularly as concerns what laws or structures take priority) needs to be 
made explicit in any good physical theory to avoid assumptions getting smuggled in the back 
door or simply by ignoring dimensional implications. 
Bearing in mind that frameworks like string theory hypothesise unproven entities and 
relations, we should nonetheless be able to locate telling areas of uncertainty in our handling 
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of dimensionality.  Perhaps we do not know exactly how dimensions shape properties, but it 
“appears that the dimensionality of the world plays a key part in determining the form of the 
laws of physics and in fashioning the roles played by the constants of Nature” (Barrow, 
p.337).  Lacking the specific ways that dimensions shape properties, we might still be able to 
review some of the structural elements—like connectivity—that seem central to our 
understanding of the concept as well as exploring other attributions for dimensionality itself.  
For instance we might investigate whether our ‘degrees of freedom and independent 
pathways’ picture of dimensions gives us any notion of primacy for either the pathways or 
the objects.  Additionally we might explore the possibility that the number of dimensions is 
no more absolute than time, or the ‘right’ perspective.  In this, dimensionality might be a 
matter of how one cuts the ‘hyperplanes’ of spacetime—a suggestion that, again, will need 
more mathematical exploration to give it weight. 
The philosophical interest in this area has generally revolved around the relationalist/ 
substantivalist debate, and although we should be cautious of adopting those arguments 
directly into this framework, reviewing analyses like Nerlich’s on pathwise space could help 
inform and situate the discussion.  For instance, he might be interpreted as giving the objects 
(or nodes) priority over the pathways: “I do claim that in all possible worlds, as we ordinarily 
envisage them in philosophy, there always is a path between two objects that do not touch 
each other” (Nerlich, p.42).  Elsewhere such nodes include spacetime regions, but in any case 
it is these pathways that make up the space; “a space is just the union of pathwise connected 
regions (Nerlich, p.44).   
Making sense of the primacy of pathways or their nodes/ objects in our theories and 
expectations could clarify our view on dimensions and their attribution.  For instance, low 
energy processes in higher dimensions will not always be able to take advantage of the extra-
dimensional pathways for movement, and thus may lack any distinguishing feature of the 
higher dimensional qualities of momentum or structure (Randall, p.355).  This raises the 
possibility that dimensionality might not be simply a property of spacetime, but that it might 
in some way depend on the object and its other properties, for instance, its energy; after all, it 
was in response to a need for localising enough energy and independent movement that string 
theorists first posited higher dimensions
90
.   
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 This move follows the basic assumption that more dimensions means more possible directions of motion, that 
is, “more dimensions means more vibrational patterns” (Greene, p.370) are possible. 
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12.3 Dimensionality as a property of objects 
 
It may be that objects, and not space, bear the property of dimensionality, a possibility that 
would appeal to both the dispositional essentialist and the relationalist (though the 
substantivalist could account for it as well).  Mathematical treatment of objects gives a ready 
model to this theory, whereby the number of dimensions is seen to rise with the number of 
objects; with more objects haphazardly moving through space “the complexity of the system 
goes up, as does the dimensionality” (Yau, p.4).  The relationalist could try to account for 
dimensionality restrictions (e.g. incongruent counterparts, should they exist) by having the 
objects restricted to certain ‘planes’ of action by law or some as yet unknown aspect of the 
object.   
 A substantivalist could also accommodate objects bearing dimensional properties, 
whereby space—if a real substance—might a) be totally without such structure in this way, b) 
be infinitely dimensional, such that it alone cannot account for the restrictions on interaction/ 
movement for objects of varying dimensions, or c) have some dimensional structure with 
which certain fundamental entities may be able to engage.  This latter option might mean that 
space derivatively acquires the dimension of whatever object currently inhabits it, or it might 
mean that objects and space in some other way collaborate to give the dimensional structure 
suggested by some theories.  While these options do not exhaust the possibilities, it would be 
interesting to see if any mathematical formulism could support them, as well as more 
developed philosophical implications.  
 As mentioned, for the non-substantivalist a different story is likely to be told about 
dimensionality, attributing it to the objects themselves or to some governing law, which is not 
likely to be any easy mathematical feat, but the option is at least currently open.  Bede 
Rundle, for instance, takes space to have a subservient role to objects: 
Not only is space dependent on matter for its existence, but others of its features may 
also flow from its dependence…Possession of [three-dimensionality] by objects is 
straightforward, but if we delineate a three-dimensional structure by tracing out 
appropriate lines between bodies, does this show that space itself has three 
dimensions?  It tells us something about the dimensionality of objects which might 
occupy space, but by way of saying what ‘Space is three-dimensional’ means.  Would 
space have more individuality if it were not true that any two objects in space were in 
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the same space, if somehow there were no path from space s1 to space s2?  But the 
spaces in question would still have to be identified in terms of the objects in them. It 
would be a matter of there being no way of linking up objects in the spaces which 
each identified (Rundle, p.218). 
Beyond such intuitions, perhaps the strongest argument in favour of such a view is again 
parsimony; it is ontologically simpler to just carry on giving attributes to objects rather than 
hypothesising some vast and structurally complex thing (dimension) that modifies those 
attributes.  Whether objects can bear certain relations to each other, take on certain extensions 
and shapes, or interact with other objects in certain ways may all simply depend upon the 
nature or disposition of the object itself.  Given that objects and their behaviour seem to be 
the best and perhaps only guide to our understanding the entity called ‘space’, we only get a 
clue about different dimensions when some object exhibits certain behaviour.  Simply 
embedding a lower dimensional object in a higher dimensional (or no dimensional) space 
need not mean the object can ‘take advantage’ of the new degrees of freedom.  
 A good deal more of the mathematics needs to be explored to really evaluate this 
possibility, however, as does a plausible enough mechanism to delimit the interactions of 
certain species of object.  It may be that, like superstring theory, an explanation can be found 
in the manifestation of energy from fundamental entities whereby the permitted (for whatever 
reason) or most efficient vibrations need such-and-such number of non-overlapping (perhaps 
orthogonal) wavebands in which to move.  For example, to get a jump rope to undulate 500 
times per second, it might not be enough to produce waves in the ‘up-down’ direction 
requiring further ‘side-to-side’ undulations to dissipate the energy.   
 Our failure to detect higher dimensions raises the likelihood that if they do exist, they 
are very very small and spatially constituted.  But it might be possible to translate this idea of 
‘ubiquitous minute dimensions’ to ‘multidimensional movement in certain contexts’ such that 
entities might still move in higher dimensions wherever they need to (thus accounting for the 
ubiquitous aspect) and for only certain kinds of entities or interactions (thus accounting for 
both the minute dimensions and our inability to observe them).  If such a physical theory 
cannot be formulated, then we have good reason to embrace space as the dimensional 
property bearer, and—if higher dimensions are proven to exist—we may have further reasons 
to adopt a realist stance towards space (which does not in itself force a dualistic or monistic 
substantivalism upon us). 
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 The many interconnecting elements that will need to be parsed out in order to 
understand the assumptions, nuances and implications of dimensionality and dimensions are 
not easy to pull apart in a linear way, and no doubt advances in one area will demand a 
retuning of other areas.  But such an interconnected and somewhat messy affair is in keeping 
with the more integrated and interdependent approach I have adopted in general, and will 
hopefully not be a detractor to initiating the enterprise.  Undeniably, dimensions give a 
powerful tool with which to divide and explain the universe, but it is important to know 
whether that is all they do, in the same way that determining whether the ether was merely a 
tool was important.   
 For spatial realists (substantivalists and supersubstantivalists included), dimensions 
will presumably afford tempting structures that critically organise information and perhaps 
collaborate in the formation of properties and laws.  Substantivalists are also free to attribute 
dimensionality to objects rather than space—nothing in their theory prevents them from 
doing so—though I imagine it will make the most sense (as so many discussions of 
‘handedness’ demonstrate) to assign dimensionality to space first and foremost.  For the 
staunch relationalist,on the other hand, dimensions may be loose talk that a deeper 
understanding of laws or matter could reshape into some palatable aspect of the object-rich 
world we inhabit.  More moderate relationalists—who accept space but as a non-fundamental 
substance—or dense relationalists who may use talk of ‘space’ to signify particular fields—
could also entertain the notion of dimensionality arising not simply through individual 
objects; dimensions could be a property of an emergent or field-constituted space.  In any 
case, the exploration of dimensions and dimensionality offers a significant metaphysical 
landscape, as well as a study in mathematical interpretation that, I argue, is overdue for 
analysis. 
12.4 Future Programme 
 
I have reviewed some of the most significant issues for ‘space’, including concerns that it 
does not guarantee separation, suggestions for distinguishing real from abstract space, and a 
look at its possible dimensional structure.  My primary goal in the last three chapters was to 
convince the reader that dimensionality is a rich metaphysical concept in need of study.  
Simply joining the physicists in searching for the magic number of dimensions misses all the 
foundational work that lets us know what we are talking about.  Suppose I tell you that 
“Boggles are everywhere—they are key to the structure of the universe!  Sometimes 7 
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Boggles creates the same world as 16 Boggles, but it can depend on other issues like 
Troggles”.  Assuming you care to make sense of what I said, you will enquire after these 
curious Boggles and usefully fit them alongside or under other relevant and important 
categories of understanding that best explain their behaviour and roles.  If this is an obvious 
response then it is all the more puzzling that philosophers have been so slow to address it in 
terms of dimensionality.    
 Perhaps the main reason for this reticence is a belief that such pursuits are properly in 
the physicist’s purview rather than in the philosopher’s.  I think there is a need for both; 
physicists are often in the business of interpreting mathematical formulae and models into 
physical phenomena, tying a collection of symbols to the relevant proportions expressed in 
events of a certain type (i.e. I can determine the momentum of an object from collecting the 
proportionally related variables of mass and velocity).  But physicists do not always get it 
right; they can fall prey to confirmation bias; or they can become so far-removed from 
familiar phenomena that they have no clear conception of the physical manifestation of some 
mathematical terms or whether every term has such a manifestation (and is not simply an 
instrumental modifier).  Indeed, there is a concern that once we move beyond a certain 
familiarity with the phenomena we study, we will always be lost in connecting them to our 
concepts of understanding.  As Bohr aptly noted: “however far the phenomena transcend the 
scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in 
classical terms…observations must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable 
application of the terminology of classical physics” (Bohr, p.209).  This is a real concern that 
we may not always work our way around, but there are other cases—like those of 
dimensions—that are not yet proven to be beyond our grasp. 
 Philosophers can be useful in such cases, clarifying the commitments, pointing out 
weaknesses and helping to develop structures for analysis.  This activity may also be of use to 
philosophers in other disciplines.  For instance, in discussions that grapple with mind-body 
dualism, the nature of ‘emergence’ or even the analysis of dimensional semantics, we can 
review the reasons why some properties/aspects/qualities are seen as independent variables.  
There is always an underlying framework that adopts certain assumptions that in turn helps to 
distinguish what counts as independent (e.g. our 3-dimensional assumption that position is 
extrinsic).  These frameworks, in addition to many of their precepts, should be reviewed to 
better determine their appropriateness in light of modern physics.   
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 Future work in this area should include at least the following.  1) It will be important 
to sort out what our expectations are for dimensions as well as exploring the mathematical 
formalism behind those theories; 2) following that foundation, or perhaps concurrently, we 
need to develop what is required for a clear realist framework; 3) we need to scout out the 
possibilities for dimensional property bearers (whether dimensions can be or are possessed by 
objects as well as by space) and dimensions as an organising principle (that can explain 
interactions and informational ordering—presumably in a geometrically accessible model); 4) 
Callender’s concern with primacy will also be important to address—ideally through 
experiment—so that there is an established method for adopting certain laws or behaviours as 
more fundamental than others when examining different dimensional models.   
 Further, 5) we should better elucidate the implications and nature of the types of 
equivalences encountered.  This will likely make us re-examine ‘properties’, or ‘values’, as 
having the same underlying cause with different manifestations from different perspectives.  
In this it may not be that different from what was once seen as electricity under one 
interaction and magnetism under another, and which is now seen as electromagnetism.  
Similarly, it may be that there is no fact of the matter about the number of dimensions, in 
much the same way that there is no preferred reference frame, no privileged way to slice 
spacetime.  As should be clear, there is a good deal of work to do concerning dimensionality, 
particularly as regards our current physical theories.  The strangely minimal engagement of 
philosophers and even physicists with the exact nature, expectations for, and interpretation of 
‘dimension’ does both disciplines a disservice as the concept is surely a worthy topic that 
goes to the heart of the metaphysical programme.   
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Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that we should both re-evaluate the presence of classical 
ontological models in metaphysics and readily engage science with philosophy.  The 
particular union of physics and metaphysics discussed offers reasons for overturning the 
classical notion of an object, exploring a singular fundamental ontology, and for addressing 
the puzzles of physical space and dimension.  In Part I, I criticised the pre-theoretical, 
‘classical’, concept of an object, describing the context and central definition of an intrinsic 
property as a property that does not depend (even partly) on anything else.  I then outlined 
attendant philosophical concerns such as the circularity of duplication, the irreconcilability of 
intuitions, and the assumption that hypothetical situations more accurately reveal the object in 
itself than in situ.   
 I reviewed physical examples that point to both interdependent and indeterminate 
properties and boundaries, looking at difficulties of classification in terms of reference 
frames, virtual particles and the pervasive dependence of properties in modern physical 
models.  Traditional intrinsic properties like mass are, I argued, extrinsic by definition—
further, I found the extrinsic grounding of mass indicative of a larger failure of intrinsic 
properties, making the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction lose its utility.  I then explored some of 
the ways we might deal with the issue, ultimately rejecting the distinction in favour of finding 
models that could do more work. 
 In Part II, I continued exploring the classical conception of an object and its 
interaction with its environment, this time largely in terms of the substantival model.  It was 
put in context with its main rivals relationalism and supersubstantivalism, both of which were 
lauded for their parsimonious unification though I focused on the latter (SS).  I argued that 
there are many benefits of SS, though they are not, I think, as overwhelming as (Schaffer 
2009) makes them out to be.  Returning to substantivalism, although noting that the central 
complaint against it is generally the ‘hole argument’, I was more interested here in 
substantivalism’s other baggage and whether it was the best model for various challenging 
physical phenomena.  To this end, I argued that the substantival model raises more questions 
than answers when it comes to describing space in terms of fields, expansion, emergence, or 
when empty.  I also explored substantivalism’s problematic ‘occupation relation’ as well as 
persisting concerns with the reification of points in some substantival models.  I found the 
interaction between dual substances as mysterious as it was in the Cartesian model and 
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argued for developing monistic ontologies; while supersubstantivalism is susceptible to the 
geometrisation concerns of substantivalism, there is certainly room for other singular 
ontological theories, dense relationalist or otherwise that should be explored. 
 In Part III, I searched for a clearer idea of what space is, using phenomena like 
entanglement, tunnelling and the double slit experiment to reveal the non-separability of 
space; i.e. that spatial separation does not guarantee causal separation.  I also explored what 
we mean by real physical space in epistemic and constitutive terms, that is, as an integral 
means of experiencing the world and as a host to certain fundamental properties.  In this, I 
surveyed several seemingly abstract spaces of physics and suggested that some of the loosely 
defined criteria we use to distinguish real physical space needs to be tightened.  I also 
explored what we are to make of one of the most common spatial characteristics: dimensions.   
 Because there is so little literature on this subject, my aim here was to raise 
awareness, scouting out the main issues, characteristics and themes.  I first canvassed some of 
the confusion expressed by those who work most intimately with dimensions, and sketched 
some of the main components of possible definitions.  I reviewed some of the terms’ more 
significant uses and looked at the main implications of taking a realist or instrumentalist 
stance towards dimensions, including whether they are properties of objects rather than space.  
Much more work by philosophers and physicists needs to be done before conclusions can be 
drawn, however, so here I have contented myself with making the case for such an enquiry. 
 There are lots of case studies in this work that point down many tangential, but 
promising, byways—I may have strayed down a few myself—but there are also important 
themes that bind together this research; there are explicit themes of ontological status, of 
classical and modern approaches to metaphysics, and of exotic worlds of matter and space.  
There are also implicit themes of an interdisciplinary methodology that keeps metaphysics 
scientifically up to date.  Allowing myself a brief indulgence: I think there is a critical role for 
reflective analysis in a time when scientists are not only in positions of great influence (which 
is not all that new), but often publicly disparage philosophy.  Indeed, it’s hard to look at these 
disciplines without noting the asymmetric regard that each generally feels towards the other.   
 Philosophy, in general, respects the sciences and welcomes their essential exploration 
of the world, but the admiration is rarely reciprocal.  Scientists have a bad habit of dismissing 
philosophy—and often much of the humanities—as unimportant, but in this they 
fundamentally misunderstand their role and the real need for the reflection, memory and 
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depth the humanities provide.  I do not believe there will ever come a time when we do not 
need to connect scientific phenomena with the rest of our knowledge, and there will never be 
a time when science is done without a philosophy, as Dennett so aptly notes:  
scientists sometimes deceive themselves into thinking that philosophical ideas are 
only, at best, decorations or parasitic commentaries on the hard, objective triumphs of 
science, and that they themselves are immune to the confusions that philosophers 
devote their lives to dissolving.  But there is no such thing as philosophy-free science; 
there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without 
examination (Dennett 1995, p.21).  
To avoid the criticisms of ignorant or unsympathetic scientists, philosophers need to engage 
with modern science, lend their hands to organisation and interpretation of material, point to 
overlooked or new areas of research and, critically, to check the assumptions that scientists 
make in fruitful and informed ways.  I do not mean to collapse metaphysics into philosophy 
of physics or even into philosophy of science more generally.  Rather, I think that there is a 
useful and larger space for examining and integrating the phenomena, categories and 
processes of scientific enquiry with our ways of understanding the world.  Like Bohr’s 
reference to the quantum and classical divide or Kant’s view of the inalienable restrictions 
human perception imposes, we seem unable—in principle—to remove ourselves from the 
pursuit of much objective analysis and explanation.  However, metaphysics offers a powerful 
means of integration that bridges old terms, structures and theories with new ones.  I believe 
my research is very much in this spirit. 
 In partnership with physics, I have sought to dismantle the comfortable and clear 
distinctions between object and the container space, endorsing both a new interactive and 
interdependent model for analysis, as well as a closer dialogue with physics in general.  
These commitments may lead us to abandon old distinctions  (e.g. the intrinsic/ extrinsic 
distinction, substantivalism), embrace new ones (non-separability, supersubstantivalism) and 
open new areas to metaphysical review (dimensions).  There is a very real analogy with 
bridge building here, as philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular, try to stay 
relevant in a changing academic environment: it is far less useful to wait until after all 
bridges are built to analyse them for faults, and better to analyse before or as you go—even 
(and especially) if it is a bridge to nowhere. 
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